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**The Structural Interdependence of the Three Spheres: a libertarian  
analysis of Political Organisation for the process of democratic  
radicalisation**

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Porto Alegre, March 2009.

**The Structural Interdependence of the Three Spheres: a libertarian  
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radicalisation**

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## **DEDICATORY**

I dedicate this work to my family, wife and son, for everything we've been through and are building, and for the joy of bringing João Camilo into the world while I was completing my thesis. I also want to dedicate it to my blood family, mum, aunt, uncle, grandparents and cousin, for everything and forever. Especially to my grandfather, Jorge, who passed away before I saw all this finished. I also dedicate these words to my father-in-law, son-in-law, sister-in-law, brother-in-law, nephew and other relatives, for their tenderness and comfort. I would also like to dedicate these words to the motivators of all this: to all the men and women who have offered their lives, little or much, something or everything, to act on the principle of sowing the winds, reaping the storms and then the collective bonanza.

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Finally, in the verses below, penned by Uruguayan libertarian poet Idea Vilariño, I express my deep and sincere gratitude to those who live through their actions

#### *THE EASTERN*

*The Orientals come from everywhere, with blood and courage, to save their soil; they come from mountains, with spears and sable, from among the hills.*

*They leave the towns, they leave the hill, on every corner they wait for the Orientals.*

*Because they gave up their lives, their friends and their possessions, because the freedom they don't have is dearer to them, because the land and the freedom they do have are foreign, and because people always know how to break their chains.*

*Eran diez, eran veinte, eran cincuenta, eran mil, eran miles, ya no se cuentan.*

*Rebellious and brave, they go marching, the things they most want abandoning them.*

*Like a wind that blows they blow away, like a water that cleans they . Because they*

*gave up their lives...*

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## **SUMMARY**

The thesis formalises the Theory of the Structural Interdependence of the 3 Spheres (political; ideological; economic) by applying its model of analysis to the study of the role of the Finalist Political Organisation and the projection of a political and social process called Democratic Radicalisation. The exposition of this Middle-Range Theory is divided into intrinsic and extrinsic parts, beginning with the articulation of the categories and continuing with the logical argumentation. The ontological dimension of the work is based on anarchist ideological-doctrinal assumptions. The theoretical-epistemological dimension is located in the approximation of structuralism with the centrality of political science, specifically social democracy. The methodological dimension locates the work within strategic analysis studies. The work formulates a theory that supports the concept of building Popular Power. This is the creation of a new institutionality, where the different representations and sections of interest and identity are represented on a distributist societal basis, with full individual and collective rights and guarantees of the freedoms of assembly, expression, demonstration and organisation.

## **ABSTRACT**

The thesis formalises the Theory of Structural Interdependence of the 3 spheres (political, ideological, economic) applying its model of analysis in the study of the role of the Organisation and the final political projection of a social and political process known as Radicalizing the Democracy. The exposure of a Middle Range Theory (empirical theory construction) divides itself into intrinsic and extrinsic parts. The first part provides the essential theoretical statements, and the second one provides the definition of terms and all logical arguments. The ontological dimension of the thesis stands from the doctrinal-ideological anarchists assumptions. The theoretical-epistemological dimension is located in the approach of structuralism with the centrality of political science, in particularly in the social dimension of democracy. The methodological dimension is located in the strategic studies and subsequent analysis. The thesis produces a theory whose instrumentalises the concept of building People's Power. This power creates a new political design, where the different sectors, identities, class fractions and segments is represented in a social equality based society with full rights and guarantees of individual and collective freedoms of assembly, expression, expression and organisation.

## PRESENTATION OF THE THESIS

*The expansive factor of the participatory democracy of the demos in the face of the oligarchic democracy of the elites has a collateral manifestation in the civic-cultural explosion that has historically accompanied its scarce manifestations. This proves that the extraordinary creative capacity embedded in the energies that are released when the people own their destiny without interference or professional representation.*

*(Rafael Cid, 2008, p.36)*

This work has an ancestry that goes far beyond the PhD period, the postgraduate programme in political science at UFRGS and even the relationship with formal education. In this presentation, we will set out the focus of the initial work, the areas that can be developed, the academic links and the possible developments. We believe that this information will make it easier for the reader to understand the text, the context and the intentions behind it.

I begin the thesis by explaining the personal, academic and political trajectory that resulted in this work; I explain the areas and axes of study; I explain the reason for the chapter titles, the bibliography chosen and the combination of methods adopted. With this intention in mind, the thesis focuses on the study of a middle-range theory, in fact its formulation, which, like any major work, is not an act of individual brilliance, but the result a collective debate. The positioning as a Middle-Range Theory is not due to the fact that we test the hypotheses raised throughout the work, but because we prove the two theorems stated in the articulated discourse.

**Theorem 1: The application of strategy makes social conflict possible through popular struggle.** Without finalist political organisation, there is no possibility of strategy

Therefore, there is no strategic planning and no strategic concept. The reverse is also true.

**Theorem 2: Popular struggle builds Democratic Radicalisation and accumulates Popular Power.** Democracy becomes substantive to the extent that it serves as an organisational value in the accumulation and coordination of forces by majorities (Popular Power) and progress in the conquests of rights, redistribution, sovereignty, guarantees and freedoms are achieved through organised social conflict.

It has been a long road to formalise these two theorems, taking the role of the finalist non-electoral political organisation and the anarchist ideology-doctrine as the axis of analysis. It is understood that the study of finalist political parties with internal democracy is a gap in political science, even considering the studies of so-called "revolutionary parties". In general, both within the field and in society, the model of the party of representation, or the intermediary between sectors of society and the formal design of the exercise of power, is naturalised. A party, or political organisation, that acts with social democracy (participatory, substantive, deliberative, with a multiplicity of forms of representation and delegation, radical democracy) as an indispensable value is a way of studying political science that meets the Democratic Theory that is yet to be built. Specific political participation outside the competition of representative democracy is not exclusive to the so-called "social movements" and the development of this study is a gap in political science, however open and broad its spectrum may be. It is part of the intention of the effort presented here to advance the study of this type of political party, which professes an ideology, has a doctrinal basis and bets on the non-institutional arena to build another institutionality as a way of exercising counter-hegemonic power while still under the regime of formal democracy.

As you can see, this thesis has a theoretical background and an ontological link. However, it is precisely not an anarchist work, but a theoretical and epistemological work whose ontological dimension is anarchist one. I have chosen to present this dimension directly as a methodological option. This is because collaborating with the advancement of this school of thought in the academic sphere is also an intention of the work. O

It began in 1970 through the work of Raul Cariboni<sup>1</sup>, an Uruguayan historian and the person responsible for the political formation of the *Federación Anarquista Uruguaya* (FAU). This political organisation, which adhered to anarchist ideology, adopted some of structuralism's theoretical and epistemological presuppositions in its internal formation which, added to the historical ways of doing politics and libertarian mobilisation, resulted in a *modus operandi* and a pioneering theoretical construction in Latin America, materialised in the two documents presented and discussed here: *Huerta Grande* (1970) and *El Copey* (1972).

In these studies, which can be considered empirical or medium-range theoretical material, a political theory of social transformation is presented, based on structuralist analysis, the guiding ideas of politically organised anarchism and taking the mobilised majorities as the protagonists. It also provides the ideological-doctrinal and theoretical-epistemological foundation for the systematic use of force while simultaneously practising democracy as a fundamental value both within the organisation and in the political-social and social environments, as well as setting up a public space for the popular movement where different positions are tolerated in an idea of a *common road*. The concept of structural interdependence, that politics is the synthesis of discursive decision-making and that ideology is transversal to all spheres is condensed in this period.

As this thesis focuses on the object of political science - the exercise of organised power - we won't go into the political history of the FAU, or the political philosophy of anarchism. From now on, the history of the intellectual fabric of the thesis is given. From 1973, the channels through which the thesis passed were twofold. One, within Uruguay, in the study groups organised by FAU militants imprisoned in the Uruguayan political-prison system, especially in the Penal de Libertad. This is where the thought of politically organised anarchism, known in the Southern Cone as *especificismo*<sup>2</sup>, is structured, and studies are deepened.

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<sup>1</sup> It should be understood that when we mention Cariboni, we are actually referring to the whole of the training and political analysis team that worked under his coordination and directly linked to the FAU Secretariat, both in hiding and when it was submerged (1967-1971 and 1971-1973 respectively). See FAU and FAU General Secretariat.

<sup>2</sup> This is the name adopted in the Southern Cone for the format of anarchist political organisation recreated from the 1950s onwards in Uruguay, as a sum of previous experiences, making it more flexible.

This is based on the work of authors such as Foucault, Althusser and Poulantzas. The concept of class, not centred on the category of economic exploitation, is concretised in these studies.

Another stage in building the ancestry of this work also took place with FAU activists who were political prisoners in the Argentinian prison system, especially in the Maximum Security Penitentiary of La Plata, in the province of Buenos Aires. In this prison, the Argentinian autodidact Mauricio Malamud<sup>3</sup> gave training courses bringing together structuralist thinking and the national-popular camp. The development of the categories of discourse, the structure of thought, the importance of language and the question of identity condenses and takes shape during this period.

The direct relationship with some of the political operators who went through these training stages began in December 1994. My contribution to this specific formulation process began in April 1998, in the Cerro neighbourhood of Montevideo and then in the city of Colonia del Sacramento. What is now formalised as a doctoral thesis has its structure based on a series of studies and non-academic training material that I had the opportunity to help formulate, even before entering postgraduate studies in political science. This effort is largely, but not entirely, due to my militant commitment to the Anarchist Federation of Rio Grande do Sul (FAG), a political organisation that is a strategic ally of the FAU.

In this formulation effort, the thesis topic - Political Organisation and its role - has long been the subject of study and experimentation. Structural Interdependence, on the other hand, is the fruit of research that was resumed in 2003, the basic text of which, in non-academic format, was only completed in November 2007, in the neighbouring cities of Santana do Livramento and Rivera, on the Western Border of Rio Grande<sup>4</sup>. Here's the reason for the remote date

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theoretically the modalities of intervention and being a sum of experiences that began in 1868 with the International Alliance. For a definition of specialism, see FAO (2007).

<sup>3</sup> The only electronic record I found of Malamud is at: LA PÁGINA DE TOMAS ABRAHAM. *About the teacher N.E. Perdomo*, electronic electronic found at: <http://74.125.45.132/search?q=cache:Urh9bqnIFJ0J:www.tomasabraham.com.ar/filosofia/perdomo.htm+mauricio+malamud&hl=es&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=ar>; archive consulted on 10 September 2008. This is an oral account from people who worked and studied directly with this self-taught thinker.

<sup>4</sup> This thesis, as it corresponds, is authorial, but collectively inspired. The scientific cumulative process that we have in the academic field takes place in a similar way in the universe of the non-parliamentary left. The difference lies in the rites and formalities, which are different. I waited for the document that has paper

I started my doctorate in March 2004. The original material (see FAU/FAG 2007) serves as an inspiration, direct source and theoretical-epistemological matrix. And, as I have already explained, in the academic field par excellence, the link between history and the discipline of study can be found in the libertarian movement and the rapprochement with the so-called structuralists, still in the fierce Latin American conjuncture of the second half of the 1960s.

As a reading guide, the thesis is divided into:

- the beginning of an epistemological proposal (Chapters 1 and 2);
- a theoretical problem to be solved by developing a medium-range theory (Chapters 3, 4 and 5);
- the reaffirmation of the objectives of the research, in the form of strategic thinking and training for its application, just as the process reaches its conclusion (Chapters 6, 7 and 8 and the geometric representation in the Appendix).

This work opens up a number of avenues for study, such as: new institutional design; political-legal experimentalism; the study of theories and forms of popular mobilisation; collective action promoted by political minorities; defining the meaning of democracy as the exercise of rights, freedoms, distributions and guarantees; the process of accumulating forces through democratic radicalisation; the study of low-intensity conflicts and mass participation; the anarchist ideological dimension.

All of the studies derived from this work are guided by a normative dimension aimed at the exercise of political, religious, cultural, identity, individual and ethnic freedoms in a classless societal structure with a federalist and economically distributist political, legal and administrative organisation. The sentence above summarises the normativity found in the thesis. I affirm this normativity because I agree with Cid's statement (2008, p. 37)

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foundational for the Interdependence of the 3 Spheres because, just as it would be impossible to develop a study on Habermasian theory (for example) without the work of Jürgen Habermas, it would be impracticable to develop a middle-range theory without the foundations of the matrix to which it is affiliated.



*Otherwise, if the people end up being supplanted by the elites and reduced to an epistemological mirror, the political system becomes a reversible 'Russian roulette'. This can also be used to legally move from a situation of dictatorship to one of agreed democracy (such as the Spanish transition from the Moncloa Pact), as well as the reverse path, from the democracy of elitist mirrorisms to totalitarianism.*

# **1. FOUNDATIONS OF THE THEORY OF THE STRUCTURAL INTERDEPENDENCE OF SPHERES: A LIBERTARIAN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF POLITICAL ORGANISATION IN THE PROCESS OF RADICALISATION DEMOCRATIC**

In this chapter, I begin by explaining the method used for theoretical modelling, the formulation of the central question, the research problems, the complementary objectives and the dialogue used to bring together different areas of knowledge that complement each other<sup>5</sup>.

## **1.1. The Method Used**

A structuralist-based format is used here because I believe it to be the most appropriate for a theoretical thesis. The attitude towards the use of the methodology I adopt - and any methodology - shares the following point of view with Dencker & Viá (2001, p. 29):

*The use of methodology should be the result of reflection on scientific activity. In reality, all approaches can be used as long as the method chosen can help solve the research problems. The aim of this reflection is to draw attention to the importance of not turning the method into a 'straitjacket' that imprisons the researcher in a scientific research project. [...] Finding a balance between the tendencies and developing a method that is appropriate to the object of study are the challenges facing the researcher.*

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<sup>5</sup> For didactic purposes, I have made it clear that all the emphasis throughout the text of this thesis is mine.

I believe it is necessary to present a way of putting the theory together, in such a way as to explain its intrinsic part. Here we apply a modelling approach based on the work of Gibbs *apud* Thompson (1976), Baquero (2004 polygraph), Baquero & Prá (2004 polygraph) and Dencker & Viá (2001). We take as a basis a model for building theories, not as a ready-made recipe, a prefabricated container to be filled, but as an acceptable and epistemologically coherent format. Gibbs *apud* Thompson (1976, p.1) points to three forms of theory-building accepted by the academic field.

One is the Formal Theory model, which incorporates equations as pure language, applying sentences in the form of mathematical equations. Another is the Pure Normative Theory model; this is purely discursive, with no concern for its impact on society, on the world of life. It is built on discursive rationality, and the concern for making it effective does not lie with the formulators of the theory, but with those who are going to use it.

Another format, which is the one incorporated here, deals with Middle-Range Theory, or Empirical Theory. This theory has a normative basis and tangibility. The production of this theory is a coherent discourse with measurement and incidence instruments that allow it to be tested, adapted, validated, falsified and consequently adapted. Another characteristic of this modelling is the construction of knowledge, not as representation, but as strategic knowledge.

The exposition format adopted here is that of the two authors mentioned above, which presents a structuralist convention for the construction, presentation and exposition of theories. This construction format is intended to increase the clarity of its components and the efficiency and organisation and presentation of the system of ideas called Theory. This form of construction is based on three principles:

- Logical questioning between the declared components.
- The differentiation between definitions and empirical assertions
- Not all empirical assertions are of the same type

These three principles allow the Theory to be presented in two parts. Firstly, the intrinsic part, equivalent to the metaphor of being the skeleton of the theory. The skeleton uses a logical and coherent articulation of the substantive construction (intrinsic). The other part of the presentation is the extrinsic part. This, due to its format, provides the definition of the terms used in the intrinsic segment and any other aspect, term, partial concept, fragment that is necessary to communicate and justify the theory to the reader.

I have incorporated this format in order to make explicit the intrinsic part of the Theory of the Interdependence of Spheres applied to the analysis of the role of Political Organisation in the process of Democratic Radicalisation. The extrinsic part is therefore the remainder of this first chapter and the following ones, including the concluding chapter, Chapter 8, when we return to the intrinsic part of the theory.

According to Gibbs (*apud* Thompson 1976, p. 2), the substantive part of modelling a Middle Range Theory consists of three terms. These are:

- constructs: terms that are neither completely definable nor empirically applicable
- concepts: terms that are completely definable but not empirically applicable
- benchmarks: terms that empirically designate applicable or operationalisable formulas

The assertions of the intrinsic part serve to relate the noun terms and give a logical order to the language of sentences. These are made up of five types (Baquero 2004, polygraph, p.10):

- (1) axioms: formulations that relate constructs;
- (2) postulates: formulations that relate the constructs as concepts;

- (3) propositions: formulations that relate concepts;
- (4) transformational: formulations that relate concepts to referents;
- (5) theorems: formally derived formulations that relate referentials.

Before going on to explain the intrinsic part, it is necessary to note a caveat regarding the apology of this format. According to Baquero (2004, polygraph, p. 11): "Obviously, this way of constructing theories is not exclusively constituted in a textbook. In fact, the nature of the theory-building process cannot be based on a type of cooking book. What the theory-building format discussed above allows is to improve the clarity and presentation and organisation of a theory. It is in this spirit that the format is utilised in this study."

In order to properly explain the assertions and formulations of this theory, it is necessary to set out its assumptions. The process model for the impact of political organisation proposed in this thesis is adapted to the post-transition Latin American context and based on neoliberal prescriptions. The procedural democracy applied in this scenario necessarily has to isolate and fragment the sense of class unity and disorganise the social fabric that forms collective identities. The political dispute consolidated in these democracies does not involve advancing individual and collective rights for the common good, nor does it empower the population to participate directly in fundamental decisions for the country.

Therefore, in a structural way (it could be hypothesised that the design of non-participation is deliberate), politics is emptied and political and social conflict is replaced by the massification of hidden premises (of an ideological-doctrinal cut) based on the supposed mastery of "technique" originating in "economics". In other words, based on neoliberal hyper-structuralism. Reversing this situation necessarily involves building a theoretical-organisational model that sees the space as a synthesis of politics, that doesn't replace the specific political instance with the organised social subject (the social agent in the form of popular movements) and that takes ideology as its starting point.

as a component of society's structural interdependence. This deliberately not hiding the ontological dimension of the theoretical-political premises.

The multiplicity of organisation and representation of interests, subjects, identities and class sectors is guaranteed through the coordinated collective action of one or more political agents imbued with this objective. By manifesting this objective through social force, this is the manifestation of the process of Democratic Radicalisation. This process takes place through the accumulation of forces within the political and social construct called Popular Power.

### Exposing the Intrinsic Dimension

Axiom I: The non-existence of political organisations with a finalist objective means the abandonment of strategy and, therefore, the one-off victory of the dominant hegemony;

Axiom II: The confusion between ideology, doctrine and theory leads to predictive-analytical incapacity, therefore to the paralysis of proactive policies, to strategic vagueness and, consequently, to the incorporation and admission of hegemonic hidden premises in the dominant context;

Axiom III: Fragmentation of the social fabric lowers the stock of social capital and makes it difficult to forge collective identities, thus hindering the organisation of social subjects and preventing the empowerment of majorities;

Axiom IV: The growing mediatisation of social relations increases and reinforces individualistic behaviour in private life and indifferent behaviour in collective life;

Axiom V: The greater the notion that democratic stability occurs in the form of procedure and not in substantive terms (such as distributive economic policies and an independent and sovereign political economy design), the greater the indifference to the exercise of rights, which leads to greater apathy and scepticism;

Axiom VI: The idea of an unequal balance between classes and a "zero-sum game" leads to the paralysis of the demands process and naturalises social injustice under the procedure of competition between parties;

Axiom VII: Change in political behaviour comes about through an escalation of collective mobilisation, including media and cultural mobilisation, reorganising the social fabric and valuing democracy as plurality within the process of popular struggle.

Postulate 1: The horizon of systematised guiding ideas is the primary delimiter of the depth and type of political action;

Postulate 2: In the current stage of capitalism, the horizon of ideas is mediatised and everyday activities are crossed by Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs);

Postulate 3: The accumulation of social subjects' forces involves the construction of identities and this also happens through social agents motivated by political organisations that have an impact on and from these sectors;

Postulate 4: The impact on organised social subjects must take into account the different levels of intervention, in scale and complexity, within the majorities. In order to address them, it is necessary to have one or more political organisations that adopt this organisational format and act in the process of Democratic Radicalisation;

Postulate 5: The permanent strategy for Democratic Radicalisation involves popular protagonism, forcing the state to be responsive and compatible with the expansion of collective and individual rights and freedoms, taking into account the multiplicity subjects, demands, identities and generalisable issues.

Proposition 1: The analysis and perception of reality can be organised by outlining the structural interdependence of the political, economic and ideological spheres;

Proposition 2: There is no determination of one sphere over the other;

Proposition 3: The ideological sphere structures all the others;

Proposition 4: The political sphere (legal-military) concentrates the synthesis of forms of conflict and decision-making.

Transformational 1: Collective action on the part of majorities is only guaranteed if it is developed within a non-institutional framework; for this to happen, the finality determined in the form of political minority organisation is necessary;

Transformational 2: The exercise of politics in the form of non-institutional collective action forces the state to be responsive, making it more public and, consequently, more democratic;

Transformational 3: Democracy becomes substantive as a set of organised social forces incorporate it as an essential value for social justice.

Theorem 1: **The application of strategy makes social conflict possible through popular struggle.** Without a finalist political organisation, there is no possibility of a permanent strategy, so there is no strategic planning and no strategic concept. The reverse is also true.

Theorem 2: **Popular struggle builds Democratic Radicalisation and accumulates Popular Power.** Democracy becomes substantive to the extent that it serves as an organisational value in the accumulation and coordination of forces by majorities (Popular Power) and progress in the conquests of rights, redistribution, sovereignty, guarantees and freedoms are achieved through organised social conflict.



The whole of the extrinsic part will be demonstrated in the following chapters. We return to theoretical modelling in the conclusions of the work.

## **1.2. The Central Question, the Research Problem and the Secondary Objectives :**

This doctoral thesis in political science states its main objective, among the many to be located within the text. It is through this work to give a theoretical form to the debate, formulation and conclusion of the central question, presented in two topics:

- 1) To formulate a theory that instruments the concept of building Popular Power, creating a new institutionality, where the different representations and sections of interest and identity are represented on a distributist societal basis, with full individual and collective rights and guarantees of the freedoms of assembly, expression, demonstration and organisation.
  
- 2) To formulate an idea of the process of Democratic Radicalisation, where the accumulation of forces for the construction of this form of Power is applied, based on the strategic analysis applied to the central categories pointed out for this objective. Both the accumulation of forces for the creation of power emanating from the majorities and the process that radicalises and makes democracy substantive have, in this work, the role of the Political Organisation as the axis of analysis. This model of political institution has as its end activity the construction of Popular Power and as its middle activity the process of Democratic Radicalisation.

The Central Question is faced with two research problems to be solved. The current problem for any organisation and movement with intentions of rupture is based on an already classic political procedure, applied to contemporary class society. I start from two political and strategic premises, which I take to be valid and which are operationally absolute today. So, in order to return to the central question and achieve the research problem, it is necessary to take these premises as a given of reality and a requirement for any political operator. These are the requirements in the case of the conflict studied in this thesis:

1st - Divide and rule (dominance)

2nd - Concentrating forces for the conflict (a-dominance)

Thus, the research problem to meet the objectives of the central question is to seek the answer to two questions:

- The excessive fragmentation of social subjects, coupled with the agents' inability to unite, can prevent both organised domination and the organisation of resistance against domination?<sup>6</sup>

- What are the forms of collective action and ways of organising collectively to accumulate forces towards a process of rupture?<sup>7</sup>

This antagonism runs through the centre of the work, where we will see the confrontation of intentions and conceptual bases. I'll conclude the presentation of objectives and problematisations by stating that, as a doctoral thesis in political science, there are two other goals, both within the institutional and academic spheres:

- To advance in the study of the current configuration of class society, specifically the idea of oppressed classes, the new poverty, the struggle to expand collective rights and their contemporary forms of organisation in Latin America. Thus, the conclusion of this work formalises a Medium-Range Theory, but with a totalising basis, which serves as a theoretical tool for analysis and finalist incidence in our continent<sup>8</sup>.

- To contribute to the advancement of research and analysis with a Latin American identity and to bring public universities closer to the demands of the region.

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<sup>6</sup> I take as valid both the existence of classes and the fragmentation of the majorities that make up a society divided into classes. This lack of unity, both in terms of identity and the structuring forms of collective life, I will try to affirm and prove throughout this work.

<sup>7</sup> Breaking with the established order can involve several different processes. The term and the depth required will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5.

<sup>8</sup> And by extension it can be generalised to Brazil and Latin America, in mind the theoretical limitations and different realities.

majorities. Specifically in the field of political science, participating in the effort to build a Latin American democratic theory of political thought. This is seen as a great theoretical-epistemological framework in which the matrices of thought that operate and impact on academia from this perspective coexist and contribute to the substantive concepts of democracy, such as participatory, deliberative, substantive, radical, popular, among others.

### 1.3. Strategic Analysis and the Real Game of Politics

I explain the aspiration of epistemological construction within the human sciences, specifically in political science, in order to demonstrate to readers and critics the political and theoretical intentionality of the thesis. This work also aims to bring together two apparently distinct, or at least distant, areas within political science. More precisely, it deals with the debate about the absence of finalist (strategic) objectives as a way of defeating and/or weakening the popular movement and the political organisations within these sectors of the organised class. We start from the premise that an accumulation of forces is only possible when there are containers for this accumulation, in other words, political and social institutions that operate within this logic and with long-term objectives<sup>9</sup>. I believe that in this field, a development of strategic studies, which I began at the end of my undergraduate studies (in social communication, specialising in journalism, UFRJ, 2001), is perfectly applicable, based on a critical - and opposing - reading of Golbery do Couto e Silva and Carl von Clausewitz<sup>10</sup>.

I arrived at this objective and desire through research and work on my monograph and master's thesis, where I approached strategic analysis based on the study of two federal security and intelligence agencies<sup>11</sup>. I realised that I had reached a limit in the strategic study of the state entity, where there was no possibility of the work implying either propositions or in-depth theoretical reflection within these institutions. That's why I decided to change the subject of the study and identify a new target audience, with a different focus for the strategic analysis work.

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<sup>9</sup> We address this specific issue in Chapter 4.

<sup>10</sup> We'll take a closer look at this analysis in Chapter 7.

<sup>11</sup> These are the two current federal agencies. The first work was on the *modus operandi* of the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) and the master's thesis was on the internal disputes of the Federal Police Department, also known as the Federal Police (through its unofficial acronym, PF). Both works can be found in the Bibliography.

A reading of the bibliography, and also by observing the individual trajectories of authors, shows that changing the target audience, the object of study, the destination of the research and the explicitness of the starting position are recurring phenomena within the universe of social sciences in general and political science in particular. What is counter-hegemonic is the position and not the function. Because the construction of this theory requires a stance, a starting point and a viewpoint for the "social scientist". I understand that these positions always exist, the difference is that I choose to make them explicit<sup>12</sup>. I do this not out of preciousness or to make a distinction with the field, but because I identify this need for rigour in approaching the subject.

What I do is theory that starts from reflection and from a non-dilettante position. Therefore, those who do this kind of work position themselves as strategic analysts<sup>13</sup>; formulators and participants, creating hypotheses and operationalising them in reality. From the outset, operating and analysing on one side (several) of the class conflict(s) and projects of homeland, people, land and society.

From a strictly academic point of view, I recognise that the term strategic analyst correlates with symbolic analyst, in line with Brunner and Sunkel's definition of the book (1993, p.11-14).

According to these Chilean researchers, three hallmarks characterise the symbolic analyst. They are:

- identify, solve or arbitrate problems through the manipulation of symbols, for this work they use analytical tools sharpened by experience (my emphasis);
- Usually his income is not linked to the hours he works, but to the results of his analysis products, with an emphasis on their quality, originality, timeliness and intelligence;
- in the professional field, their careers are not linear or necessarily hierarchical, but rather depend on their networks of relationships, ability to work, forms of interaction and teamwork.

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<sup>12</sup> I go into this debate in the first part of Chapter 2

<sup>13</sup> See Silva (Golbery do Couto e) *apud* Lima Rocha (2003, chapter 1).

This profile is contextualised by the allocation of funds for demands that involve knowledge in the humanities and social sciences, and political science in particular, but not necessarily more resources for public universities. The growing demand is for specialised, multi-functional staff<sup>14</sup> with the ability to solve real, concrete problems, usually in the shortest possible time. Topics such as organisational development, strategic planning, system design, training and reorientation of human resources, marketing and publicity, sub-contracting of public functions, evaluation of knowledge and related areas are among the areas for which some kind of consultancy and/or medium and long-term advisory projects can be provided.

The symbolic or strategic analyst also has the necessary mastery of the dominant theories with the greatest gravitational weight in each of the fields in which he or she operates. I recognise this function and in my thesis I seek to explain both this mastery and the ability to use parts of adjacent theories. These come in as complementary areas of study that the Theory of the Structural Interdependence of Spheres, applied to the analysis of the role of Political Organisation in the process of building the process of Democratic Radicalisation (in other words, this thesis), must dialogue with and problematise.

Returning to the characterisation of the symbolic analyst, I recognise this correlation with that of the strategic analyst, I admit all this functionality and on this basis I position myself in conditions and functions within the class societies that exist in Latin America. As I said before, the coldness of analysis also implies prior positioning, which will define whether or not a prediction is correct in advance. This is the form of rationalisation used by Golbery do Couto e Silva (1981a, 1981b) for strategic planning, through a maxim. Here's the assertion:

"The objective subordinates the method, according to the conditionalities."

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<sup>14</sup> It is very interesting to note how the same concept of polyfunctionality was applied by political organisations with intentions of rupture, as we discussed in Chapters 4 and 7. In the definition of "middle management" used in the thesis, the concept of the polyfunctional individual is used.

What we see today as a hegemonic and often unspoken norm is the hidden premise of a single, supposed objective that is universalised by the very power of the so-called "single thought"<sup>15</sup>. I say that this premise is not total and even less absolute. I begin by using the example of the symbolic analyst as very close to the strategic analyst because I understand that this is the job and function of making the immense mass of scientific and academic knowledge tangible so that it can have an impact on reality. It is therefore up to the analyst to go beyond the hidden premise and the apparent and formal rules.

In order to operate in politics, the formulator of analysis and incidence must recognise the wide range of variations that are possible at each juncture, at each moment. And they also have to recognise strategy as it is in the nature of this field of study. That is, as the science of conflict; a dispute between irreconcilable interests; the competitive interaction of opposing agents; with a permanent risk factor; and any realistic analysis must take the conditionalities as given in advance.

In this sense, when the political scientist<sup>16</sup> or professional from related fields only works within hegemonic conditions, as in a simulacrum of developing "unique" knowledge or for whom they provide "consultancy", it will be in this situation that the so-called symbolic analyst can also be considered a service provider. In other, a specialised but highly versatile professional a high degree of strategic *information* (equipped with sources of *inside information*<sup>17</sup>) and the ability to work as part of a team.

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<sup>15</sup> In Chapter 5, we take a sideways approach to criticising single-mindedness and the hidden premise. We present three classics of neoinstitutionalism and see how the premise of these authors is not hidden at all. Their concealment under a supposed polyarchic zero-sum board game is the result of the hegemony of post-war neoliberal and classic neoinstitutional thinking over the deformation of the field of political science. In Chapter 6, we debate and polemicise with the conceptions of state and democracy constrained by the gravitational weight of economic theories, particularly neoliberalism, operating as a pole of force over declared politics and ideology. The problem of the hidden premise is permanent in these approaches. <sup>(16)</sup> I also note the existence and use of the term politologist, used in Castilian and French to designate the political scientist.

<sup>17</sup> For an appropriate concept of *inside information*, see PALAST, Greg. *The best democracy money can buy*. São Paulo, Francis, 2004. The term gets a good definition in Chapter 6: Pat Robertson, General Pinochet, Pepsi-Cola and Antichrist: Investigative Special Reports. A complementary and critical view can be found in Greg Palast's coverage of the meeting of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, at the following website: <http://www.gregpalast.com/imf-and-world-bank-meet-in-washington-greg-palast-reports-for-bbc-televisions-newsnight/> (document consulted on 2 April 2007). An insight into the workings of this type of *inside information* practice in informational and financial capitalism can be found in Greg Palast's testimony for

This analyst, the symbolic one, differs somewhat from the information analysts in intelligence agencies and military organisations. The symbolic analyst would play an intermediary role between an information analyst, a human resources trainer (training, education and retraining) and a classic strategist. We therefore consider these three characteristics to be part of the symbolic analyst's job profile.

The role is not new in Brazil and we have several successful *cases*<sup>18</sup>. We consider it important to explain the role of the symbolic analyst because we see it as a possibility - not an exclusive one - of typifying a highly qualified professional who can work for different markets, both in terms of business logic and specific political logic. I believe that this polyfunctionality brings the figure of the symbolic analyst closer to the role of one of the analysts I have used the most in different professional activities (such as texts, articles, master's dissertations, courses and published books).

This other analyst used throughout the thesis is the Rio Grande do Sul general Golbery do Couto e Silva<sup>(19)</sup>. He, the renowned strategist of the Brazilian Armed Forces (FFAA), is used not because I agree with the destination and end-activity of his analyses and incidences, but because of another virtue. I believe that this gaúcho, a career military man, has applied and operationalised concepts that were at first watertight and abstract into a logical and materialisable system.

Golbery do Couto e Silva (1981a, 1981b) had the ability to execute, in addition to predicting, a factor that I consider essential. Many of his concepts have been surpassed, but they are still valid in the panorama of strategic thinking.

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journalist Alex Jones, the World Bank's secret documents on Argentina. You can find it at: <http://www.gregpalast.com/world-bank-secret-documents-consumes-argentinaalex-jones-interviews-reporter-greg-palast/> (archive accessed on 2 April 2007).

<sup>18</sup> Colleagues in communications with a degree in advertising will forgive the irony, but the language carries the concept and the type of work employed. For a good definition of a *case*, see: FALCÃO, Eduardo; GRANDI, Rodolfo; MARINS, Alexandre (eds.). *Voting is marketing, the rest is politics. Competitive Electoral Strategies*. São Paulo, Loyola, 1992.

<sup>19</sup> The term is often confused. Riograndino is a native of the city of Rio Grande, on the southern coast of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil's southernmost port. Golbery was born in this municipality, which was the first Portuguese capital of the then Captaincy of São Pedro.

<sup>20</sup> See Chapter 7.

working in the organisations that carry it out. I'll go further. If and only the general were more read rather than commented on, basic principles of policy and strategy would not be so ignored. I say that the simple notion of Maximum Programme and Minimum Programme, or Strategic Objective and Tactical Target for the Stage are almost lost in current usage.

An example of the conceptual abandonment of the idea of process can be seen in the fact that the concept of *target* is almost non-existent today in its strategic sense. In Silva (1981a, p.266) we find a quote from Golbery to a text by Arthur Lewis (Principles of Economic Planning), differentiating the goal from the planning activity and the initial balance of the equation of possibilities, available resources, plannable deadlines and the estimated interaction of opposing agents. "The goal is, in fact, what we propose to realise as a result of the action we really intend to undertake." Further on, the definition of "conditionalities" comes when defining estimates. "It is very important to estimate it (the goal) without any illusions as to what is actually possible." I give this example to demonstrate the possibility that the conceptual body of a thesis like this has to expose a political process beyond the generalising and non-substantive notions of the concepts used.

The same is true of Silva's (1981 a, p. 89) criticism of "simplistic" or "reductionist" thinking. According to Golbery, and taking a concept from Mannheim as a contribution, "planned thinking, which is at the basis of the whole doctrine, implies the definitive abandonment of the simplistic concept of linear causality and the recognition of concomitant interaction as the complex and indissoluble element that gives a de facto organicity to dynamic structures in perpetual evolution." I understand that the option to deny any linear causality thought matrix is essential for the ability to predict. Due to the abandonment of the strategic ambitions of social agents and also due to the analytical reduction within polyarchic parameters, we are experiencing a loss of capacities and abilities in hegemonic political science today.

This loss is equivalent to being literate in analysis. What about basic complementary notions such as: accumulation of forces; characterisation of the stage; mere description of the complex scenario; identification of central and secondary agents with their respective strategic and tactical interests; applicable coercions;



manoeuvre, among others. I believe that Golbery used his erudition as fertile ground for influencing society. I'm not discussing the normative nature of this here, but I do recognise his merit as a strategic analyst and I consider his works to be fundamental both for Brazilian political thought (with an emphasis on conservative modernisation and the development of the control society) and for this thesis. We are and I am in opposite positions of origin, just as I am with many of the *advisors* or *consultants* operating in the Central Plateau. But I believe that both offer us good typifications of strategic analysts who are compatible with what can be considered symbolic analysts.

Having affirmed the difference, this doctoral thesis in political science also aims to present minimum parameters that can initiate a dialogue between academic knowledge and its impact on society that actually exists, nourished by intentionality, strategic purpose, analytical coolness and the necessary rigour to operate in the Real Game of Politics (including legal and real, formal and informal norms). In this respect, I am referring directly to the search for a political science produced in and linked to Latin America. An open discipline based on studies of relationships, institutions and their values that process and administer power, as a consistent part of the human and social sciences, incident within its complexity and therefore endowed with the forcefulness of strategic analysis<sup>21</sup>.

The concept of the Real Game of Politics is defined here by me as "a set of formal and informal, legal and illegalised rules and institutions, with explicit and implicit discourses and margins for manoeuvre that go beyond constraint". This concept is similar to Clausewitz's definition (p. 127) when he states that "war is even more like politics [...] politics is the matrix in which war develops". Consequently, this concept of the Real Game and the definition of war as having its origins in politics - and therefore as war being a variable politics and politics of war - requires a theory that doesn't confuse the sentiment of believing in final objectives and the strategy that ensures this finality with the scientific knowledge of the game itself.

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<sup>21</sup> As we realise that this concept of strategic analysis is central to the work, we dedicate the whole of Chapter 7 to this area of study.

We are faced with the very difficulty of defining the nature of what we are calling politics, specifically the Real Game, given that "reality" is not something absolute, but rather the set of constituted existences, whether or not they are perceptible. Clausewitz (p. 108) points out this difficulty and suggests a way out: "In order to recognise clearly the difficulty involved in drawing up a theory of war, in order to be able to deduce from this difficulty the character that the theory must have, one must consider more closely the essential difficulties inherent in the nature of warlike activity."

The Real Game of Politics, due to its lack of pre-defined absolute rules, requires a theory that extracts the dynamic organicity that only exists in a real scenario from the complexity and interactions between opposing and allied agents. To this end, the theoretical training of the political operator is similar to that of a man or woman in a command position in a war scenario. I agree with Golbery's criticism of simplistic thinking and linear causality. No formulism allows for accurate decision-making and no indirect training will allow for a skill load beyond the environment. Clausewitz (p. 114) gives us an example of this theoretical training, agreeing with those who see the importance of knowledge as something tangible and strategically applicable and who do not confuse it with something that, although important, is not scientific. In other words, Clausewitz criticises the formulation of knowledge as representation.

*Theory exists so that people don't need to be constantly putting things in order and mapping out paths, but so that things can be put in order and clarified. It is designed to educate the spirit of the future warlord, in other words, to guide his self-education and not to accompany him on the battlefield, just as a prudent pedagogue guides and facilitates a young person's spiritual development without, however, tying him to himself for rest of his life*

What is not scientific belongs to the universe of belief systems, which, in the view of this study, is inherent to the human condition and interdependent with scientific knowledge. Belief systems take the ideological element as their raw material, which in the case of the nature of war (analogous to politics) is characterised as follows

Clausewitz (p. 109), as the fruit of accumulated experience in a hostile and adverse environment, with real risk: "[...] combat engenders an element of danger in which all the activities of war must maintain and evolve, like a bird in the air or a fish in the water [...] courage is not an effort of intelligence, it is a feeling as well as fear."

#### **1.4. The structuralist matrix, the first steps in defining what science is and the realist approach**

As we saw in the Introduction, this approach to strategic analysis with an analytical position in favour of Democratic Radicalisation and based on the identity and importance of the ideological component, is similar to the conceptual body of "structuralism" that arrived in Latin America in the second half of the 1960s. We will see in this topic the relevance of this matrix of scientific thought for the construction of this thesis.

This approach to "structuralism" gives rise to philosophical and epistemological positions and postulates. The first of these concerns precisely the concept of emergence, of how a human science appears. I agree with Foucault when he states that: "There can be no doubt that each of the human sciences was created on the occasion of a problem, an obstacle of a theoretical or practical nature<sup>22</sup>" (Foucault in Coelho, 1968, p.46). We therefore see the emergence of a science, a discipline, a subdiscipline, a subfield or a new field of knowledge as a problem to be solved and a challenge to be overcome. In the case of this thesis, the challenge is the theoretical solution to the possibility of realising Popular Power as a new form of constituted institutionality.

We know that the "novelty" of this type of approach, or even its rediscovery, will be criticised in all sorts of ways. Nothing that doesn't go hand in hand with good academic debate, as well as the idiosyncrasies of the field. We see the new or "resurrected" phenomenon as something positive in all circumstances.

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<sup>22</sup> This is the Portuguese collection organised by Eduardo Prado Coelho in Lisbon, August 1967. In his Introduction, Coelho gives the interesting subtitle: "Introduction to a cruel thought: structures, structurality and structuralisms." This book provides the necessary framework for understanding the paradigms proposed by this generation of French thinkers and all the necessary rigour to break with the rules of pre-established disciplines in an administrative manner.

At the roots of what we study, being the very area of cumulative knowledge and disciplines known as the "human sciences", they emerge as something distinct and an inaugural phenomenon. According to Foucault (see above, p.46): "the fact that for the first time since human beings have existed and lived in society, man alone or in groups, has become the object of science - this cannot be considered or treated as a phenomenon of opinion: it is an event of the order of knowledge".

This "event of the order of knowledge" approach implies recognising the necessary requirements for a rigorous study (we'll explain them shortly) and at the same time refuting the premises made beforehand. The way we have chosen to do this is by initially declaring the framework of intentions, the desire for incidence and the need to seek out an episteme appropriate to the subject. We will not be debating and proposing a conceptual framework for the accumulation of power and substantive democracy with the hidden premises of "maximising gains and reducing losses", nor with "examples from econometrics". No preconceived idea of a zero-sum game can be distributist and participatory.

The debate outlined here aims to empower the real operators of politics, which we conceptualise as social agents. The thesis aims to bring our vision closer to the realities experienced by the poorest classes in society - whose general definition, according to our characterisation, is oppressed classes - and whose class sectors with the possibility of being organised we conceptualise as social subjects. Here's the assertion:

"Agents (operating at the level of political, political-social or social incidence) organise and influence Subjects. In the absence of these concrete agents and without a really existing subject, there is nothing to organise."

In other words, it is necessary to have a concrete, historically constituted social formation, endowed with identity and a collective sense (even if latent) so that it can be organised to accumulate its own share of power. This is why the thesis necessarily crosses over into the debate on political culture and the composition of the organised social fabric, and to do so, it goes through the concept of social capital.

We repeat that our quest is to formulate a theoretical framework that is operational from the strategic position of the oppressed classes. In this way, we contribute to bringing academia closer to reality, helping to reduce the gap between the centre of knowledge and society, and meeting the "virtuous" circle that is self-referenced by our peers within the university field. This thesis and the effort it is part of aim to make operational concepts accessible, providing capacities for the decision-making process of those who operate politics from within the oppressed classes.

In order to apply this proposal, that of a strategic study based on a new medium-range theory, we need a terrain. We understand that politics cannot be made or analysed outside the real, concrete world. To do this, you need four elements that make up the terrain: concrete societies; a geographical space; a timeline (for inference) and experiences that formulate guiding ideas.

The section itself is where the hypotheses and inferences pointed out throughout the text are applied. That is, the continent of Latin America and specifically the experiences of overcoming neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus. This section is based on the beginning of the experiments - arbitrary, of course, like any section - on two passages in the Latin American political scene in the 1990s. One is the so-called Zapatista uprising that took place in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas on 1 January 1994 (Ornelas 2004). Another remarkable experience was the overthrow of Ecuadorian president Abdala Bucaram Ortiz on 5 February 1997, after only six months in office (Torre, 2005).

The relevance of the Zapatista experience is due to a number of factors (Parra 2002 and Ornellas 2004). One of them is the approach of controlling the territory; another, which can be understood as a cause of this, is the ancestry of the original populations and their relationship with the native land. This occurs at a time when the use of natural resources is seen as a commodity and not as a non-renewable collective heritage. It is also interesting to emphasise that the use of force opened up political space, even leading to a deadlock in traditional politics and making a decisive contribution to bringing down the Priista regime, leading to a conservative renewal in professional politics.

Mexican. Finally, one of the elements that should be highlighted is the non-professionalisation of the majority of political leaders, with a good rate of turnover and common apprenticeships in coordination functions.

The experience of the popular rebellion that overthrew Abdala Bucaram in February 1997 (with only 120 days left in office) is significant because it inaugurated a process that culminated in a series of *puebladas* (Pachano 2005 and Torre 2005) where various forms of struggle and participation were present. Ideological elements, including those of republican motivation, played a major role, in addition to the constitutional vacuum and the constant presence of the social organisation of the original peoples in the form of an indigenous confederation (Confederación Nacionalidades Indígenas de Ecuador) as a vector for these struggles. I therefore realise that the fall of Bucaram is like an inaugural event. This is when the fragmentation of the multiplicity of social subjects represented gives way to a tactical unity (at least) generating a victorious experience. This historic achievement ensures a degree of confidence among the Ecuadorian majorities who were mobilising against the effects of the dollarisation of the economy and the effects of the political behaviour of the ruling elites associated with the presidency and President Bucaram himself. The defeat of President Jamil Mahuad in January 2000 and Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez in April 2005, I believe, are the culmination of the process that began with the rebellion in the summer of 1997.

The fact that I have highlighted these two experiences is not for a case study, but just the opposite, it is to take advantage of what is generalisable and universalising (for the Continent) about these two historical episodes, and which at the moment I have finished writing the thesis (December 2008) retain their vitality. I see these experiences as inaugurating a discourse of popular direct action, direct democracy, horizontal public space and collective decision-making through broad debate.

These political practices go hand in hand with and repudiate government measures, which are necessarily fundamental decisions for the respective countries, and which have not undergone any form of consultation. We understand that in Latin America, its concrete societies have undergone and continue to undergo the activation of two ideas applied to two completely antagonistic discourses. The first is the effects of the deconstruction of the social fabric as a result of the "reforms" of neoliberalism. The second

forms an arbitrary set (of my choosing) of generalising practices that accumulate towards the concept of Popular Power as a way of organising that same fragmented society.

Having considered the terrain (space) and historical period (time) of this thesis, I return to the structuralist matrix that gave rise to the studies that fuelled this work. I go back to the roots of the structuralist school. At this point, I don't go through George Canguilhem (1904-1995) - whose assistant Michel Foucault (1926-1984) was - but through a book that marks the beginning of the affirmation of the idea that the unconscious is irreducible and operates on any formulation of thought. I'm referring to the work whose first original edition in French dates from 1938 and was authored by Gastón Bachelard (1884-1962). For this thesis, the material used is the Spanish-Mexican edition of 1972.

In addition to his refined language, sometimes verging on poetry, Bachelard as a philosopher and epistemologist offers us a wealth of possibilities for criticism and knowledge about the formation of scientific thought. For the purposes of this thesis, the application of a method of rigour and precision is more important than the statement that the "theme or approach is or is not scientific". The endeavour of knowledge demands the existence of the "scientific spirit", which in Bachelard's own words implies:

*We will show the effect of memory on reason. We will emphasise that a scientific spirit cannot prevail until it is sure that, at every moment of its mental life, it has to reconstruct all its knowledge. Only rational axes and bases allow such reconstruction. The rest is just low mnemotechnics. The patience of erudition has nothing to do with scientific patience* (Bachelard, 1972, p. 10).

I agree with this stance and I go further. I see that there is a double discourse. Most of the time, a hegemonic current in a given field claims to be scientific, but refuses to review its own paradigms. The affirmation of scientificity is based on a position of strength and control within a field of knowledge or sub-area. The breadth of vision in political science therefore implies the consideration of

all the analytical scenarios and the explicitness of the premise. There is no "scientific spirit" that can flourish when an idea of optimal equilibrium prevails in theoretical formulation over actually existing political practices. The formulation of ideal types, or rather ideal types, I understand as modelling and not as a "scientific basis".

That's why I see the opposite attitude as positive. Assuming the typification of models as a direct influence of normativity is therefore something intentional. The normativity that generates models serves as a motivating force for research, study, analysis and incidence. It is the same for epistemology as the ideological sphere is for politics. Normativity is necessarily a construction of ideas.

Ideas have irreducibility and a material existence as "concrete" as any physical matter. This applies to the normative idea and the capacity for abstraction for scientific realisation. In the absence of abstraction, anything but the "scientific spirit" prevails. In line with Bachelard: "In all questions, for all phenomena, it is necessary to pass first of all from the image to the geometric form, and then from the geometric form to the abstract form, and resort to the normal psychological path of scientific thought." (Bachelard, 1972, p.10).

I recognise that it is difficult to understand this basis of thought and even more difficult these days, when the hegemony in our field operates within a supposedly pre-conceived and absolute "rationality". Bachelard also states that abstract thinking is not synonymous with "bad scientific awareness", as trivial thinking usually puts it. I understand that the concept occurs abstractly in its original format. This is why abstraction activates and dynamises the scientific spirit (Bachelard, p.8). It is in the abstract state (later and more advanced than the concrete and concrete-abstract states, the classification of states of thought) that the spirit undertakes information voluntarily abstracted from the intuition of real space, voluntarily disconnected from immediate experience (hegemonic and apparently omnipresent) and even polemicising with basic reality, which is always impure and always shapeless (p.11).

It is in the false appearance of "concreteness" that the hegemonic thinking of the moment arvora and attributes "scientificity". I see the normativity as necessary and



Normativity should not replace a phenomenon that really exists, or even worse, simply deny that these phenomena exist. In the absence of "research", the political and social practices that exist in society are seen as "empiricism" when what is actually missing is the abstraction and theoretical modelling that can shape research hypotheses and middle-range theories that support these same experiences. Any illustration outside this framework becomes more normative than the accusation of normativity levelled at the pioneers of experiments and readings of phenomena.

I agree with Bachelard about the type of illustration needed to exercise the "scientific spirit" and I see these bases as being consistent with the political and social thinking needed to resolve the fundamental issues for Latin American democracies and the political and social thinking that must emerge and assert itself as the fruit of the search to resolve these issues. According to the philosopher, illustration must be normative and coherent; it must make the pleasure of spiritual excitement in discovering the truth clearly conscious and active; this is because such fecundity must result in something, because a scientific hypothesis that doesn't raise any contradictions is close to being a useless hypothesis, just as an experiment that doesn't rectify any errors, that is merely "true", that doesn't provoke debate, what good is it? (p.13)

Finally, two conclusions are essential to understanding the definition of scientific experience to which this thesis and its author adhere. The first states that "a scientific experience is therefore an experience that contradicts common experience", and therefore cannot necessarily accept the hegemony of thought as something perennial, but simply circumstantial and the result of the correlation of forces of the moment. The other is the need for reasoned criticism, contrasting one system of ideas with another and against another. In this way, it is impossible for a human science to set up a theory with a presupposition and theoretical and methodological bases that are incompatible with the research objectives, encouraged and motivated by prior normativity. Thus, "the rational critique of experience is in solidarity with the theoretical organisation of experience".

I continue with the roots of this Middle-Range Theory by proposing a methodological definition and bringing up the permanent theme of interdependence, the ideological sphere. The sequence of revisiting the pillars of the so-called structuralist school now presents a synthesis by Louis Althusser (1918-1990) of Jacques Lacan's (1901-1980) fruitful reading of the work of Sigmund Freud (1856-1939). The text, simply called "Freud and Lacan"<sup>23</sup>, was made public in the unconventional form of a "journalistic" article in issues 161 and 162 of the journal *Nouvelle Critique* (December 1964/January 1965).

In this text, considered a classic, Althusser revisits Freud's epistemological foundations, the efforts that a pioneering thought has to make to assert itself and the necessary support that Lacan exerted on the area of knowledge called psychoanalysis. From this material, we are interested in two conceptual blocks. The first affirms the unconscious as unique and irreducible. This is in line with the assertion of this thesis, emphasised in chapter 3, which states that the ideological sphere of human societies is as structuring as the sets of relations and productions called economics and politics (including the legal and military spheres). The second block of ideas that interest us is the very structure of scientific thought presented by Althusser, a structure with which we agree and affiliate.

The French philosopher of Algerian descent begins by affirming the very difficulty of psychoanalysis to rise as knowledge recognised by its peers and defamed by opponents, both in the field of ideas and in the controls of "administrative epistemology". He begins by stating that:

*The fact that it was particularly difficult to escape it is easy to understand, and first of all because of the function of this ideology<sup>24</sup>: since the "dominant" ideas played their role of "domination" magnificently, even imposing themselves against the*

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<sup>23</sup> For bibliographical purposes, see ALTHUSSER, Louis, *Freud and Lacan*. 3rd chapter of the 3rd part (Psychoanalysis) of the book by COELHO, Eduardo Prado, *Estruturalismo, antologia de textos teóricos*, pp. 229-

255. Rio de Janeiro, Martins Fontes, 1968.

<sup>24</sup> Observation by the author of the thesis, Althusser refers to "ideology" as the set of guiding ideas that were dominant on the European and French scene before World War II and that exerted a degree of domination over new knowledge, including in the correlation the very absence of the right to exist. Any resemblance to the colonisation of economics with neoliberal philosophical inspiration over politics and the colonisation of abstraction itself in the form of mathematical models summarised in econometrics, which exerts an enormous gravitational weight over the major lines of economic thought, is no coincidence.

*their will, to the very spirits who wanted to fight them. But we also understand the fall of psychoanalytic revisionism that made this exploitation possible: the fall in ideology began, in fact, with the fall of psychoanalysis into biologism, psychologism and sociologism. (p.230)*

I interpret this so-called "fall into ideology" as giving up one's own paradigm, in the case of psychoanalysis, the paradigm of the unconscious as unique and irreducible, as the exclusive object of its science, and moving into areas of knowledge that were then established, that is, then dominant. The same happens today with the fall of objects in the face of dominant areas, in the defeat of research into the societies that really exist in Latin America in the face of hidden (and sometimes not so hidden) normativity, falsely universal premises (such as objective rationality, methodological individualism and the background as a zero-sum game), the failure to make assumptions explicit (which forces the researcher and theorist to position themselves from the start of the work) and the denial of the ideological motivations of every academic, researcher, analyst or illustrator. The problem, as I see it, is not the premises and their consequences, but the hidden premises and the assumption of a universal thought that is not even open to refutation or falsification. Knowledge as representation, applied in the field of political science in particular, has these characteristics.

Returning to Althusser, he states that in the mid-1960s, the defence of Freud and Lacan in the clashes in France over psychoanalysis and, consequently, the ideological sphere and its irreducibility, implied the following demands:

- 1º) Not only to reject as a gross mystification the ideological layer of their reactionary exploitation<sup>25</sup>;*
- 2) But also to avoid falling into the more subtle misconceptions of psychoanalytic revisionism, maintained by the prestige of some more or less scientific disciplines;*

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<sup>25</sup> A perfectly applicable analogy of "gross mystification" is to look to studies of the unconscious for adaptive bases for the individual an uncritical way in class and structurally unjust societies. The same is true when we debate a political model with "scientific bases" of optimal and sub-optimal functioning, or else in search of "equilibrium" as a universal will.

3°) *And finally to dedicate ourselves to a serious work of historical-theoretical criticism in order to identify and define, within the concepts that Freud had to use, the true epistemological relationship (emphasis in original) that exists between these concepts and the content that they thought about.* (p. 231)

Althusser goes on to say that "without this triple work of "ideological critique (1st and 2nd) and "epistemological elucidation" (3rd), inaugurated in France by Lacan, Freud's discovery will remain, in what is specific, beyond our reach." (p.231).

I believe that these assertions are accurate and valid for the study and criticism of any area of knowledge based on the structure of scientific research. Ideological criticism is a constitutive part of all knowledge in the "applied human and social sciences", and the epistemological relationship is the only way to discover whether or not there is discovery in the new knowledge or hypotheses raised. In the case of Freud and his thought and study structured by Lacan, discovery is revealed by method and rigour, without giving up the object, the unconscious as the raw material for the formation of the sets of representations that make up "ideology"; just as the raw material of politics is the sets of relationships, institutions, representations and operators of de facto and latent powers.

Althusser continues in his didactic efforts and in his defence of the object and science in question, the unconscious and psychoanalysis respectively. We could make analogies with other unique objects and their respective sciences in question, but I remain faithful to the source text, pointing out that: "you will easily understand that such a brief article<sup>26</sup>, which intends to address a problem of such importance, must limit itself to the essential (my emphasis), if it is not to betray its purpose: to situate the object (emphasis in original) of psychoanalysis, to give it a first definition, within the concepts that allow localisation, an indispensable preamble to the elucidation of this object."(p.231).

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<sup>26</sup> And proportionally, a thesis is a short work to give form and academic institutionalisation to a Middle-Range Theory, so I assume the analogy between Althusser's article and the effort of this thesis. The same goes for previous collective debates in this and other historical periods.

I would like to draw a first analogy for the same purpose. The object in question in this thesis is a model of analysis, with ideological origins, a proposal for a method, with political and academic ancestry, located in space and time, through key concepts and whose premises are in the form of assertions. The model of analysis is the Theory of the Structural Interdependence of the 3 Spheres (Ideological-Political-Economic); the method is strategic analysis; the academic ancestry is the old structuralist school, added to this study, which is aligned with other studies of substantive and radical democracies in Latin America and within the field of political science; the political ancestry is anarchist especificismo, practised in the Río de la Plata and currently in the Southern Cone, debating its instrument of political incidence, the Federalist Organisation; the location of space and time is our Subcontinent after the clashes and the fall of the 2nd Washington Consensus; and the basic conceptual map can be found in sub-topic 1.5 of this first chapter.

I understand that making the method explicit is both a virtue and a requirement. At the same time, I see normativity as an inspiration, but it can't operate as a "blind spot" in an attempt to adapt theories to realities. Althusser presents us with a summarised and very didactic framework, with which we agree. He summarises what Freud is for him, which we present below: "1) A practice (the analytic cure). 2) A technique (healing method), which gives way to an abstract, theoretical exposition. 3) A theory, which is related to the practice and the technique. This organic set of practice (1), technique (2) and theory (3) reminds us of the structures of all scientific disciplines."

Following on from the comparison, I present: 1) a practice, implementing strategic analysis on historical-structural matrices and having the interdependence of the three spheres as the hard core of the theory; 2) a technique of analysis, applying different methods, but starting from a descriptive analysis superimposed on the practices of item 1; 3) a theory, the structural interdependence of the three spheres, projected onto the medium range, Latin America after the 2nd Washington Consensus. This is the structure to which we agree, in line with Althusser's assertion that it is common to all scientific disciplines.

Finally, I'll bring up Althusser's analysis of Lacan's reading and advances of Freud's studies. I find it very interesting, not only because of the structure of thought presented, but also because of the understanding of the unconscious as an object. According to the author quoted:

*Lacan recognises that Freud founded a new science because he "discovered" and formalised the existence of a new object, the unconscious. A science, new or not, is a science and therefore obeys the common structures found in all sciences. It has a theory and a technique (method) that allow it to know and transform its object into a specific practice (emphasis in original). As in any authentic science, practice is not the absolute of science, but a theoretically subordinate moment; the moment when theory becomes method (technique) and comes into theoretical (knowledge) or practical (healing) contact with its own object (the unconscious). (p.236)*

We understand that the link with the object itself, in our case, is umbilically linked to the problem we want to answer and the way we try to solve this problem. For the most part, analytical practice (in comparison with Althusser's text, psychoanalytical practice) does not contain the secrets of strategic analysis: it only contains part of its reality, that which exists in practice. It does not contain its theoretical secrets (p.236). I make the comparison because the same happens with analysis, which is often dismissed as "journalistic"<sup>(27)</sup> in the academic sphere, because it is overloaded with descriptive data, which is absolutely necessary. The theoretical secrets told by Althusser are to be found in the decomposition of the concepts used, their historicity and the indelible marks that each stage of thought formation leaves on the researcher's scientific spirit. Certainty, when it comes in a rigorous form, is the fruit of countless doubts, of difficult and cruel formulations of thought. As I defend knowledge as a strategic and substantive application, going far beyond knowledge as a representation, I understand and perceive these marks as intellectual scars.

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<sup>27</sup>I recognise that the subject is controversial and very poorly addressed. The defence of journalism as the foundation of political thought will be done at another time, soon after the presentation of the thesis and, subsequently, its publication in printed and digital book format.

From the definitions outlined above and expressed on the first page of the thesis, I see that it is necessary to go beyond the "classics" of political science that advocate minimalist democracy, the major lines of research based on "rationalist" schools and the basic books written in central countries<sup>28</sup>. I have the restrictive intention of seeking out the most well-founded political science (with an open approach), the humanities<sup>29</sup> and the social sciences, cutting out what I see as applicable models within Latin America<sup>30</sup>, and not ideal types formulated in central capitalist countries.

As a basic element of any theoretical formulation, here I present the concept to which I adhere<sup>31</sup>. We assume the definition that a concept exists as a tool for analysis, as part of the theoretical instrument, and needs to be tested. The concept of the concept is made up of the following elements:

Concept= ideological elements

ways, techniques and technologies of analysing reality

historical experiences (historical-structural matrix)

strategic interests

Of the various categories that the thesis discusses, I focus on and follow the search for four key categories<sup>32</sup> to model an accumulation of forces for democratic radicalisation in contemporary Latin America. The first two refer to

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<sup>28</sup> This applies even to the core areas of work, whose production is much more developed outside Latin America, such as political culture and social capital studies. That's why in these subfields I approach authors from the continent, such as Baquero, whose research problematises precisely the problems that our societies are obliged to solve. We'll see some of his criticisms in the first part of Chapter 2. The recovery of the structuralist school connects with the thesis through the study groups of the 1960s and 1970s in Argentina and Uruguay.

<sup>29</sup> I see the humanities as a large, related area of research and study, with the crossing of disciplines becoming increasingly important. A practical example of this position is in the subfield of the 'political economy of communication, information and culture'; an academic space whose greatest gravitational weight is that of the Latin Union in this field of study (see: Ulepícc, Brazil chapter: [www.ulepicc.org.br](http://www.ulepicc.org.br)).

<sup>30</sup> This is a political choice, but first and foremost a theoretical choice. I believe that CLACSO ([www.clacso.org](http://www.clacso.org)) is a centre of excellence which, in the productions and centres affiliated to this Council, shows and proves that this possibility exists.

<sup>31</sup> This conception of the concept is derived from the document "The Importance of Theory" by the political training team of the Uruguayan Anarchist Federation (FAU), dated 1970 and coordinated by the organisation's political training secretary, history professor Raul Cariboni. We'll look at this document in Chapter 2. For further information: CARIBONI, Raul. *The importance of theory (huerta grande)*. Document found at the following electronic address:

<http://www.estrategiaeanalise.com.br/teoria.php?seltitulo=80701dc83b3474f76f5d16db2f5843f6> (file consulted on 02 February 2008).

<sup>32</sup> We'll look at these in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.

environment/scenario/theatre of operations. The following two are concrete social expressions, and therefore suffer the conditionalities and operate within and on the first two concepts:

Social Fabric  
 Fragmentation  
 Popular  
 Power  
 Finalist Political Organisation

Therefore, in order to construct the thesis and apply the projections of these categories mentioned above with structural interdependence, I also incorporate the assumptions of so-called scientific realism as a form of approach. Within the literature generated in the countries of central capitalism, which we avoid using on a large scale as a reference<sup>33</sup>, a reference work for this approach and epistemological method is that of Ruth Lane (1997). The term scientific realism is a recent understanding of the philosophy of science, which emphasises explanatory models applied to real processes (Lane, viiii). Its adaptation to political science comes with an expanded application of explanatory models, breaking with both pre-established academic loyalties and the defence loyalties of subfields and types of emphasis<sup>34</sup>. The author's argument, with which I agree, states that there is a type of concrete theory (analytical and incidental), recognised in fact, that studies political interactions between real people and develops explanations for the events and phenomena that happen and how they happen.

An example used by Lane (p.116-117) seems to typify what we are doing. According to the author, the method characteristic of a political model works best when carrying out hard analyses. Thus, breaking down systems into parts, explaining the logic of interaction between actors with different objectives and resources, projecting scenarios based on this concrete data and not on ideal types of how these same real actors are supposed to work.

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<sup>33</sup> Except for the so-called structuralist school and tradition, for the reasons already explained.

<sup>34</sup> Just as a result of personal observations, I dare say that the "dispute" between culturalists and institutionalists that is currently taking place in Brazilian political science is part of what I call the loyalty and rivalry between sub-areas. Although I lean towards real processes, and therefore the political culture approach I understand that real politics does not take place outside of some institutionalised framework, whether legal or not, state or private, with economic, religious, military or political objectives.



"should" act, mostly result in greater successes than in knowledge schemes as a form of representation. This is because, in general, the analysis focuses on highly complex political interactions (p.131-132), where the abstract rationality of gaining material resources is in fact subordinated to a wide variety of cognitive characteristics. Thus, they will give and add different values, according to each actor/agent, with the very normalisation of their groups of origin as their axis.

We take the "realist" approach as an identity paradigm (we recognise that we can even be "ultra-realist"), when applying it to the thesis, because we seek to analyse the strategic interactions between different agents sharing one or more overlapping real scenarios. This takes on the meaning and need to build something testable and falsifiable in dialogue with reality and with a Latin American matrix and foundations (frameworks). The intention and will to build this theory is to provide the social agents who organise and/or influence the most disadvantaged class sectors with a usable theoretical tool<sup>35</sup> and a comprehensive explanation that subsidises the inevitable partial actions.

### **1.5. Class structure and the category of domination**

If there is one characteristic that can be criticised in hegemonic political science, it is the fact that it has abandoned the social dimension of democracy. At the same time, we understand that the social dimension does not necessarily replace or condition a political regime or a power-sharing model. Even so, in the absence of society, any analysis becomes excessively normative, even making it impossible to realistically adapt a polyarchic or democratic model. Considering that the work is located within the normative field of democratic radicalisation and the defence of collective interests, we understand that there are conflicts - latent and declared - in Latin American class societies. Since we understand that the category of exploitation cannot be absolute, we need a category of analysis that encompasses exploitation and other forms of domination (López 2001) within the class structure. That's why we chose the category of domination.

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<sup>35</sup> Without any pun intended, we could call these tools "analysis tools".

By pointing to this concept of domination as a tool for analysing the majorities in Latin America, we come to understand the role of exploitation, imperialism and the coordination between fields of knowledge and action. These factors allow and enable domination to predominate over resistance (by the dominated) and sabotage of the mode of production (by those whose labour power is exploited).

Domination, according to Errandonea (1986), begins to be defined from the idea of legitimacy. We understand that there must be a will to obey, a norm that allows the dominated to obey and the dominant to exercise their authority based on something legitimate. Sometimes this legitimacy has no formal legal basis, but is a social norm that predates law.

I realise that domination doesn't necessarily take place through persuasion, but can also be through coercion or a combination of the two. The "naturalisation" of the existence between the dominant and the dominated would grant legitimacy to this de facto situation. If practice over time becomes ideology and gains legitimacy, 500 years is a long enough period to "naturalise" the forms of domination in Latin America.

Domination takes place in the form of a relationship, always bilateral, where there is a minimum of will (custom, incorporated habit, naturalised) between the parties and the sectors. It is a normative relationship, constituting a probability made up of the mutual expectations of: commanding and obeying; exploiting and being exploited; dominating and being dominated; excluding and seeing oneself the margins; repressing and feeling the weight of repression; holding hegemony and confronting forms of resistance.

All these variables (and many others) materialise and shape the content that can be part of the mandates of domination. It's as if even the most cruel and sadistic form of domination of man over man has limits of effectiveness, within the expectations caused by the norms (imposed or subliminal) of this same domination.

Legitimacy is the indispensable requirement for generating the consensus necessary for continuity and for institutionalising the various forms of domination. Consent that generates consensus (Chomsky, apud Mitchell & Schoeffel 2002, p. 359), consent on the basis of ideas permitted by the oppressors, is the necessary basis for the stability of the norms of domination.

The breakdown of consensus mechanisms makes it possible for the dominated to resist and break away, whether these are mechanisms of ideas, pure brute force, or the most common, a complex combination of both forms of domination. The dominant consensus is the basis of oppressive authority, the foundation that is evident at different levels in all sectors of a society whose creative and productive force is dominated by a hegemonic minority.

Errandonea (1986, p. 94 and 95) cites, in an exemplary and generic way, the types of domination systems<sup>36</sup> most commonly found in capitalism. These would be:

1) Exploitation - *this form prevails in societies with a market economy and plays an almost exclusive determining role in capitalism of the type generated in Europe from the 19th century onwards. The existence of other forms of economic domination should not be overlooked.*

2) Physical coercion - *this is certainly the oldest in history, and is present as the last measure of any system of de facto domination. Its greatest limitation is that its effective use is very exhausting. The police-repressive apparatus and modern military organisations are the current manifestation of this form of domination.*

3) Political-bureaucratic - *this is the ability to make decisions that affect the whole of society. It is generally made up of the set of mechanisms that make up government bodies and the political-legal system, together with the instrumentalisation involved in the state apparatus as a whole, thus characterising the political-bureaucratic type of domination.*

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<sup>36</sup> Same as above, pages 94 and 95

The most generalised form of domination in the current stage of capitalism is the class structure. This form manifests itself when the stable probability (consensus through consent) of obtaining continuous obedience becomes institutionalised and operates on productive routines. These routines are based on the exploitation of the labour power and potential of the majorities by the minorities who own the means.

We're not just talking about the means of production, but also the means of violence (physical coercion, police, military, intelligence, para-military, etc.) distribution, circulation of goods (material and symbolic) and decision-making capacities (international and state bodies, instruments for standardising social life, such as the judiciary, among others). This is how the relationship of domination takes place. This continuous institution of domination acts and is constituted over the dominated majority of social classes. The system in which they occur is a class structure.

It is essential to understand that the concept of class is relative to the existence of other classes. The structure of social classes manifests itself in the distribution of what is unequal in this same society. This inequality is not only manifested in the distribution of goods, commodities and material resources. It's obvious that the inequality of material distribution is both quantitative (amount, gross total) and qualitative (net total, added and symbolic value) of means, goods, commodities and currency in various ways.

But class structure manifests itself more broadly in everything that is distributed unequally: we can cite differential access or exposure to the ; in the exercise of political power; in bargaining and the correlation of forces in the defence of interests; in aspirations for prestige and a role in society; in the historical representation of the oppressed classes in capitalism; in physical coercion; in the functioning and "exemption" of the judiciary and the "correction" of deviations in society; in religious significance and its norms of behaviour and conduct in all forms of power disputes and relations in class society.

Although it is not the of this chapter, it is essential to at least point out that class domination is something that manifests itself globally. Simultaneously with the mode of production, a mode of capitalist domination over the world has developed,

perhaps never before as developed as in the current stage of the system. It is not the role of this paper to address the issue of globalisation, although we recognise its importance, especially for understanding the so-called neoliberal single mindset. This would be hegemony based on a foundation of ideas stipulated as a source of argument and reasoning. This form of thought and derived social action is legitimised through the capitalist media and other institutions that elaborate valid discourses that underpin the contemporary form of domination.

I understand that today there is a contemporary structure in which there is a composition of social sectors, social subjects and class fractions that make up, in a positional way, the so-called oppressed classes, auxiliary classes and the ruling class (including the ruling elite fractions). For a minimum definition of this working hypothesis, we are looking for something that exists and works. Thus, we consider that there are some classes (including various class sectors and within these various social subjects) that suffer a set of dominations. The criterion for analysis is therefore not just salary, but where the social subject is situated in the capitalist system, in other words, their social function.

Initially, we propose 3 economic factors to analyse in order to define the Dominant Classes (which is made up of the Bourgeois Class + Ruling Elites: Political Elite, Military Elite and Techno-Legal Elite):

- Capital accumulation
- Accumulation of property
- Labour exploitation

In addition to economic factors (bourgeois class), domination also relies on class fractions that make up ruling elites. The sum of these examples is 1st echelon technocrats, political elites and high-ranking military officers (these are the military elite). At least in Latin America, we can say that this group makes up a National Elite. A generalisable example of the Brazilian national elite: oligarchies, big Brazilian capitalists, physiological political elites, technocrats, new converted elites coming from the opposition, high-ranking military officers and the trusted fraction of financial and multinational capital operating in Brazil.

One controversy that needs further definition is the idea of an oppressed class or group of classes. Hence the debate about whether to use the concept Oppressed or Oppressed Classes? We use Oppressed Classes to define which oppressed people we strategically want to work with. There are several Oppressed Classes, not just one class that suffers oppression. The Oppressed Classes are made up of more than one social subject. Who are these social subjects? Minimally, at least in terms of salary, employment, income and function, we define the Oppressed Classes as being made up of the Excluded Class sectors + the Working Class sectors. Thus, the social subjects of the Oppressed Classes are:

- Salaried worker
- Informal worker
- Precarised Workers
- The excluded (who, in economic terms, are the unemployed, underemployed or gangsters).

Thus, we propose three criteria for thinking about the condition of class from the point of view of the social subject itself:

- Class identity and sense of belonging
- Possibilities (of collective exits or social mobility)
- Material needs (urgent and consumables)
- Political demands (which could become a collective project)

The sum of these four factors, plus origin and social position, directly influence the formation of class consciousness.

So we don't run the risk of confusing the Oppressed Classes only with those who are in a situation of either economic exploitation or misery and exclusion. Rather, they are a group of social subjects, class sectors, ranging from the poorest to those who are still in the world of work and employment. All of these make up the Oppressed Classes.

The condition of Oppression implies the sum of these 4 forms of domination:

- Economic exploitation

- Physical domination (repressive-legal-military)
- Exclusion from capitalist society, its services and rights
- Political alienation + political domination (administrative-bureaucratic), from the absence of the right to organise to the existence of this right and the concrete impossibility of this happening.

In the concept used in this work, it is the joint existence of these 4 forms that generates the Oppressed Classes.

### **1.6. An analytical map of the terrain where this thesis is intended to be universalisable**

In order to operationalise the formulations, the theoretical instrument is presented below in the form of an analytical map, presenting elements that can be generalised to Latin America.

- Capitalist society is divided into classes (Rossell and Poveda 2005). The peripheral and semi-peripheral capitalist society found in Latin American countries is also divided into classes (Boron 2006a). The ideological dimension transcends the division of classes, but it is fundamental to this type of clash, since class implies antagonism (López, pp.51-52, 2001).

- There is a degree of unity and identity between these societies. Like any concept, sign, symbol or reference, unity and identity are in dispute and have different meanings. The thesis therefore assumes that there is a dispute over the concept and that there is Latin America (Coronil 2000).

- The class societies of Latin American countries are unequal to each other, but have some similar axes and bases (Porzecanski 2005). Regardless of the level of economic development, the level of informality is high and unemployment is structural (Ortiz, Cabello, López Herrera 2007). Regardless of the level of political development, there is a high level of dissatisfaction with representative democracy (Di Filippo 2006). Extreme inequalities between social classes are standard in these societies, and entire sections of the population are either deprived or poorly assisted in their basic rights (Moneta 2007).

- There are places of non-justice and territories where, for a variety of reasons - from armed insurgency to paramilitarism (Castillo 2006) - the state is seen as a threat.

distrust, does not provide assistance to its citizens (Rocca 2006) and often the state acts as an occupying force (Mayre, Andrew and Maria 2002).

- The configuration of today's class society is fragmented and fragmenting. There is thus a structuring logic of social fragmentation, acting on the most diverse layers and sectors of class (Veiga 2004). Fragmentation is not an isolated or localised phenomenon; it cuts across the whole of society (Nugent 2003).

- The majority of people in Latin America are in the lower classes. As a result, the different class sectors find it difficult to see themselves as a unit (Ahumada, 2002), and their demands have a greater political, organisational and communication cost than in previous stages of capitalism (Chacarera 33, 2006). During bipolarity and the period of ideological borders, the cost of repression was higher (Piuzzi 2002), but on the other hand, the less complex class societies allowed the subaltern classes to increase their power to bargain and conquer (No hay derecho 2007).

- The absence of greater unity in the lower classes facilitates de facto domination, although it makes it difficult to institutionalise representative democracy (Rojas Bolaños 2005). The opposite is true: when there is greater unity in the lower classes, and there is strategic interest, representative democracy may or may not be strengthened by this unity (Regalado Alvarez 2004).

- This current configuration of fragmented classes also implies current forms in the class struggle, which continues to exist, but in a more complex form than during the period of bipolarity and industrialisation (Ospina Peralta 2003).

- This current class struggle in Latin America is permeated by issues of identity, national and ethnic formation, territorialisation (Quijano 2000); also disputes over the concept of democracy, with varying degrees of violence (Figueroa and Tischler 2002), disputes over the national project and other forms of struggle associated with the economic struggle (Seoane, Taddei and Algranati, 2006). This thesis is based on the assumption of the non-determinism of one sphere over another (Unda 2006) and the complex nature of strategic interaction.

- In this context, the operators of institutional politics have an interest in disorganising the institutions of the social fabric of the lower classes, increasing its fragmentation and subordinating it to institutional politics (Amat, Brieger, Ghiotto, Llanos and Percovich, 2002). Hegemonic political science ends up providing the theoretical foundation for this top-down disorganisation (Roitman Rosenmann 2008), in the form of



To the extent that these centres of knowledge ignore political activity beyond representative and to some extent institutionalised democracy (Boron 2006b).

- Thus, political resources such as clientelism, together with the criminalisation of poverty (Jelin 2003), conflict between the poor (Pucciarelli 2002) and the spread of the illegal economy (led by low-cost drug trafficking, Salvia 2004), further fragments the social fabric (Gutiérrez 2003) - especially that of conurbations and metropolitan areas (Angarita Cañas 2004) - lowering their stock of social capital and reinforcing political behaviour based on an individualistic, parochial and very short-term culture (Tunnermann Berheim 2005).

- The actions of the corporate, commercial and mass media reinforce and accentuate the political behaviour described above (Guareschi and Bizz 2005 pp. 61-65). According to the assumptions of this thesis, the ideological sphere is considered to be strategic for any kind of profound social change. The work of communication is no longer subordinated to a specific, utilitarian project and becomes the precondition for disputing hegemony. There is no way to have a profound impact on any social sector without the elaboration, dissemination and symbolic exchange of a synthesis discourse. Such a discourse can only exist in the daily lives of disorganised majorities through communicational action (Vizer, 1999 pp.265-268).

- The recomposition of this social fabric, based on common objectives and common enemies (Perez 2002), can reinforce or recreate current forms of class struggle (El sindicalismo, la izquierda y el movimiento anti-globalización en América 2005). The interdependence of the economic, political and ideological spheres points to an analysis in which the different themes converge towards a possible new accumulation of forces (FAU-FAG 2008): issues that in theory would be separated in the analysis and discourse practised today would come together from the possibility of a discourse-synthesis and a tangible long-term goal.

- The recreation of these forms of class struggle can lead to limit situations for both the political system and the concept of representative democracy (Núñez del Prado 2006). This thesis, within the necessary rigour, is also seen as an instrument of incidence for democratic radicalisation, aimed at increasing the participation of the majorities (Farah H. 2006) by giving real ways for sectors of the oppressed classes to take part in the fundamental decisions of the concrete societies in which they live (FAU-FAG 2008).

## **2. INITIAL CONDITIONS FOR FORMING A THEORY OF INCIDENCE AND CONFLICT IN LATIN AMERICA: IDENTITY - POLITICAL POSITIONING - THEORETICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS**

This chapter formulates the statement that supports the thesis of this work. As we saw in Chapter 1, the author of this thesis and the person officiating these words believes in and practices its production by relying on certain elements. Amongst others, I base myself on the ability to analyse, the sum of the virtues of inference, deduction and induction, the need for the incessant search for precision and the precision of the analyst in order to make a convinced decision. It is therefore understood that taking a position is a necessity for the formulation of thought and tangible products of the social sciences.

Position Taking is conceptualised as = place of speech + political positioning + theoretical-methodological assumptions + recognition of collective identity

I return to this statement at the end of Chapter 2, basing it on what I consider to be classic thinking expressed by Celso Furtado (2003). This chapter is based on an assumption of deep and frank questioning that, in opinion, should be carried out by any researcher. The necessary rigour goes hand in hand with the mandatory boldness to carry out such a task. This is because it is the very construction of the social sciences in Latin America, and the place of speech of the author(s), producer(s) of knowledge as a representation or as a tangible and strategic asset, that is the subject of this part of the thesis.

The analytical point of view includes the role and positioning (political, theoretical, epistemological and identity) of the formulator of theory and analysis as central, both in the

process as well as in the final product of this intellectual work. For this thesis, the place of speech is fundamental to understanding the statements and their objectives and assumptions. In this second part of the chapter, we return to the time when the field of social sciences was about to become institutionalised - post-war period, ideological borders, bipolarity - and the knowledge produced in the academic world was anchored in the "state of the art" in Latin America, the challenges of democratisation, autonomous development and the need for autochthonous science for these same achievements.

Some doubts arose during the studies for this chapter:

- 1) Were the shaping elites of the social sciences on the continent expanding their role and political penetration within the state itself, through their formulations while simultaneously occupying key positions in the country?
- 2) Were these same elites behaving more like reproducers of social science thinking - and more broadly of the so-called human sciences - generated in the central countries, incorporating theoretical bases and matrices whose demands and precedents are typical of other societies very different from those in Latin America?
- 3) Finally, do these elites see social upheavals and the real relations of tension between classes (in the broadest sense) as an "anomaly" within the parameters of central countries, endowing this intellectuality with prescriptive capacity aimed at "solving" certain problems?

In the concluding section of the second part of the chapter, a key idea is based on the work of Celso Furtado. The positioning of an elite, together with theoretical premises, are the two factors that decisively influence the existence or not of theories and projects for implementing public, macroeconomic and development policies.

## **2.1. The root of the conflict and the origin of Latin American intellectual production. A look at the period of bipolarity**

The basis of the argumentation and the historical-structural recovery are structured on the basis of the problematisation discussed in the Introduction to this Chapter. Before we get into the latter, however, it is necessary to address the links between the text that follows and the thesis' research problem. I understand that the proposal to build a theoretical model for the possibility of finalist political organisation is directly related to the position, the place of speech, the parameters of the knowledge producer.

This confluence of initial positioning and the inter-subjectivity of the intellectual worker in an aparadigmatic area is the reason for the criticism of the existence and development of social sciences subordinated to the central countries and with theoretical and epistemological matrices derived from them. For this theme, the works cited, respectively, are those of Guerreiro Ramos (1957) and Otávio Ianni (1971), which provide us with an analysis of the development and identity of Brazilian social science (including social scientists), observing in these authors their reflections and notes on the subject. The texts and concepts discussed also give us an idea of how much they were opposed, at the time, by the "hegemony" of the field in the period.

The second theme, which we recognise is a little more diffuse, deals with pointing out and looking for national solutions (national being, national reality, national problems), based on knowledge from the humanities and social sciences, to the basic problems of Latin American countries. This theme interests us above all because of the notion of ancestry that it contains and the very definition of Latin America that the affirmation of these "nationalities" brings internalised.

To this end, we examine the development of the social sciences in Mexico and the work of Silvia Sigal (2002) on the role of intellectuals and power in Argentina. The Argentinian debate is centred on the 1960s and has as its backdrop the crises and possibilities at the end of the military dictatorship initiated by General Juan Carlos Onganía

(1966), ending with General Alejandro Lanusse (1973) and concluding this period with the electoral victory of Peronist Héctor Cámpora. Finally, we point out a possible continuum between the two blocks of themes, based on our own theoretical reference and the assertions of Celso Furtado, which we'll explain below.

Although it deals with a contemporary period of globalisation and almost one-sidedness, we felt it would be more accurate to assume for our critique the search for a new episteme elaborated by Boaventura de Souza Santos (2002). Its contemporaneity does not invalidate the critique of the broad historical moment we are dealing with, almost entirely centred on the aftermath of the Second World War and the bipolarity of the 20th century.

The first criticism we have incorporated concerns the supposed universal generalisation of so-called modern science. According to the Portuguese author, this universalism is positional, it is ability of the central West to tax and classify as "local, particular contextual all forms of knowledge that rival it" (Santos, 2002, p.14). Following this line of reasoning, it is the power to tax, to name, to localise, to generate a convention about X knowledge or Y theme, which for scientific-academic circles is equivalent to the same centre-periphery relationship seen in other areas. According to Santos (p.15), it is "the capacity of one kind of knowledge to turn another into raw material or a resource for its realisation, which makes one scientific and modern and the other particular and local".

Recognising Santos' statement as true (p.16), social scientists are, more or less reluctantly, the heirs and bearers of hegemonic scientific paradigms. The question remains: is the social science we are discussing in this paper itself a reproducer of this paradigm, the generator of a counter-hegemony, or does it have the potential to generate a new hegemony? Although Santos formulated these questions in the present day, we believe that they apply to the period delimited in this thesis.

It is precisely because of this validity that we see a *continuum* in the centre-periphery relationship, or centre - semi-periphery - periphery, as Boaventura characterises it. It is the continuity of

The relationship of dependence and intellectual subordination to a "globalised field" is the target of the Portuguese sociologist's criticism, with which we agree. I realise that this very subordination makes impracticable a organisation of theories theories with transformational goals of existing and lived realities. It stands to reason that breaking with subordination is conditional on the standardisation of these same theories.

Returning to Santos' reasoning and exposition, the dichotomy between the Centre and the Periphery, the First World and the Third World, can also be seen within the humanities and social sciences. We have specifically observed in the studies analysed in this section that during the period when field of social sciences was institutionalised, there was a time when the themes of development, independence-interdependence and the possibilities of national self-determination in Latin American countries were central to many social scientists. There were different forms, approaches, theoretical-epistemological approaches, ontological motivations, ideological-doctrinal motivations, but the problems addressed were aimed at resolving these issues. This was the framework, the paradigm, which was diffuse but clearly defined (Ramos 1957 p.81).

In the contemporary world of globalisation, and especially in the historical context in which this thesis is situated, the conflict within the field takes place, according to Boaventura de Souza Santos, in the dichotomy between mercenary science (and/or mercenary consultancy, within the hegemonic paradigm and centralised by this hegemony) X science-action (p.18). We draw an analogy between scientific rigour with supposedly neutral intentions and whose epistemological matrices came from central countries, and the search for an episteme and methodology that is applicable and capable of finding solutions to major national issues, as is the case with Ramos' work (1957).

According to Santos' contemporary classification, there would be a division between centre - semi-periphery - periphery, replacing the classification of the bi-polar period, between 1st, 2nd and 3rd worlds. From our point of view, we will recognise the existence of Latin American countries with a good level of industrial and scientific development, with Brazil, Mexico and, in recent times, Argentina being placed on this scale from top to bottom.

Done

For this comment, we quote the Cuban Roberto Retamar (apud Santos, p.20) when he says: "There is no one who knows the literature of the central countries better than the reader from the periphery". The Portuguese author makes an analogy with social scientists from the semi-periphery, saying that they are the best knowledgeable the epistemological bases and what is produced in the central countries.

If we recognise the above statement as true, then we can conclude that the efforts of the social sciences (if not all of them, then a good part of them) during the period of the developmental state, such as contributing their own episteme and problematising the realities they experienced, did not materialise. The analogy between economic dependence, a crisis of sovereignty and autonomous scientific development, including the humanities and social sciences, seems logical. A logical factor such as who finances partially or totally imposes the subject studied is a more than satisfactory and sufficient statement. As Santos says, the correlation between dependence and "modern science is a factor in much epistemicide in favour of imperial power" (p.14). Since our reality and work deal precisely with an area of scientific knowledge in countries on the semi-periphery and periphery of the West called Latin America, this thesis by its very nature positions itself alongside Santos' critique and against the idea and action of "epistemicide".

Based on these observations, this chapter focuses on the themes presented by the authors studied. We recognise that the emerging themes of that historical moment, at least for the social scientists examined, were those related to institutional modernisation, industrial development, the creation of a scientific universe of their own and national sovereignty. It is on the basis of Santos' statements that criticism is made of the scope that these ideas and political intentions had at the time of their realisation. From this point of view, he also criticises the formation of an intellectual elite and its most pressing concerns.

## 2.2. Brazilian and Latin American social thought

Taking Guerreiro Ramos's classic work, *Critical Introduction to Brazilian Sociology* (1957), as a basis, there is a series of criticisms and comments, often in the form of an "essay" or in the "journalistic" form of a "battle article". Ramos writes his work polemicising against his critics and opponents, weaving alliances, affirming assumptions in order to compose an area of sympathy, a set of themes, which, relativised to the time and historical period of his production, would suffice on their for all the intentionality of this Chapter. I understand that this happens when a work is a classic, having its production milestone in the historical-structural basis of its moment, transcending itself (the work) and the author, in the problematisation it proposes and in its continuity in later historical moments. In this work by Ramos (1957), we have emphasised, in a discontinuous way and according to our interest, the theme that seems most compelling and that we need to delve into.

The complementary foundation is the work of Octavio Ianni (1971), *Sociologia da Sociologia Latino-Americana*, which in our opinion is just as wide-ranging and forceful as the first. I believe that one of the differences between these works is the motivation behind the criticism and the affirmation of valid social science in order to point out the problems identified by the respective authors as the most significant. In his opening, Ianni points to two major sociological currents on the Latin American continent. A current that he classifies as being "outlawed", precisely because it is the one that would best contribute "to the knowledge of the conditions of social existence of the different social classes in Latin America" (p.1).

Its production, that of the so-called "outlaw" current, points to recognising and interpreting the mode of accommodation, tension and reciprocal negation between classes. In terms of structure, it points to the dimensions of economic appropriation and political domination in the different states and regions of the continent (p.2). Methodological praise is also expressed, as Ianni states that this current is positively critical both in its production - the interpretation of social problems - and in the research methods employed (p.2).



Ianni's counterpoint is quite forceful. He claims that the hegemonic current is a producer of knowledge about the social problems proposed by the dominant classes. We understand that the use of the category of dominant class and not sectors of the economic and/or political elite is constantly employed, aiming at least at a structural analysis of the binomial of political domination and economic appropriation. Returning to the critique, the purpose of this hegemonic current, according to Ianni, is to collaborate with the *status quo* and ensure the maintenance of current social conditions.

Finally, he notes that the "scientific" assumption of this current is that society is normally stable, with crises and upheavals seen as an "anomaly" (p.2). Thus, for social science linked to the ruling class, the tension and reciprocal negation of collective actors that mobilise and polarise classes, especially sectors of the dispossessed classes, would be a "disease of that society". In the first two pages of his book, he points out these two currents generate the main contradiction, which he will discuss throughout his work.

Guerreiro Ramos (1957) starts from the premise that sociological knowledge cannot be produced without an objective understanding of national society<sup>37</sup>. This understanding is the result of a historical process, which generates an objectivity that is different from that of the so-called hard sciences (nature and physical sciences), and where object and observer interpenetrate<sup>38</sup>. Objectivity in the human sciences has a multiple nature, and is always affirmed according to the perspective of the authors' production, considering the range and complexity of this scope (p.1). It is from this condition that the thinking of the social sciences derived.

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<sup>37</sup> I can analogue this statement with something I have repeated many times in public, in debates and articles of all kinds. The universalising pretension of "optimal or sub-optimal equilibrium" assumptions does not stand up, in the case of Latin America, to even a simple descriptive narrative of the concrete societies of our continent.

<sup>38</sup> This interpenetration of object and observer, contrary to the false claim of neutrality, is fundamental to the objectivity itself of analytical rigour and prescriptive coldness according to the conditionalities and intentions of the observer-scientist. This concept of *per se* underpins the entire chapter and serves as a reference for my assertion that the Positioning of the Intellectual Worker in the social sciences = place of speech + ontological dimension + theoretical-epistemological arsenal/toolbox + identity reference.

Ramos states that the social science practised in the country is the result of an induction of processes and trends in Brazilian society. The discipline(s), still lacking the real pressures that make it possible to become aware of the conditions given for sociological production itself, is incapable of producing an objective interpretation of our society (p.18). The reason for this, according to Ramos, is the logic of the colonial situation, which historically the country has only altered to a certain degree, but without ever changing the very nature of the condition of colony.

In this regard, it is worth noting that this author also establishes a dialogue in terms of the semi-colony, or semi-periphery, a peripheral country endowed with relative development and autonomy compared to the conditions of its region, as Santos states. This colonial condition is a complex of situations and relationships, in addition to economic exploitation, dependence, assimilation, acculturation and intersubjective association with the coloniser.

Guerreiro Ramos points out the need for the social scientist - and in our case, the political scientist in particular - to break with their dubious condition, so that only then can they produce knowledge aimed at their society, based on their own reality (my emphasis). In Latin America, according to the author, the knowledge produced by social scientists is much more about informing the natives of the "scientific" production produced in the metropolis - considering Brazil's status as a colony, according to Ramos himself - than generating knowledge for and from the land itself<sup>39</sup> (p.19).

This condition leads to a double domination, subtle and complex, where the intellectual worker does not identify with and does not position himself in the condition of the colonised. Access to the coloniser's language (bilingualism), generating the cult of speaking well, speaking beautifully; the

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<sup>39</sup> The vitality of these statements and the forcefulness of these criticisms within a developed and consolidated field is impressive. We are writing this thesis half a century after Ramos' work and the essence of the debate and the overcoming to be achieved remains the same. This is even more evident in the field of political science and in the sub-disciplines related to the propositions of polyarchic functioning and ritualistic democracy.

The psychological duplicity of coloniser-colonised; of colonised, accepted and with transit in the metropolis<sup>40</sup> would not allow this intellectual to position himself from an identification with the objective condition and complex mechanism that he himself suffers from colonising domination (p.18).

It is worth noting the extreme vitality of these two statements, taking as a parameter the presuppositions of the critique made by Guerreiro Ramos, which I have stated I agree with. That in the constitution of the elite producers of Latin American social sciences in general and Brazilian social sciences in specific, the degree of colonisation varied, but not the nature of the colony and the producers of knowledge from a condition of duplicity.

*But the training of the Brazilian or Latin American sociologist consists, as a rule, of training for conformism, for the availability of intelligence in the face of theories. They learn to receive ready-made solutions, and when faced with a problem in their environment, they try to solve it by comparing texts, appealing to the recipes they've learnt from compendiums. Trained to think in ready-made thoughts, he often becomes, as far as feelings and volition are concerned, a répétiteur (**repeater**), i.e. he feels by ready-made feelings, or by ready-made wills, as Péguy would say. (Ramos p. 79)*

The second premise is also found in Ramos' work, and is based on intention. The charge of intentionality is the first "objective" step towards altering the also objective condition of the social scientist's positioning and identification with his object analysis (his own society). The third premise goes through Ianni. If the intellectual worker - or the intellectual who is a member of an elite that produces social and human sciences - from a basis that society is in equilibrium and its prevailing conditions are given; if this same intellectual looks at social problems (we prefer to say social issues) from the perspective of the ruling classes and fractions of the ruling class,

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<sup>40</sup> I understand that this is also because this intellectual worker has a *habitus* that is incorporated from the hegemonic field and the premises that come from the metropolis.

any and all convulsions and tensions will be seen as anomalous, and their prescription will be the cure for this anomaly (Ianni, p. 32 and p. 172)

The working methods, premises and assumptions will be based on same purpose, that of correcting an anomaly. Thus, the scientific work of this intellectual criticised by Ramos will have the intention of accommodating tensions according to the perspective of balance. This specialised worker - the intellectual who formulates and executes theories - is already hegemonically positioned by the dominant classes, elevated to the category of scientific technician of the *status quo*, a specialist in prescribing this accommodation.

Structurally, in the period of the developmentalist state and bipolarity, both authors state that there is a continuous relationship between Brazil's colonial situation and the complex structure of political domination, economic appropriation and ideological subordination. As part of the local elites, or to be more precise, in the constitution of their own intellectual elite with functions in this semi-colonised state, intellectuals in the social sciences and humanities would have a dubious position to say the least - at least as producers of knowledge about their own society - and would only break with this duplicity if they exercised the intention of breaking with their own condition of dubious existence and double belonging (that of being a colonial elite and culturally belonging to the metropolis). The entire production, methodology and choice of themes would derive from this condition and these tensions. For Ramos, the conflict is between colony and nation. For Ianni, the central conflict is between critical capacity and dominant hegemony.

The continuity of Ramos' critique focuses on the phenomenon of the Brazilian social scientist producing from the perspective of the metropolis. At the time of his work, the author typifies the following phenomena:

- conceptual symmetry and syncretism based on the reference point of the central countries; dogmatism in the acceptance of authoritative arguments (from the centre issued and reproduced by them) and/or in the reproduction of texts by established authors;

- Deductivism, the fruit of dogmatism, taking foreign assumptions as an explanatory starting point for local-national phenomena, so that historical contingency<sup>41</sup> is abstracted, replaced by absolutised categories generated outside this same contingency;

- alienation that comes from the fact that the studies produced here not intended to strengthen or promote the self-determination of the dependent country;<sup>42</sup>

- inauthenticity as a result of the categories listed above, since the Brazilian social scientist - that is, the intellectual typified in this critique - is not a producer of the categories he uses, and hardly handles (emphasis mine)<sup>43</sup> these same categories and processes employed (Ramos, 1957, pp.19-23).

This list typifies and forcefully points out the phenomenon of the dual condition. This is that of the colonised with a mentality generated by and focused on the metropolis, which, according to Ramos, is found in the majority of producers positioned in the hegemony of the field of sociological studies at that historical moment. It would be redundant to say, according to Ramos, that he received criticism from various sides, fitting the taxonomy of the profile he narrates with many of his colleagues. For Ramos, going beyond the polemics between his peers, it was only the conditions of the intention to progress, the intention to seek national self-determination (even if restricted to the economic sphere), that generated the conditions of possibility for a "sociology in shirt sleeves" to emerge.

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<sup>41</sup> By denying the historical-structural matrix, the colonised intellectual starts from the idea of standardisation coming from the central countries. They deny their own trajectory, because they don't see themselves in it, but as an outsider.

<sup>42</sup> This contradiction, which the author sees as essential and a priority, I once again, with due modesty and acknowledgement of his pioneering spirit, join in this criticism, affirming it as valid and up-to-date.

<sup>43</sup> In Chapter 1 I made reference to this familiarity with categories that are foreign to those applicable in the scientist's areas of experiment, following Bachelard's (1972) criticism when he says that: "We shall insist on the fact that a scientific spirit cannot prevail until it is sure that, at every moment of its mental life, it has to reconstruct all its knowledge. Only rational axes and bases allow such reconstruction. The rest is just low mnemotechnics. The patience of erudition has nothing to do with scientific patience."

Many of the criticisms of Guerreiro Ramos place her in the realm of "hyper-structuralism". I believe that this statement is absurd, because to label this premise "hyper-structuralist" to deny the evidence that Ramos permanently emphasises the role of perspective and intentionality<sup>44</sup> as essential in scientific production in the "humanities and social sciences". This premise has the basis of breaking with the structure of the nature of dependency relations, the variation of degree in the permanent colonial nature of our country. Since this author does not emphasise the class perspective as a priority contradiction, it is then the intentionality of national self-determination that, for him, precedes the possibility of authentic Brazilian sociological production<sup>45</sup>.

According to Ianni, the division of currents in Latin American social science, already at the theoretical-scientific level, involves the intentionality of the social agent and the individual actor (both emphasis mine). In this case, Ianni is referring to the scientific producer from Brazil or some other country in the region. What we could later see today was the formation of an elite of social scientists, with an essayist past and elevated to scientific status by incorporating methods and premises from central countries.

This elite found itself emerging and developing divided according to the strategic obstacles that emerged at that historical moment. These contradictions in various countries (including ours, in part), between a direct opposition of a part of this "intellectual elite" not operating as an auxiliary class to the rulers the regime of force, not associating in an auxiliary way with the fraction of the ruling class associated with the hegemonic power of the time and allied to the dominant classes operating in the country. In the Brazilian case, this concertation of classes and elites took over the Brazilian nation-state on 1 April 1964 with the military coup.

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<sup>44</sup> In the field of political practice, intentionality is analogous to political will and the analytical perspective is analogous to a sense of belonging.

<sup>45</sup> This thesis accepts the national and Latin American subcontinent perspective and positions it alongside a class structure perspective, based on the category of domination as central to profound changes in our societies.

Ianni speaks with precision about the definitive institutionalisation of social science on our continent. He begins with the conventional periodisation, whose distinctions between pre-scientific, institutionalisation and properly scientific phases are like descriptive artifice, which often reduce the creative thought of science (Ianni, 1971, p.18). If the author states that the act of discovery is an act of creative imagination (p.20), I seriously question how this act can be exercised and developed, if the arguments of authority classify devalued models as essayistic, speculative, pre- or para-scientific and social philosophy (p.19)? And how can young people in the profession (at least young people at the time) develop a creative intelligence if what methodologically guides them prevents them from responsibly exercising their sociological imagination?

We repeat the question of how it is possible to break away from scientific dependence if the rules of "science", the power to label it local-partial-essayistic and/or speculative come (and at the time they did and the pattern continues) from categories, models, methods and premises that are alien to Latin American reality? If the intention of the producer were to generate something tangible to affect part of our reality and not reality, even if it were equipped with these models and methods, the contradiction between the will and the means of realisation would be (and continues to be) glaring.

Moving on, in the last phase of making this knowledge definitively scientific, the subject of the social scientist as technician comes into play. This is the work that will ultimately validate or invalidate a social configuration (p.20). Subsequently, it is this technician, an official with responsibilities in government, private, party political, academic and contemporary third sector projects, who implements certain measures and manages their execution. In short, society does not give up the tools of political and sociological analysis, it qualifies them as technical-scientific and professionalises them, thus highlighting the concern with the increase in tensions and complex antagonisms in Latin American countries.

We have entered into a problem of the relationship-integration between subject and object, and also between the producer of knowledge and the destination of production. This brings us directly to the category of consulting science used by Santos (2002, p.20). We understand that the type of production derived from subject-object integration varies according to the type of study and the type of agent who commissions it - and also carries it out - as well as the intentionality of the contractor and the contracted, the requester and the agent of the demand. The object and subject chosen reflect this intention, both of the intellectual workers endowed with some autonomy and of the composition of centres/networks of centres of research and excellence and aimed at generating autochthonous knowledge referenced in concrete Latin American societies.

It seems obvious to me that the period, the historical moment in which the texts cited here by Ramos (1957) and Ianni (1971) were written, was one of intense dispute and political will to be able to study Latin American issues using rigorous - and appropriate for this purpose - categories generated from the reality we wanted to focus on. This first part of the chapter deals with the social sciences in Latin America, their institutionalisation and the perspective of the author(s). This automatically excludes knowledge and categories of rigour generated with the same intentions - that of affecting reality itself - but which do not belong to the official academic and often state universe, which is the one we are discussing.

I would reinforce the idea that the desire to focus on a given reality requires the appropriate scientific spirit for such an endeavour, using rigorous methods and categories. In the case described so far, I am dealing with sociological categories, but they could be of any other nature, including the physical and material sciences. Such an endeavour is the fruit of the exercise of political will, applicable to any human collectivity endowed with this will and the relative capacity to carry it out<sup>46</sup>.

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<sup>46</sup> Just to keep within the historical range of the works by Ramos (1957) and Ianni (1971), many political-military organisations, parties with rupturist intentions, and also right-wing conspiracies, organic structures within the state apparatus, could provide themselves with (technicians) to validate and/or help manage the application and social consequences of their political projects. The technician providing services does not necessarily mean a direct association between academic knowledge at the service of state or private projects



Considering the historical moment, the institutionalisation of the social sciences accompanied a moment of economic growth, of development to break with dependence, of "nationalist motivation, which gave rise to the superstructure transformations in our country" (Ramos, p.33). This same author emphasises the importance of historicity in thinking, and so - for him - the historical moment breaking with dependence arrived, institutionalising in an expansive economy, a generation of professional social scientists in tune with the intention of knowing and transforming reality itself. The nascent field of social sciences would have the task of breaking with the binomial of:

brazilian national science= scientific dependence.

In other words, for Ramos at the time, this was the way to position himself and contribute to self-determination and development,

With regard to the "culture of dependence", Ianni points out some limiting characteristics of Latin American social science at the time:

- the external nature of much of the problem presented;
- theoretical implications inherent in adoption, of problems that are often poorly conceptualised, secondary or simply external;
- an unsatisfactory, superficial or erroneous interpretation of our societies, result of adopting external problems and/or a lack of critical thinking;
- the relationship between science and politics, as expressed in sociological production (p.40).

According to Ianni, these characteristics are also the result of theoretical fluctuation according to the "academic prestige" of intellectuals in vogue in capitalist countries.

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within democratic norms. As a matter of fact, political instability is more normative in most Latin American countries than "stability", a prescriptive premise of liberal regimes in countries with central capitalism, in my understanding, not verified in our reality.

central. An almost impressionistic statement, revealing in depth a "culture of dependence", where the double positioning is expressed from the source of study, presentation of themes and problems, the theoretical-methodological tools used and the subsequent implementation.

In order not to fall into a universe of redundancy, where we would present a series of arguments from these two authors, in addition to those already presented, just to illustrate a similar point of view between Ramos and Ianni (at least in the text of these works), and one that I share, I would like to emphasise the observations, which are the result of logical reasoning and are in line with the proposal of this thesis. During the so-called inauguration process, the supposed "pre-scientific essay phase", the stage before institutionalisation and the elevation to the category of "scientific professionalism", throughout all these stages, both authors affirm premises for the construction of an autochthonous and independent social science.

First and foremost, I would like to reinforce the idea they expressed of the intention, the political will to carry out this scientific collaboration for national development. Intentionality, if the ontological dimension is differentiated from the theoretical one, is a corrective to the problems of perspective presented to this intellectual elite. It is the dubious position of the colony's intellectuals, the fact that many were endowed with the *habitus* of the metropolis, an identity gap that did not position them from the point of view and daily life of the object. Since the object is its own society, a certain "myopia" is exercised by the colonial powers over the producer of scientific-sociological thought.

Thus, intentionality is the first factor in generating the appropriate perspective, the intention also to be in the effort of self-determination, and not just as a reproducer of a disinterested science, with a Western matrix and by conditions of hegemony, self-proclaimed universal, according to Santos' premises that I incorporate into the thesis. Within this universe, structural transformations would generate the minimum conditions for this intentionality to manifest itself, and from this, the appropriate theoretical instruments and research methodology.

What differentiates Ianni's interpretation from Ramos' is the strategic challenges that both prioritise. Ramos emphasises the issue of dependence and breaking with the nature of the colony condition. In this condition, only the degree and not the nature of the relations of submission vary historically.

Ianni, on the other hand, doesn't deny these conditions, but he goes into the subject of the social complexification of Latin America, in the effervescence and tension between the dispossessed classes and the local and national elites who own them. As a result of this tension, he points to two simultaneous movements: - political domination; and - economic appropriation (exploitation). He also positions this economic elite and political leadership as aligned with dependency, and questions the role of the social scientist as a "technician". He also questions the role of the social scientist as a "technician", thus questioning at whose service the sociological instruments generated, even if autochthonous and appropriated by Latin Americans, are.

Finally, in this part of the chapter, we come to the rupturist point, at least the rupture episteme. Although also a product of the times, and like all thinking that is also a product of the historical moment, Ramos affirms the need and desire for a militant social science, at the service of and as an instrument of self-determination (p.88). He questions the transplantation of political structures - just as he questioned and criticised imported sociological theories - and divides them into two types:

- predatory ones, such as the institutional basis that made Latin American countries independent.
- accelerative ones, as classified by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)<sup>47</sup>, a consultancy body of the United Nations (UN).

Ianni, for his part, concludes that it is necessary to study the sociology of dependency. In this area, he observes the need to delve deeper into the way in which it is constituted and

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<sup>47</sup> See the collection of classic ECLAC texts organised by BIELSCHOWSKY (2000), with the support of ECLAC itself and the Brazilian Federal Council of Economics.

develops structural dependence (p.183), and moves towards studies imperialist action. It is imperialism that produces the conditions of structural dependence, and simultaneously, dialectically, creates the conditions for its negation (p.183). If, according to the logical reasoning of both authors and agreeing with them on this premise, it is intentionality and political will that generate the preconditions for the search for an appropriate instrument, it is the intention to oppose imperialism and understand the mechanisms of our dependence that generates the conditions for the sociologist's perspective as a scientific technician endowed with this task.

Thus, engagement and individual positions in line with collective interests would be the necessary steps towards the creation of an autonomous and national science. The internal positioning, in their own societies, of these elites (not just the national one, but in two Latin American examples), we will see in the following topics.

### **2.3. Closer to and further away from the central powers**

The following sub-topics set out the position of two Latin American intellectual elites, the Argentinian and Mexican, especially the producers of thought in the social sciences. We refer to this positioning in terms of both formal power structures and the degree of institutionalisation and university autonomy. Thus, stability would lead to greater professionalisation, but the technical-scientific function would be at the service of the premises set out by Ianni above. The result of all this is the product of these intellectuals, which are studies and research into their societies.

From the cases we have analysed, Argentina and Mexico, we can see some underlying themes that emerge from these historical examples. Based on the above statements, we recognise the double role and perspective of the Latin American intellectual (my emphasis). As this intellectual worker is doubly positioned, bilingual in relation to the coloniser, with the habitus of the metropolis; recognising also that this concept refers to a structure that is also structuring, although not totalising, we point out some issues:

- In this case, is the stability of the university system, its "neutrality", characteristics emphasised as positive and necessary by most authors, also a way of keeping this dubiousness out of the reach of national pressures?

- Wouldn't the concepts of rigour and professionalism be confused with a certain defence of an intellectual field with a degree of autonomy, or at least a peripheral field, where these conflicts inherent to the producer(s) of human and social science(s) and their (imported, exogenous) theoretical-epistemological matrices would be safe from the pressures of the Centre-Periphery type?

- Assuming that an intellectual counter-hegemony is gestated within a national and autonomous network of universities. Assuming that this threat is recognised by the state, the agent of this dubiousness as a central policy and submissive to central designs. Wouldn't it be more than obvious to expect the loss of this autonomy and high levels of repression according to the level of threat posed by this counter-hegemony?

We see these issues as fundamental to understanding the institutionalisation or otherwise of the social sciences in some Latin American countries and the respective commitment of their protagonists to the underlying issues of their societies. In the examples from Argentina, the difference is striking. Although we won't go into these processes in depth, we see two factors in the survival of university autonomy and the consequent stability necessary for the cumulative development of these sciences.

The first is positional, regarding the role of intellectuals in the key positions of the Argentine and Mexican state. Although in the neighbouring country the 1870s generation of great essayists and intellectuals was one of the most important of the republic, the intellectuals never asserted themselves as a fraction of the ruling class. The same cannot be said of Mexico, and even less so of Brazil. Both here and in the neighbouring country of the United States

United States of America, intellectuals have ensured their role as leaders of the republic at different levels.

In Mexico, inaugurated by the regime of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the state, the party and social construction became central necessities for this model of domination. The dichotomy and estrangement between intellectuals and the PRI's university body began in the 1960s, and then they moved closer together, again with the valorisation and allocation of funds to this same sector. We could say that the state's move to get closer could hypothetically generate an accommodation of the tension between the dominant classes and their leaders towards this fraction of the class which, once it is revalued, also becomes a leader.

The second question addresses a fundamental issue that has been ongoing since the so-called "essayistic" phases of both historical and sociological thought. It can be seen in both Mexico and Argentina that the move away from the central powers and the intellectual workers of the social sciences is also the fruit of a new period of study. The classic work by Pablo González Casanova (1967), *La democracia en México (Democracy in Mexico)*, inaugurated and opened up the perspective for demands for studies no longer about "being national", but about national reality. It replaces abstraction with theoretical research applied to reality, with empirical data.

In short, they move on to the stage of studying a reality that has been read and constructed out of a desire to understand society itself. The same happens with Argentinian intellectuals. It was the rapprochement with popular nationalism (albeit of a left-wing Peronist nature) that turned the research methodology towards the "discovery" of the inner country. The "national being" was rediscovered in the Argentinian intelligentsia in favour of university autonomy, by the intellectual body that would become the reform party itself. These two issues are examined below.

## 2.4. Institutionalisation and radicalisation of social science in Argentina before the 1976 coup

In the work by Silvia Sigal (2002), *Intellectuals and Power in Argentina*, we take as our reference the part of the book that portrays and analyses the 1960s. This Argentinian woman based in France presents as her central research problem the representation of the discourse of the country's intellectuals, the reconversion of general themes and the collective subject to a return to individual interests. In depth, the defenders and bearers-generators of the discourses of national reality, the concrete interpretation of the search for the "national being" and its consequent emancipation, would be served by the space granted to them by legal democracy. Thus, they would reconvert their discourse of People, Nation and Revolution to the interests of the individual in a liberal society: the Law, Human Rights and Conscience.

What distinguished the Argentine process from other societies in the West - which we refer to as the Periphery or Semi-Periphery, in other words, the peripheral West - was the adherence of intellectuals with a solid Marxist background to national themes. In other words, this group of producers of symbolic goods and scientific studies was mostly affiliated with popular nationalism in its left-wing Peronist version.

Another hallmark of this process was the adherence of this generation of intellectuals to a rupturist option, often going beyond discursive elaboration and even taking part in the operational arms that generated political violence. This was the association of intellectuals with their people, without reticence (according to the author), and consequently with their emancipation projects. The representation of the political in Argentina was as concrete, if not more so, than actual politics itself. Armed direct action as a political language was also widely incorporated by these intellectuals.

As far as the Argentine university is concerned, and the social sciences themselves, the key issue would be the guarantees of the 1918 Córdoba Reform<sup>48</sup>, with its

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<sup>48</sup> For a historical account of the contents that led to the rebellion and the subsequent university reform in Córdoba, see La Juventud argentina de Córdoba. *La juventud argentina de Córdoba a los hombres libres de*

achievements of university co-government, autonomy and parity of representation. And also the consequent stability that would generate professionalisation and institutionalisation.

It is imperative to draw a parallel with the political system. Institutional stability in both the legislative and executive branches (p.1), stability for the exercise of the profession of humanities technician-scientist. The return of democracy in 1983, the defeat of Peronism at the ballot box and the fact that both the Radical Civic Union (UCR) and the Justicialist Party (with right-wing Peronist hegemony) had central positions their parties and elected governments, thus inaugurating a new phase in the relationship between intellectuals and politics in the neighbouring country. If the "new phase" is one of incorporation and stability, by logical association, the previous phase, even before the 1976 regime, was one of instability and alienation of intellectuals from the formal structures of power.

Once removed from central power, Sigal asks, what was the role of politician for Argentine intellectuals (p.2)? And how and why did a fraction of them, conservatives to be sure, become responsible for disseminating a certain vision of Argentine history that took on the proportions of a government programme (p.2)? The first conclusion that can be drawn is that the role of permanently reconstructing the country's history became a political action programme. This programme not only applies to governments, but also to regimes, parties and political-military organisations. This permanent reconstruction is a central role for Argentine intellectuals. The construction of unifying myths and the elaboration of a collective identity for all the different shades of Argentine politics, the function of groups of writers in a literate country, these would be and are ways for society to understand and reread itself (p.3).

Thus, the *modus operandi* of a large part of the Argentine intelligentsia is to give a political meaning to something vaguely specialised, such as the management of discourse and the

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culture. It has a mixed cultural and political character (p.9), allowing us to point to explanatory factors for the ideological and political itinerary of groups of intellectuals in this country. On the negative side, we can deduce the impact and rejection among intellectuals of an anti-intellectual motivation, such as the Peronist slogan of the first government: "espadrilles yes, books no". The same thing happened - a certain anti-intellectualism - within this peripheral field, with Germani's more precise and scientific methodology, his "objectivity" and even the controversies over external funding for research.

The progression of this dichotomy led to an association already advocated by Ramos, that of methods with intentions, of theoretical-epistemological premises and the colonial society in which they were produced. This confrontation, political in nature but with a theoretical and epistemological agenda and the way the university functions, would reach its peak in 1966, on the eve of the Onganía coup. It was during this period that the student movement simultaneously fought against private subsidies for research and the scientism advocated by the professors (p.84).

This dispute of the sixties has its roots in the affiliations of intellectuals, not only to political parties, but also to ways of trying to build a Nation or a Civilisation. The dichotomy is between liberal civilisation, including the first supporters of reform, and nationalism. Nationalism is subdivided into popular and reactionary. Like the idea of destiny, it also has its origins in historical reconstruction. And this historical revisionism is the essential function of the whole of the intelligentsia (p.11).

The first and second generation of Argentine social scientists could be included in the liberal civilisation camp, especially given they were not Peronists and were banned during the first government. Not coincidentally, the so-called golden age of the University of Buenos Aires (UBA), which we would say was almost as important as the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), was between 1955 (the year the first Peronist government was overthrown) and 1966, the year of Onganía's coup. After this coup, the universities were intervened in and professors were sacked.

Following on from the critical narrative, Sigal states that once the "scientific" phase of the human sciences has been reached, surpassing academic social science (partially and temporally), Gino Germani calls it "Argentine para-sociology" (apud Sigal, p.90). The Italian-Argentine intellectual, a point of confluence of tensions within his field and institution, claims to be starting from scratch, inaugurating a systematic endeavour in the field, but also leaving aside not just an essayistic tradition, but a body of knowledge. The "curious" discard is cited, leaving aside even the influences that the so-called pre-scientific, essayistic phase had on sociological thought itself. Germani's importance is seen by the author, starting from an analogy between the weight of Sartre for France, Gramsci for Italy and Mariátegui<sup>49</sup> for Peru (p.91), as an example of the influences that occurred throughout Latin America.

The process of institutionalising social science at the Argentine university was also a consequence of the end of the Peronist government. The scientific phase also marked a common trait among the Marxist-educated intelligentsia of the academic left, who were obviously not part of the anti-intellectual tradition. They no longer studied the national being, at least not at that stage - although the phenomenon recurs as we will see below - but rather the search for national reality (p.93). The so-called post-Peronist moment therefore inaugurates a possibility of studying this same phenomenon, Peronist populism under the national-popular sign (p.94). Radicalisation takes place with its institutional space closed off by Onganía's anti-Peronism. The institutional setting and the political conjuncture would bring the perspective of intellectuals closer together, as they became politicised and later became their objects of study:

- the reality of the country;

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<sup>49</sup> Sometimes the history of social thought seems to take on subtle but very noticeable patterns. The "Seven Essays on the Interpretation of Peruvian Reality", from 1928, inaugurated a series of fundamental themes that concern the entire continent. For the Andean countries, the issue of indigenous people would be analogous to the issue of Africans in Brazil. And, in the case of this part of the work we're quoting, José Carlos Mariátegui also challenges the restorationist studies of the Inca past and sets out to study the reality of the Inca heritage at the time. It's interesting to see similar polemics at different times. These concepts are repeated in Mariátegui's prologue to the book (*Tempest in the Andes*), also of an order that could be classified as pre-scientific, written by Luis Valcárcel (apud Mariátegui in LÖWY, 1999.).

- the mobilising capacity of populism;
- the authenticity of the masses;
- the real conditions of life and survival.

We can deduce this sum of factors as a mobilising effect on the intelligentsia itself and its object of study. When the UBA was closed down by the military regime in 1966, the associative capacity rose to the level of a "university of the catacombs", where more than two thousand (2,000) study groups were held with an average of eight to ten participants in each one (p.70, Klimovsky *apud* Sigal). We are therefore talking about a critical mass of more than 16,000 young people with the capacity to critically read reality, ontological motivation and free time to apply their theoretical incidence based on the hypotheses generated in the "underground" of the engaged intelligentsia.

The epistemological battle of the majority of the left and the student movement was against "scientism" and external (and private) funding for research and investigations in the social sciences. The main motivation of this same young left-wing intelligentsia is the study of the national reality, and getting closer to its object of study. This explains a large part of the reasons for the militant commitment that these same intellectuals have had to national reality, combined with popular nationalism. In other words, the adoption of the collective subject and the mission of being the bearer of this discourse and the support or direct participation in political-military organisations, hegemonically of the Peronist left.

As a complementary aspect, we would like to tell you about an inaugural lecture that took place at the Faculty of Economic Sciences of the UBA in 1973, shortly after the victory for president of Héctor Cámpora, the candidate of the Peronists and especially of the left. The lecturer was a young sociologist, Horacio González, a member of the

unity of the Montoneros<sup>50</sup> of the UBA. This organisation occupied a central place in the university of progressive Peronism. Under the previous regime, the name of the subject was "Introduction to the Knowledge of State and Society". Under the populist hegemony, and also the left-wing nationalist hegemony, the title was changed to "National and Popular History". The basic element was to add political agitation for 10,000 new students, based on a discourse of historical revision, or more appropriately, historical interpretation.

The Montonero leader said: "the main contradiction has always been between liberation and dependence, no matter what the political actors at each moment in Argentine history"; in another part of the speech, González returns:

*Even if the previous conflicts have been given other names, other cultural or party identities, they are in any case antecedents of this greater conflict that is clearly evident in the historical moment we are living in. The justification for reading it and whether or not it is valid, according to this contradiction, is what made the Montoneros of 1973 join or not join the Unitarians or Federalists, the Americanist caudillos against the Buenos Aires elite, a party or caudillo that really mobilised the interior country (González apud Anguita y Caparrós, 1998, pp.42-43).*

We can thus observe a pattern in this intellectuality, originally Marxist, which, once affiliated with popular nationalism, reprises the function of historical revisionism. In other words, the national reality studied needs a discourse of national being as an influence on the motivating factors for social change. The so-called "scientific" social science, on the other hand, is the basis of Silvia Sigal's argument, with which we agree, and could only validate itself as such, according to its own pretensions of a certain neutrality and professionalism, in a more stable regime. This regime, of regularity in competition

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<sup>50</sup> Political-military organisation within the Argentine Peronist left. It was the largest political organisation with a military arm in Argentina. It arose from Catholic origins, merged with the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR, Peronist of Marxist origin) in 1972 and from that moment on had absolute hegemony on the left in that country. For more information, see Anguita and Caparrós (1998). For a critical reading of the political trajectory of the Montoneros OPM, see Gasparini's doctoral thesis (1999), published in book format by Editorial de La Campana.

democratic-representative and with the Justicialist Party being allowed to contest the elections, would arrive in 1983, but still under the sign of the bankruptcy of the state and its successive financial crises, political discredit and the breakdown of the social fabric.

## 2.5 The Mexican case study and the fundamental work of Casanova

Institutionalisation and the choice of themes in the Mexican case come from a pattern closer to that of Brazil, and this is where we come in now. The three authors we have taken as a basis for this part of the chapter, Reyna (1979), Castañeda (1989) and Loyo (1982), agree on a linear classification of social science research in Mexico. This is classically subdivided into the pre-scientific, scientific and institutionalisation phases. Derived in this country from Law and Anthropology - whose indigenous and land issues had already mobilised the basis of the 1910 Revolution and were the first of the social sciences in the strict sense to develop - the other disciplines of social sciences (namely sociology and political science) would begin their so-called scientific phase from the mid-1950s.

But according to Reyna (pp.61-63), even with modern methodological applications, the sociological and political investigations of the time had little or nothing to do with their own national problems. Pointing out these problems, which the regime of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI, which lasted from 1946 to 2000) was unable or unwilling to answer<sup>51</sup>, was tantamount to questioning the legitimacy of the regime. According to the author, the system was not "prepared" for criticism.

It is in this sense that Casanova's classic work (1967), *La democracia en Mexico*, inaugurated a phase of fusion of scientific methodology with the demands of the problematic

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<sup>51</sup> For a good look at the trajectory of partisan authoritarianism in Mexico, it is worth consulting the chapter by Reyna, which is part of a collection published by Clacso. The text can be found in: REYNA, José Luis. *Mexico: an incipient democracy*. Published in: *En los intersticios de la democracia y el autoritarismo. Some cases from Asia, Africa and Latin America*. CORNEJO, Romer (org.), CLACSO, Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales, Buenos Aires, October 2006. ISBN: 987-987-1183-60-9. Access to the full text at: <http://bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/ar/libros/sursur/cornejo/reyna.pdf> (archive consulted on 08 August 2008).

(my emphasis). The result of this equation was an increasingly systematic questioning the political system and the PRI regime, developing into relations of repression and systematic violence. This process culminated in the Tlatelolco massacre<sup>52</sup> in 1968, where estimates put the death toll at at least 5,000 students.

Not that Casanova's work alone was the reason for this escalation, far from . But as far as the social sciences are concerned, it inaugurated their scientific phase, of empirical research, of pointing out reality, questioning the problem and guiding national lines of action. From this work, also under the encouragement of González Casanova, came studies into social stratification, looking for the basic causes of social inequality. The same happened in other areas of study, such as the agrarian structure, the peasant sector and the relationship between indigenous and non-indigenous societies.

The progression of themes and national problems led to the central theme of the 1960s being dependency (p.72). We note that this is a recurring theme in several countries and is pointed out as a central contradiction by several authors. With the accommodation that came from the political opening mandate of Luís Echeverría's PRI (first half of the 1970s), many of the national and social issues raised by the university were incorporated into public policy. And so they rediscovered the role and proximity of power with the Mexican intelligentsia and social scientists. How this movement of tension and accommodation between social science and the state came about is what is discussed below. One of the logical consequences is that academia has moved closer to themes such as state and society, with the same state entity becoming the central object of study. At this point, authors

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<sup>52</sup> A good read on the role of political organisations within the Mexican student movement, the causes of the use of the method of conflict and mass protest and the corresponding repression by the Priista regime is worth reading: GÓMEZ NASHIKI, Antonio. *El movimiento estudiantil mexicano. Notas históricas de las organizaciones políticas, 1910-1971*. Published in *Revista Mexicana de Investigación Educativa* [en línea] 2003, 8 (017): Access to the text at: <http://redalyc.uaemex.mx/redalyc/src/inicio/ArtPdfRed.jsp?iCve=14001712> ISSN 1405-6666, archive consulted on 09 August 2008.

such as Gramsci have regained their importance (p.72), serving as a theoretical basis for the relations between the state, the political system and class society.

Returning a little earlier to Casanova's work, Loyo (1982, p.327) states that scientific activity needed a favourable institutional space, endowed with the stability and autonomy necessary to establish itself, if not as a field, at least as a recognised sector with a share of the country's leadership. This institutional space had been consolidated and gained its place of excellence at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). Considering the nature of the PRI regime, it seems that such tranquillity was also the result of a complicit and dubious relationship in terms of the amount of criticism and the type of study carried out by the Mexican intelligentsia. In line with this statement, Loyo (p.336) tells us that it was the repression carried out by the state and the regime, starting autonomous workers' movements in 1958 and culminating in systematic violence, that changed the position of intellectuals. Until then, this sector had seen the Mexican state as, in essence, the heir to the insurrectionary process of 1910.

Both theoretical-epistemological and political movements led the student movement and academic life, at a certain point, to disqualify anything that wasn't derived from Marxism and other left-wing readings (p.337). The politicisation and unionisation of categories of workers and university students also brought the dispute to the theoretical level (p.331). At the same time, according to this author, confrontation and physical violence made the possibilities for work and research from a more scientific and academic point of view unstable.

Once again, the theoretical and epistemological agenda is marked, according to Loyo, by the fundamental work of Casanova (p.335). This is because, according to the author, "Don Pablo's work contemplates the theme of power and domination". And this would be from a broader perspective, not necessarily encompassing studies from political science, history, sociology or anthropology (p.334). This differs greatly from the more rigid framework that was used at the time in the USA and Western Europe (i.e. the Centre). The evolution of theoretical and epistemological guidelines, together with the measures

The repressive and harsh government of Díaz Ordaz (the president at the time the 1968 massacre) led to a sharp tension between the intelligentsia and the state, the PRI and the regime (p.336).

The following term, that of Echeverría, would be the opposite, leading to a process of détente and accommodation of the intellectuals' opposition to the state. The president's move was to relax the levels of repression, increase tolerance of criticism in academic circles, funds and financing for research centres, room for manoeuvre for political opposition and independent trade unionism - that is, independent of the PRI's trade union arms. In the following term, the recessionary economic policy was not accompanied by a greater level of political repression. Thus, the accommodation of these sectors of intellectuals, despite the social contradictions, would be completed.

Castañeda (1989) examines the intervention capacities of social thought in Mexico. The first area is close to and also addressed (inaugurated, it would be better to say) by anthropology, which is the indigenous and peasant issue. In this area, sociology played a role in the political rationalisation of the national problem (p.409). Once again, the role of Casanova's work (1967) is reiterated, where he reaffirms (with data, statistics and empirical research) the dual character of Mexican society, the unfinished revolutionary process and the concentration of power in the Executive (p.420). What stands out in the work is the new totality articulated by González Casanova; not the abstract totality, but the concepts and categories that would make it possible to understand (or rather, interpret and influence) Mexican reality.

A fundamental problem that has been solved is the university student's commitment to transforming the country (p.421). Professional commitment combined with the identification of one of the structural problems, the centrality of the Mexican Executive. This, in turn, is the agent and executor of internal colonialism (enclave domination), which is the result structural dependence, led a whole generation of young social scientists and those from related fields to seek a break with the current model. Once again, episteme takes on connotations of political importance within the academic-scientific sphere.



The institutionalisation of the social sciences went hand in hand with an effort by the Mexican state to technify itself in order to solve its crisis (p.427), while also expanding its social policy. The transformation within the state needed a vigorous critique and this was provided by the former 1968 opponents. The new legitimacy would no longer be just the defence of public order, but the recognition of the crisis and the role of the state (remember, even under the PRI regime) as an external agent of the crisis itself and one of the ways to intervene to solve it.

Academic Marxism, epistemologically advanced, was accommodated from its former tension and began to dialogue with the national state, inaugurating a new public sphere (p.428). The 1980s became the decade of the financial crisis, also known as the lost decade, the debt crisis, but "less lost than the 1990s. In the 1980s, with politics being transformed into technique (p.429) and the elites of the social sciences and humanities, after seeing themselves valued to overcome the contradiction marked in 1968, fall into the background in a "technified" environment. Let me remind you that according to Ramos' parameters, this "technique" would be imported and not indigenous.

The common feature of the three authors cited is to emphasise Casanova's work as the bearer of a new totality (my emphasis). This new totality goes beyond and thus escapes what we consider to be a false dilemma, which is the dichotomy between research and political practice. In this case, the national problem of concentration of power, dual society, structure and dependency would be the centre of conflict for the 1968 generation of Mexican social scientists and intellectual workers (my emphasis). The episteme presented from this position had forced the Mexican state to step back and open up. By incorporating social scientists and researchers into this sector, which until then had been "in opposition to the priest state", the focus of the problems that these "technicians" were working on automatically changed. Although the choice of problems remains similar, the angle of the solution and the initial positioning (place of speech and starting point) change considerably.

## 2.6 The affirmation of a theoretical-epistemological basis through the work of Celso Furtado

As we have seen throughout this chapter, our central argument is that the affirmation of an autochthonous theoretical and epistemological basis is considered a precondition for the development of national technical and scientific production. For its part, the institutionalisation of the social sciences requires a relationship of accommodation and institutional stability with the state, and this applies to Latin American countries. If and when the degree to which the social sciences criticise and raise problems and the possibility of implementing solutions, clash with the *de facto* powers that be - the post-colonial order and the arrangement of the local ruling classes - this is precisely when institutional stability (which needs to be continuous) is put at risk.

We also note that the theme of dependence, and even structural dependence, is central and recurrent in the stage of the developmentalist state, which the authors rightly address in the Chapter's basic texts. No one would have more authority to relate dependence to the episteme needed to overcome it (or even understand it) than the Brazilian economist Celso Furtado. Precisely for this reason, and to avoid redundancy, I will point out two of Furtado's theoretical presuppositions.

The first is "classic" and concerns the very formulation of the dependency category and its forms of economic analysis. In "*Desenvolvimento e Subdesenvolvimento, Elementos de uma Teoria do Subdesenvolvimento*" (Development and Underdevelopment, Elements of a Theory of Underdevelopment) (Furtado *in* Bielchowsky, 2000<sup>53</sup>), the economist deals with and discusses the necessary conditions for understanding the Latin American historical phenomenon. We can engage in an imaginary dialogue with Santos when he affirms the condition of strength, the correlation that allows the West to universalise its own experience. The same applies to economics. Furtado

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<sup>53</sup> This text is Chapter 4 of Furtado's classic 1961 work of the same title, Rio de Janeiro, Editora Fundo de Cultura. In the collection we downloaded this text from, the source is the Argentinian edition of 1971.

says verbatim that "a theory of development that limits itself to reconstituting in an abstract model - derived from a limited historical experience", and then goes on to say that "the articulations of a given structure cannot claim a high degree generality" (p.241). In other words, it requires a thought process derived from a particular historical moment, specific to the society (or geopolitical region) on which it wants to focus.

Underdevelopment, as a phenomenon derived from the colonial and post-colonial condition, has to be seen as a specific phenomenon, and needs an autonomous theorising effort (p.262). Simple analogies on the part of economists, with prescriptions based on the experiences of developed economies, result in inapplicable solutions for overcoming the condition of underdevelopment (p.262). It can be seen that the criticism levelled by Ramos is echoed by Furtado, both in his theoretical formulations and in the implementation of programmes derived from these same formulations.

Within a universe open social and human sciences, including economics, we can see that this criticism continues and remains more than forty years later. In an interview with the magazine *Caros Amigos*, Furtado reaffirmed the issue of the assumption and theoretical problem of social scientists and economists equipped with theoretical frameworks that are inapplicable to our reality. According to Furtado (2003), the solutions applied at macroeconomic level had their origins in the inability of economists to understand a Brazilian economic system with some degree of autonomy.

This is why the "possibilism" of the Centre's economic prescriptions never opens up the prospect of change (p.30). On the other hand, reflection itself is far removed from implementation: it is reflected on but does not unfold into action, there are no strong repercussions from the reflective effort (p.31). Once again, we see a possible dialogue between science-action (Santos) and what Furtado (2003) says. Identifying the object of economics, which according to Furtado is not the economic level but the social level, leads to another condition for theoretical formulation and the possibility of having an impact on national reality.

We conclude that the social and human sciences in Latin America have two central conflicts in their institutionalisation process and in their scientific phase onwards, which are highlighted throughout the thesis. The first is the theoretical-epistemological issue, where the intentionality and perspective of the scientist can enable a break scientific dependence and the double identity (coloniser and colonised). The second is relationship between this intellectual elite and the country's ruling and dominant powers. This relationship will be as tense or more so the more forceful the criticism and the inability of the state to absorb both this criticism and the scientific labour force that formulated it.

It's the underlying issues, the central conflicts of a specific society and country, which, when applied to scientific and academic policy, may or may not lead this sector to one position or another. Whether as an elite that is a fraction of the ruling class, or as a sector of intellectuals outside the ruling arrangement and in opposition to a country's own ruling sectors and classes. By listing the strategic underlying issue and positioning themselves in relation to it, the social scientist obtains their perspective and closeness to/remoteness from the object. This indicates their capacity and/or political will to influence their own reality.

## **2.7 Taking the position**

In this chapter we provide a critical view of the dilemmas and disputes from a political and theoretical-epistemological perspective, based on the debate about the formation of the social sciences in the Developmentalist period. Retracing our ancestry in our field of academic and professional activity is a necessity. This is because the construction of a medium-range theory, applicable to political organisations and popular movements in the concrete societies of contemporary Latin America, requires that at all times, the person who has done this work (a specialised intellectual worker) takes a stand.

I reiterate that:

Taking a position= place of speech+ political positioning+ theoretical-  
methodological assumptions + recognising collective identity

This statement concerns both the position of the intellectual worker and their role in the context they intend to analyse and influence. This impact can take place both as a producer of theory and symbolic goods and in work directly linked to a finalist political organisation that needs a theoretical body as a precondition for its existence.

### 3. THE STRUCTURAL INTERDEPENDENCE OF THE SPHERES: ANCESTRY AND ACTUALITY OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND ORIGIN OF THIS THEORY

In this chapter we address the importance of building this theory from the opposite perspective. In other words, we bring the debate of origin, of the place of departure and of speech - the theoretical front of a Political Organisation with a libertarian matrix - to the legitimisation of this knowledge as a doctoral thesis in political science. In this part of the work, I dedicate myself essentially to the debate with and from the specific instance of political formation, emphasising the appropriate language for an academic text.

The starting point is the condensed work of Raúl Cariboni (2003 and 2006) and the end point is the theoretical material of the Gaucho Anarchist Federation (FAG)<sup>54</sup>, a political organisation founded on 18 November 1995, and its strategic alliance in Latin America, the *Uruguayan Anarchist Federation* (FAU)<sup>55</sup>, founded on 26 October 1956. This material, called *"Document Wellington Gallarza and Malvina Tavares: working material for joint political training"* (FAU/FAG 2007), was drafted over two years and finalised in November 2007<sup>56</sup>. The intention of this document and of this thesis is to lay the foundations for a medium-range theory, the intrinsic part of which has already been explained at the beginning of Chapter 1, based on the modelling work of Gibss (1972), Thompson (1976) and Baquero (2004, polygraph). The aim of this

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<sup>54</sup> FAG, 2006

<sup>55</sup> FAU, 2004

<sup>56</sup> As I was one of its authors, I was in charge of a delegation for its defence and exhibition in Spain in September 2008 (see CGT Catalunya 2008; Libertarian Debate 2008; Nodo 50 2008; Rojo y Negro Digital 2008; Socialismo Libertario 200 and Solidaridad Libertaria 2007).

theoretical work is to offer possibility of both a totalising analysis (taking politics as a synthesis) and a prediction of incidence. The very effort of carrying out this work in general and this chapter in particular is part of the link that, through this thesis, I as the author set out to realise.

Having said that, here I define the role of intellectual labour from the point of view of this thesis and this theoretical proposal. I also emphasise the space it occupies and the very purpose of this work and the type of worker who carries out this work. This also marks out the vision of the specialised intellectual worker and the object itself. In the following lines, I present a vision of Political Organisation, the necessary differentiation between Theory and Ideology and the respective critique of the historical document coordinated and finally written by Cariboni (which began in 1970 and was made public in 1972). In the second part of the chapter, I present a section of my own (with the exception of the graphs), the matrix of which is the final version of the Gaucho/Uruguayan document cited (FAU/FAG 2007).

### **3.1. Ancestry and the organic framework in which Cariboni's collective work was produced**

The relevance of studying the following document (*Huerta Grande*) is due to the fact that it, together with the document called (*Copey: uma crítica libertaria al problema del foco*, see Chap.7 and FAU Secretariado General, 2005), are the predecessor texts of the matrix that we are discussing in the thesis. The author, in short, the editor of the internal debates as coordinator of a political formation team and theoretical front (see Mechoso, 2002, p.437), is history professor and former militant of the FAU secretariat Raúl Cariboni (imprisoned in March 1973, released in the Uruguayan amnesty in March 1985, see Mechoso 2002, p. 482). The intention of the original document was to provide, in a synthetic way, the basic concepts for political analysis (with a view to advocacy), from the militant body of a federalist and libertarian-based Political Organisation.

Before I get into *Huerta Grande's* debate, I find the author's characterisation (Cariboni) of the very concept of organisation, politics and power interesting.

I believe that this contribution is summarised and illustrates the following theme. Mechoso (2002, p. 194) contains the original FAU document, which circulated publicly and was widely disseminated among the social bases organised by this political force, and which is dated 20 April 1970. The title is "Political organisation is decisive" and the paragraph that follows points to a definition that I consider valid for this thesis as well:

*The problem of power, which is decisive for profound social change, can only be resolved at the political level, and through political struggle. And this requires a specific form of organisation: political organisation<sup>57</sup>. Only through its action, rooted in the masses<sup>58</sup>, can the destruction of the bourgeois state apparatus be achieved and its consequent replacement by mechanisms of popular power<sup>59</sup>. Certainly, the forms of power, the state, are located at a precise level of the current social structure. Although they obviously have interdependent relationships with the other levels of social reality (economic, ideological, legal, military, etc.), politics cannot simply be reduced to these other levels. In concrete terms, this means that political activity cannot be reduced to economic struggle, trade union practice [...].*

As a conception of Political Organisation, the original text (Mechoso, 2002, p. 195) - written by Cariboni but not signed - goes on to define the "demonstrative function" applied to specific victories, the accumulation of forces and the narrative of a discourse coherently articulated between political practices and their respective dissemination and propaganda. This permanent, activity is nourished by, but does not arise from, "practice

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<sup>57</sup> A comment is in order. In this case, that of the original document, of revolutionary intent; in the model advocated in the thesis, of the same profile, but acting at the stage of democratic radicalisation aimed at the accumulation of Popular Power.

<sup>58</sup> You can see the influence of the language and concepts of the time. For the thesis, the concept that replaces "masses" is that of social subjects, and the concept of "mass movement" is replaced by that of social agents who, once organised, constitute popular movements.

<sup>59</sup> In this process, the analysis methodology applied in the thesis includes the previous stage, as developed in Chapter 7. That is, the radicalisation of democracy through the expansion of universal rights, covering the three spheres and six levels of impact proposed here.



of the masses. This level is understood as the one that overcomes spontaneity through the development of a specifically political activity<sup>60</sup>".

The conceptual definition of the long term that I am applying is that organisation as a synonym for the permanence of political presence through social insertion, specific victories, accumulations by sector and the historicity of the struggle through hard-hitting episodes. This is in line with the theoretical and methodological position defined by Cariboni (as organiser), found in the book(s) by Juan Carlos Mechoso (2002, 2005 and 2006). Mechoso (2002, p. 196) associates "strategic line" with "the ability to predict what is to come, within a more or less prolonged period of time, and this analytical condition necessarily implies and includes the line of action of the organisation carrying out the analysis, so that this political body can influence the situation in the most effective and appropriate way".

Predicting events and understanding that the "strategic line" is subordinate to the final objective and constrained by structural conditions implies adequate theoretical work. I believe that this need, for theoretical work that is compatible with the challenge and decision in which the collective political agent (the organisation) is involved, can be generalised to any organisational model.

The prediction of this thesis and the dialogue it establishes with Cariboni's work (2003 and 2006) are rigorously applied in the Political Organisation model - with a federalist and libertarian basis, specified in Chapter 4 - advocated here, since this text is also the historical sequel to the work of the Uruguayan history teacher. I would point out that this is not an absolute model, since the type of political training and the theoretical-methodological approach are not absolute. Therefore, I would argue that for each organic party model there should be its corresponding theoretical front and respective training centres.

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<sup>60</sup> Political activity aimed at creating a public space for organised movements and sectors and channelling spontaneous struggles. The accumulation factor is the capacity for mobilisation and conquest and not performance in the official electoral game. As we have seen, this arena, the electoral one, is secondary to the extended model of the thesis and in the specific model, it is discarded.

### 3.2. The "importance Theory" and the work of Raul Cariboni

Below I present extracts from this text<sup>61</sup>, followed by comments, additions or criticisms of my . To make things easier understand, in this sub-topic all the quotations are from the original by *Huerta Grande* and all the unquoted text, including the emphasis, is mine.

The first relevant theme that Cariboni addresses at the very beginning of the text is "thinking correctly", when he tells us that:

*In order to understand what is happening (the situation), we need to be able to think correctly. Thinking correctly means organising and properly processing the data that is produced, in quantity, about reality. Thinking correctly is the indispensable condition for correctly analysing what is happening in a country at a given moment in that country's history or any other. This requires instruments. These tools are concepts. In order to think coherently, you need a set of concepts that are coherently articulated with each other. You need a system of concepts, a theory. Without a theory, you run the risk of thinking about each problem in isolation, from points of view that may be different in each case. Or based on subjectivities, hunches, appearances, etc.*

It can be seen that the text applies a definition that thinking correctly means ordering the data seized from reality (at least that which is apparent and tangible) and having a discursive formulation that is coherent with the objectives and conditions to which the organisational body is subordinated. The coherent articulation of thought implies the use of a theoretical instrument, whose "technical" dimension cannot dampen or underestimate the ideological (ontological) dimension that motivates the belief system that mobilises this group of men and women. The coherent articulation of the system of thought

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<sup>61</sup> The rigour and forcefulness of a text that began to be written in 1970, took on the format presented here in 1972 and is still vital to the day and moment when I finish this thesis, in the middle of December 2008, is surprising. The length, due to its ability to condense ideas, is also surprising. The text is no longer than 4 pages, in Times New Roman, justified and single-spaced.

instrumentalised (through the conceptual body), subordinated to objectives, within a strategic framework and motivated (guided) by the ideological dimension is what can make the totalising vision possible.

Thus, strategic objectivity is endowed with factors such as accumulation, position, movement, agglutination, concentration and large-scale manoeuvres. These factors are part of the overall framework of a political-strategic system of thought, which is a theory made up of a set of coherent articulated concepts. In this way, the organisation can overcome the particularities, subjectivities, impressionisms and specificities of each situation, social subject, insertion front and environment in which it is working.

Cariboni (2006) continues his critique and predictive analysis of the importance of linking theory with political practice: "a party/organisation can avoid serious mistakes because it has thought of itself on the basis of concepts that have an important degree of coherence. It has also made serious mistakes because of the insufficient development of its theoretical thinking as an organisation".

I believe that the above observation applies to the differentiation between a Work Programme a General Line of Agitation based on the calendar of established demands, historical dates and the agenda of parliamentary and executive elections. Theoretical development and a good measurement of the social relations surrounding the organisation can ensure the necessary degree of realism and the perception of what is transcendent to the idiosyncrasies of the internal environment. It is necessary to keep in mind the incessant search for the State of the Art of the Political Theory of Deep Shift Intention. This improvement must go beyond the limits of "intellectual preciousness", being what enables one to locate the collective body (oneself), the class sectors that one intends to organise/represent and the concrete society that exists within the spatial limits where one is inserted. Incorporating the rigour of analysing a piece of work for a specialised body that fosters and nurtures the internal debate necessary for the precise guidance of this human grouping that is organised as an integrative voluntary association. This task,

The aim is to turn militants into a critical mass with some capacity for formulation, so that the universalisation of basic concepts and a reasonable amount of information enables the necessary level of training to give real existence to the organic determinations of internal democracy.

In line with what Cariboni says, we see his definition of a programme and political line.

*Without a line for theoretical work, an organisation, no matter how large, is confused by conditions that it neither conditions nor understands. The political line presupposes a programme, i.e. the goals to be achieved at each stage. The programme indicates which forces are favourable, which are the enemies and who are the circumstantial allies. But to know this, you need to have a deep understanding of the country's reality. Therefore, acquiring this knowledge now is the priority task. And in order to know, you need theory.*

I believe that the above formulations offer us a visible modelling of the shortcomings, successes, virtues and problems too little or too much theoretical work, of the sufficient or lack of application of scientific methods in political work. We can conclude that good knowledge of reality, together with the quality of intervention in accordance with the final objective, is the direct result of theoretical capacity (here characterised as a system of coherently articulated concepts), together with the analytical methodology for impact (this being the superimposition of historical-structural thinking applied to a strategic analysis board) and the ideological dimension being preserved and fed back into the making of everyday politics.

By logical contrast, little knowledge of reality (little understanding of concrete society and its structural constraints) generally facilitates sterilising internal mysticism. This "exaggerated and sterilising mystique" is characterised by an excessively emotive discourse that only feeds back on itself, intentionally confusing the cult of symbolism with the analytical coldness that is a precondition for any

impact. This political discourse materialises for the external public, in general, through a very open programme, with little coherence (with conceptual evasions and low internal coherence), which corresponds to the qualification of political advocacy in an excessively agitational character.

I would add to the factors mentioned above the need for quality intervention, characterising cohesion, from the internal to the external sphere, as a profile of political work style. This form of procedure operates both in specific political arenas and in the social-political, social and associative arenas as a whole. After all, in public arenas, the conduct of its members is the materiality of the organised intervention of the grouping that aims to foster profound change. Cariboni's work also points to the style, the form of intervention, when the organisation is identified beyond the symbolic arsenal characteristic of politics, but also by the coherent discursive and analytical articulation materialised in the political intervention of its members.

From a methodological point of view, libertarian political theory has to engage in dialogue with other theories that don't occupy the same space, but that can be useful for the analysis and impact necessary for the development of this organisation. Thus, according to Cariboni, the point of the dialogue is the formulation of suitable operational concepts in the pre-existing doctrine. "We will then have to take the theory as we go along, analysing it critically. We can't accept any theory with our eyes closed, uncritically, as if it were dogma." This implies recognising and criticising at the same time, and not deluding oneself with the intellectual elaboration of others.

I understand that this also characterises an organic repudiation of "cliché" adhesions. In the term applied below, "trendy little poster", it is Cariboni's critique (with which I agree) of citation for citation's sake, of the profusion of discourse with scientific pretensions, but whose importation of strange paradigms and inapplicable ideal types renders that very endeavour innocuous and sterile. If this can be disastrous in the academic production of an intellectual worker, for a political training team that has as its goal

This sterility is the negation of the instance in itself. I understand that this is why the critique below is so forceful.

*We're not going to adopt a theory to put it on a "fashion poster". To keep repeating "quotes" that others have said in other places, at other times, about other quotes and problems. That's not what theory is for. That's what charlatans use it for. [...] Anyone who buys a large modern lathe and, instead of turning, talks about it, is a charlatan. In the same way, anyone who can afford a lathe and use it prefers to turn by hand, because that's how it used to be done...*

At this point, I see an approximation of the criticism within the virtuous circle of the academic world, of knowledge as representation. There is praise, albeit in different terms, for knowledge as a tangible product that can be applied strategically. I analyse this because Cariboni's text does not envisage the possibility of applying knowledge that is the result of scientific method and a coherent theoretical background, outside of the organic framework and the intention of being an agent of change. The characterisation of the "charlatan" as one who plays "a bad role" is one that I see as perfectly applicable today. This "bad role" can be seen among political operators and academics alike, among those who produce intangible discourses or import unnecessary or immaterialisable categories into our societies<sup>62</sup>.

This absurdity is caused both by the complexity of arguments that are not accompanied by a formula of incidence, and by those who simply copy and apply pre-formatted types of ideas. The universal pretence of a category or a set of categorical predictions, as well as the ability of one kind of knowledge to make the other particular and itself global knowledge, is the result of both the correlation of forces and the symbolic potential of the "charlatans". The difference in the "degree of failure", without going into the

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<sup>62</sup> When I generalise "our societies", I am referring to the concrete societies that exist in Latin America, encompassing countries, regions, territories or large divisions such as: Southern Cone, Andean Zone, Caribbean, Central America, among others.

The epistemicide that Boaventura de Souza Santos (2002) tells us about, when applied to political practice, results in failures with tragic ends.

The same is true when comparing the technology to be used, ironising "those who prefer to turn by hand, because that's how it was done before...". In politics, tactical anachronism can lead to the sterility of guiding ideas, precisely because of the incompatibility that these doctrine-like ideas will have in their theoretical application. Strategic misunderstandings, the result of confusion and "value blindness" as to what is tactical and what is strategic in order to meet final objectives through a permanent strategy, according to objectives and conditions, usually take a heavy toll on those who make basic mistakes.

I believe that the above quote from Cariboni's original shows a concern to produce theory whose product of analysis is tangible, accessible and understandable, with feasibility between discursive practice and everyday organisational incidence. This is because the main concern is neither political proselytising nor the foundation of political philosophy. Although these two factors are relevant, what matters is the tangibility appropriate to the terrain, the geographical space, inserted into the social fabric and class structure from where it operates and is organised. Knowledge as representation gets mixed up and merges theory with the pure ontological (ideological) dimension, thus making theory very unscientific, bringing it closer to yet another piece of discourse acting as a mirror of a belief system with scientific pretensions. The confusion and the pointing out of some differences between theory and ideology is discussed below.

*The deep and rigorous analysis of a concrete situation, in its real, rigorous, objective terms, will therefore be a theoretical analysis of the most scientific nature possible. The expression of motivations, the proposal of objectives, aspirations, ideal goals - this belongs to the field of ideology. Theory makes the conditioning factors of political action precise and circumstantial: ideology motivates and drives it, shaping its "ideal" goals and style. There is a close link between theory and ideology.*

*that their proposals are intertwined with and supported by the conclusions of theoretical analysis. An ideology will be all the more effective as a driving force for political action, the more firmly it rests on the acquisitions of theory.*

This definition above is a necessity that I believe is current. This is because the confusion between theory and ideology is present and permanent both in the field of political practice and from the perspective of the intellectual worker with a scientific and academic vocation. In the strictness of the proposal, Cariboni differentiates the ideological dimension, which I call ideological-doctrinal, and dialogues with the proposal presented in this thesis, characterising the ontological dimension as being of a non-scientific nature (therefore equivalent to the ideological dimension). Theory, on the other hand, according to my interpretation of Cariboni, is equivalent to the intrinsic and extrinsic dimensions of the theory-skeleton; and its tangible product, when applied in incidence, has its equivalent in political practice.

The theory's development goal is equivalent to the degree of specificity it requires. Maintaining a totalising capacity without slowing down progress is a delicate equation that is up to the Political Organisation to define. I understand that there are no limits to intellectual development, but there are limits to theoretical work. The mass of data, of raw information that passes through the intelligence cycle, will be as operational as the capacity to generate a tangible good with this organisation. A mass of raw, well-analysed data can form the basis of an overwhelming discourse. This same discourse will be just as forceful, if not more so, to the extent that the central categories are defined and put into conflict with the categories used by the adversary. The paragraph below deals forcefully with the limitations of the work of a theoretical front linked to a political organisation. This analogy can also be made with the knowledge produced in our societies and located in the field of applied human and social sciences.

*What this means is that the process of understanding social reality, like any reality that is the object of study, is susceptible to infinite theoretical depth. Just as physics, chemistry and other sciences can infinitely deepen their knowledge of the realities that constitute their respective objects of study, social science can infinitely deepen its knowledge of the realities that constitute its respective objects of study.*



*indefinitely deepen our knowledge of social reality. That's why it's inappropriate to expect "finished" knowledge of social reality to start acting on it in an attempt to transform it. No less inappropriate is trying to transform it without knowing it in depth.*

Since knowledge is "susceptible to infinite theoretical depth", Cariboni claims that this capacity is endless, inexhaustible. Therefore, the degree of depth required to influence and impact on and from a given society must be defined. The typical debate between comparativists and specialists does not fit into a theoretical front of a Political Organisation. If by ideological definition the model advocated here does not see the limitation of intellectual development as legitimate, this same model is guided by operationality. Just as this thesis believes that normativity is interesting for political science, as long as it guides and fosters the tangibility of knowledge, pure normative theory does not fit this purpose. Sometimes, too much data makes analysis so complex that it becomes inoperable. The same goes for abstract models whose variables are so large that they can only be expressed in a mathematical equation language and whose modulation is only feasible through a highly developed computer programme.

As Cariboni states in the paragraph above, the measure of depth must be determined according to the theoretical development, critical mass and training of the analysts. The preciousness of small semantic variations, marked by the "war of positions" between specialised intellectuals, generally lacking a substantive definition of the concepts themselves - or of the phenomena conceptualised and characterised - are as useless for political analysis as absurd simplification and fear of the societal complexity we live in. For the Real Game of Politics, there is no room for preciousness fuelled by intellectual vanity, and even less for schemes imported from other societies. Validity lies in the coherent articulation of a system of concepts that generates a sufficient degree of certainty and cannot be confused with theoretical blindness and symbolic distortion - the result of poor analysis and little internal criticism.

The criticism of this confusion between ideological discourse and theoretical poverty is characterised by Cariboni. The validity of his discourse is impressive.

*In a reality like ours, with the social formation of our country, theoretical development has to start, as it does everywhere, from a set of effective theoretical concepts, operating on the broadest possible mass of data, which constitutes the raw material of theoretical practice. Data on its own, taken in isolation, without adequate conceptual treatment, does not give a sense of reality. They simply adorn and disguise the ideologies at whose service those data are functionalised. Abstract concepts, in themselves, without an adequate informational basis, do not contribute to understanding reality either. The theoretical work carried out in our country usually fluctuates between the two erroneous extremes.*

In the text above, Cariboni outlines the difference between an operational concept and an abstract concept. As we've said before, abstraction is part of the guiding ideas, the doctrinal concepts, and essentially abstract concepts do not fulfil the function of the theoretical practice presented here. The issue of the "concealment of ideology" I see not as the characterisation of ideology as a falsehood, but rather as the masking of doctrinal choices as "technical". Because he is against this stance, which I agree with, the Uruguayan author simultaneously criticises both empiricism and pure normative theory.

In the case of pure, raw empiricism, he says that when the mass of data has no logical order and does not comply with a previously defined ideological dimension, is ordered by a synthesised discourse that is the fruit of an ideology that is not presented explicitly. This concealment makes it natural, thus removing the ability to criticise it, using as an example and reasoning precisely the ordering of data in the form of a coherent discourse. As for criticising abstract concepts, if they don't contribute to knowledge of reality, they falsify the perception of reality. By distancing theorising about society from the societal dimension for and from which we want to produce

theory, this conceptual body is also confused with the ontological (ideological) dimension, and at most it provides something of a doctrine, but not of an incidence and even less of a prediction and anticipation of scenarios.

In this sub-topic, I have presented clippings and fragments from the original text by Cariboni (2006), and I thought it best not to comment on all of it, just the parts that are most relevant to the sequence of this work, which will take place in the second part of the Chapter. Before going into the historical, political and theoretical-methodological continuity of the work that was coordinated by the head of political education at the FAU (between 1967 and 1973), I feel it is necessary to write a brief sub-topic presenting my condensed interpretation of the theme of ideology.

### **3.3. A proper definition of the category ideology**

The issue of the definition of ideology and the use or not of this category is the subject of much controversy, both in academic circles and in political parties and organisations. In this thesis, I have generally approached the subject, starting from a definition of the interdependence of the Ideological sphere as belonging to the world of representations, symbols, meanings, interpretations of the world of life and the whole universe of memory, identity and a sense of belonging. In the first chapter, we stated, using Althusser's text (*apud* Coelho, 1968), that the unconscious is an object of its own, unique and transversal to the system of domination and class structure. Therefore, its fruits cannot be a "mirror game or a falsification of material reality" because the formation of man from a hominid into a humanised and humanising product of civilisation involves the construction of meanings.

I repeat what has already been said and reaffirm my position not to disregard the controversy over the category of ideology. I recognise the debates and clashes, but I'm sticking to the definitions set out here. Delving into this subject in depth is yet another window opened by this doctoral thesis, the fruit of the FAU/FAG document (2007) and the dialogue carried out through professional obligations and academic work.

Returning to the focus of this sub-topic, the recent definition that came closest to what this work and its author see as ideological expression, I found in a text by Argentinian Susana Murillo (2008).

In his work, equivalent to Chapter 1 "*About Ideology*", of the book *Colonising Pain. The ideological interpellation of the World Bank in Latin America. El caso argentino desde Blumberg a Cromañon* (2008), the Argentinian author gives us a good definition of the concept of ideology. In this definition, she denies the idea of "false consciousness" and does not make an ontological distinction between the economic order and the political order. This is in line with Foucault's definition (*apud* Murillo, 2008), when he states that "social practices construct objects, concepts, techniques and forms of subjectivity". I go along with this definition and agree with Murillo when states that "from these perspectives, ideology characterised as false consciousness would contribute nothing; above all because this characterisation is based on the fictitious distinction between the juridical-political superstructure and the economic infrastructure".

It is precisely this criticism and the affirmation of interdependence rather than the metaphor of super and infrastructure that brings me closer to his concept of ideology. In this concept, Murillo states that the valorisation of the concept is aimed at theoretical progress in the understanding of various processes. These are (summarised):

- 1) *to see how the being born from a human womb becomes hominised, not only for biological reasons but also for cultural reasons;*
- 2) *to understand why, in the process of hominisation, the positive or productive mechanisms of power, developed in the form of devices, constitute subjective ideals;*
- 3) *helps to avoid the cynicism (Zizek *apud* Murillo 2008) that, despite knowing about the domination of some social forces over others (my emphasis), by omission naturalises this process of domination;*

4) *to analyse how power mechanisms are spaces of struggle that transform and are transformed by individual and collective subjectivities (also constituted within these spaces) at different moments in history;*

5) *sheds light on the understanding of processes where human groups in situations of extreme vulnerability sometimes adhere to authoritarian proposals*

6) *allows us to revise a notion of "subjectivity" where it appears as a "passive" product, in order to rethink it, subjectivities, as an active and constructive product, something that is also made from social practices.*

This broad definition in defence of the concept of ideology and the importance of its theoretical development seems more than satisfactory to me. This is because the political science practised in this work is based on the notion that, as human beings, we are beyond a supposed dichotomy between "spirit" and "body equivalent to a machine". The very Foucauldian notion of the body, of bodies, is something that is constituted from a historical perspective and appreciation. The ideological sphere is a constitutive part of a human flesh that becomes subject, but not in a transparent or necessarily "conscious" way, as full of pure reason. It is a simultaneous, compartmentalised process in which every condition existence entails some degree, greater or lesser, of imaginary, which is constitutive of existence itself.

Here I present the Interdependence of Three Spheres where the political-legal-military appears as a place of synthesis, but not as a determining factor, and neither does the sphere of exchange and production, such as the economy. A good definition of the role of the Ideology Sphere (an expanded concept) can be found in the work of Castells (2003, *El Poder de La Identidad*), specifically in chapter 1: *Paraísos comunales: identidad y sentido en la sociedad red*, more specifically in the sub-topic "*La umma contra el yahiliia: El fundamentalismo islâmico*" (pp. 42-59), when the author says that "*the umma against the yahiliia: Islamic fundamentalism*". 42-51), when the Spanish author states that "the historical result of an ideology is not measured in votes or ministerial portfolios, or even in organised popular support, but in its capacity to modify beliefs, challenge dominant values and alter global power relations..."

Even though Castells is referring to so-called Islamic fundamentalism or fundamentalism, I believe that the conceptual example above is perfectly analogous to the construction of Latin American identities. Thus, Castells' definition of the power of an ideology takes us back to its very condition of existing as a category. This is because the profound change in mentalities cannot be the result of a passive relationship and subordination to other social relations and practices. These forms dispute and counterweight of the specific sphere, concept and category called ideology occupy a central place in the development of any model of political organisation. This weight redoubles in importance and gravitation, to the point of deforming the field and referencing others (following Bourdieu's concept 1997, p.60), and its application can mean a decisive factor in the conflictive relationship between democratic radicalisation and the limiting and constraining constituted order.

## **Part II: The relevance of the 3 Spheres theory and the original contribution**

### **3.4. The three levels of representation**

In this Part II of the chapter, for didactic purposes, I make it clear that the original text is my own, that there are few citations and that this is a private version of a collective FAU/FAG document (2007) of which I was one of the editors. As is the pattern of this thesis, I have distinguished my contribution to the advancement of this theory so that it is easier for the reader to identify where the new ordering and the unique discursive construction are to be found. The following pages represent the authorial condensation of a text ten times larger than the one presented here.

The aim of this part of the work is to present the general analysis model in discursive form. To do this, I use the topics and the geometric representation, as I consider it to be didactically superior to the others. I begin by pointing out the three levels of representation<sup>63</sup>:

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<sup>63</sup> Note: not to be confused with the six levels of incidence, which, divided into the Interdependent Spheres, are, in alphabetical order: legal; economic; ideological; military; political and social.

- a) Hard core of capitalism - corresponds to the systemic level. By "hard core" we mean the theoretical elements (understood as constitutive elements of a medium-range theory) that give capitalism its sense of existence and its foundational character. Private property is part of this constitutive core; a exploitation; o disciplining of bodies; a modality representation, administration and justice; a coercive and repressive system; and the existence of social classes. In other words, a bourgeoisie<sup>64</sup> (in its generic sense), workers (also in its generic sense) and the distribution of an increasing number of people in the world of informal labour and social exclusion. This exclusion from formal labour and employment relations generates different notions and customs in terms of consumption, health, education and housing, always producing ideological subgroups.
- b) Concrete social formations. These are the concrete social formations that coexist in the same region, nations, forms of life, but under a system hegemonic domination. As a counter-face to the theoretical elements of capitalism, it is pragmatic knowledge that doesn't reach a high level of abstraction, even because "pure models" can't be found in reality. The constitutive elements of capitalism operate on all these formations.
- c) General elements of conjunctures (and everyday social life). It is the current moment, a specific social time. It takes the same definition as conjuncture.

This system of capitalist domination, made up of exploitation, political-bureaucratic domination and oppression (which includes discrimination, exclusion and repression) is made up of different spheres. In this model, we present three that we consider essential for the existence of the system and that generate interdependence between them. At least one more sphere acts transversally. The spheres of structural interdependence are: economic; political-legal-military; ideological-cultural with the consequent disciplining of bodies and individuals (ideas-representations-behaviour-"mode" of information and the technologies of power linked to it). The sphere that is transversal and

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<sup>64</sup> In this case, the generalisation that seems most appropriate to me is that of the English term *ruling class*.

"crosses" a all all other é a generalised generalised of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs).

This whole constellation of spheres in which the structures of domination that circulate through the social body are located is located in what we will call everyday-social life. As the purpose of this thesis is to operationalise the potential for the accumulation of forces through everyday political work, it is necessary to first analyse the social forces that have degrees of antagonism. This degree of latent antagonism is the raw material for the work of any political organisation intent on change. Of this constellation, the political organisation advocated in this work prioritises those that seem to be able to constitute social forces that have degrees of specific or general confrontation with the system of domination.

The sphere of ideology requires a determined development of its analysis so that it doesn't become delimited in the construction of the figure of speech of superstructure and infra-structure. We have already stated this in different parts of this thesis (including Chap. 3 itself) and I repeat here that it is the unconscious (the raw material of the ideological) as its own object, which is therefore unique and indivisible. In this way, we are saying that the ideological sphere should not be judged on the basis that its "function" is so often to distort, to mask "reality", "rationality". We are against this kind of statement, and see it as false and perfectly falsifiable, as we demonstrated in Chapter 1. We realise that ideas have their own kind of materiality; they are tangible and palpable. They are as forceful as an economic measure or a political decision.

### **3.5. On the concept of structure**

For us, the concept of structure(s) is the composition of its elements and their relationships, with the relational also making up the structures. The determination of one structure over the others would not be established *a priori*. This dominance would be the product of the respective analyses and is not given *a priori*. The figure proposed is that of a resultant of a



chain that feeds back on itself. In other words, it would be a global structure with no pre-established predominance of one sphere over another. In other words, no determinants other interdependence. The "determinant", if we want to use the term, would be the matrix that this global capitalist ensemble has in the current period. We are thus taking a healthy distance reductionism as well as relativism.

The concept of structure is initially applied in two ways for the purposes of this thesis. In this way, it is applied to relationships with slower change and relationships faster change. In other words, the speeds of change and transformation are different, and this calculation includes the variables of Alternation (faster change with a lower degree of conservation) and Permanence (slower change with a higher degree of conservation). For example, the structure of the state's coercive apparatus belongs to those of slow change and the practices of political activism to those of faster change. Nor do we try a priori to establish homogeneity of time between the different spheres that make up the social totality. The pace of change, in "theoretical" terms, is a matter to be clarified very carefully.

In this way we have a system, the capitalist system, which goes through various historical stages maintaining structural elements that reproduce it in its different variants in its historical evolution.

The model maintains the "relative autonomy (or independence)" of the different spheres. These larger spheres (the three mentioned as being structurally interdependent) have elements within them that are specific to other spheres, which we will call smaller for the moment. We also affirm that there is an autonomy that exists intertwined in perpetual articulation and inter-influence. They are interdependent spheres, where the smaller spheres are equivalent to levels of analysis and incidence. We used the term sphere to replace the term level, which gave the idea of separate blocks.

Ideology is understood, as has already been pointed out, to be made up of internal systems that also have their "relative autonomy", such as: ideas-practices,

technologies of power, representations and behaviours. Disciplining, according to this model, applies both to the more direct functioning of the system in general and to specific behaviours.

When defining ideology, it's important to reiterate something of fundamental importance. Everything related to the concept of Resistance crosses ideological systems without belonging to that field, since it is a more general category that appears in all spheres. We also affirm that the places of existence of concrete social formations are where ideological elements of antagonism, possible rebellion and latent resistance can be produced. This ideological formation of indiscipline occurs as a result of the social practices that social subjects must carry out in their daily lives. Thus, everyday life produces and reproduces the conditions of its existence.

We want to return to what was already explained in the first part of Chapter 3, which is the basic idea that ideology is a terrain made up of certain objects and scientific knowledge is another. And that the object of ideology is not to know.

In this model, we recognise the existence and leave for a second opportunity the entire relationship between the media world, both in terms of content production, political action and business organisation. In this sense, the sub-field of Political Economy, Information, Communication and Culture, with its relative autonomy and the recognition of technical-aesthetic standards as carriers of ideologies and promoters of behaviour, seems to me to be of great relevance. As I explained in the Presentation, both this area and the area of institutional engineering to shape Popular Power will have to be seen in the continuation of the work derived from this thesis.


Even so, I would like to emphasise the special attention paid to the big media conglomerates, where we have located them, within the field of dissemination of the production of meanings and ideas with an ideological background. A classic example is the preparation of the ground at the level of ideas and media facts that supported neoliberal policies, the basis of the "globalisation" that hit Latin America from the 1990s onwards (Amat, Brieger, Ghiotto, Lllanos and Percovich,

2002). Today, the media penetrates all spheres, producing very relevant effects in each of them. A vivid example is the coup that took place as a result of a media operation in April 2002 in Venezuela (Lopez Maya, 2004). I would like point out that delving deeper into this area, as well as into the political-legal structure of the model defended in this thesis, will be the goal of future work.

### **3.6. The representation of spheres and structures**

In this topic we point out the only graph that appears in the body of the thesis. The others are in the appendix and not in the body of the text. I felt it was important to keep these because of their representational capacity. To understand what we are portraying, structures are made up of their elements and their relationships, and the relational is also part of the structures themselves. The most stable and slowly changing structures condition the field of social relations themselves. These form a totality in which each sphere has a specific and differentiated form of relationship. Separation for analysis always suggests two things: that they belong to a common whole and that they have their singularities

Graph representing the interdependence of the political, economic and ideological-cultural spheres<sup>65</sup>



**Figure 1**

In figure 1 (above) the set of interrelated structures is the reflection of the projected spheres. At the centre of these is a marginal area(s) crossed transversely by the dominant structural ensemble. The marginal field (white, centre) represents the zone(s) for action from the margins. It has the meaning of the "edges" where the system does not have the strength for consistent reproduction; where there is a struggle of sectors in the different spheres and whose reflection can generate a situation of a-dominance, if and if from this area (of these concrete social formations), political organisations operate to this end.

The whole field considered as the sum of concrete social formations in the latency of a-dominance can be thought of as resistance. This area is the representation where domination exercises a very relative hegemony or does not arrive at all. It is where latencies of centrifugal behaviour towards the mode of domination are being produced, including forms of resistance.

<sup>65</sup> I've kept all the graphs in the version of the original document, found in FAU/FAG 2007.



**Figure 2**

Figure 2 shows the projection of the spheres in which the whole field of political, political-social and social practices manifests itself (with political organisations, representative parties, trade unions, grassroots organisations, popular movements, social institutions) in their constant interaction. Interaction is not thought of as the determination or conditioning of a political agent over a social agent, nor vice versa. Epistemologically, this interaction is something different and the preponderant influence of one level of participation (of a concentric circle) over another is not a priori. This position of importance and determination is the role of theoretical analysis and must be found in the evaluation of the stage or conjuncture of a system that we have already configured as Capitalist.


**F****i****g****u****r****e****3**

Graphic representation of the interweaving of practices from specific society.



As with all representation, I would emphasise that this is an approximation, in abstraction, of its existence in the reality of concrete social configurations. We start from the basis that power circulates through all projections of the spheres. In other words, even when it belongs to the oppressed in their specific and "own" practices, there is a conformation of power relations. At the same time, we affirm that where there is oppression there is resistance. Resistance is a constitutive substance of domination.

**Figure 4**



Representation chart where the field of social practices at the conjuncture level is applied to a concrete social conformation.

By conjuncture we mean the current moment in a complex scenario that manoeuvres different times. The conjuncture works in diachrony and synchrony, adding to the elements of chance. Here we incorporate the category of **everyday social life**, which is graphed in different circles on the same diagram. Only those social groups (made up of social subjects to be organised by social agents) that form or have the potential to form social forces (force would be the sum of latent rebellion and organisation through agents) are taken into account here. In a second step, this evaluation would include a range of collective social experiences that are of a different magnitude, but of a coexistence type and without a direct claim definition, but which at given moments can constitute another character or reinforce existing social forces. The circles represented in Figure 4 can be of different shades, such as: indigenous communities, labour unions, housing cooperatives, land occupations, demands for various rights, environmental movements, immigrants, etc.

### **3.7. The relevance of ideological struggle as an organisational form for identities, subjects and agents**

The ideological struggle involves the need to believe that ideas have circulation and validity, that the ideological has its weight and that ideas can be materialised. Since the workers' struggles of the 19th century, ideological struggles have been present as an engine and fuel for the aspiration to new ideas, with the same force as direct action and the great popular movements.

At certain historical moments, an articulated set of ideas, representations and notions are produced within the imaginary of different social subjects. This articulated set of imaginary ideas takes the form of "certainties" defended by these social subjects. This is what can transform these subjects into protagonists of their own history or into passive and/or disciplined subjects of the dominant forces. This is what we call ideology. Ideology therefore has to do directly with the historical constitution of social subjects and the way they express themselves in society. It is quite distinct from the notion that ideology is the falsification of reality, precisely because it is one of the fundamental components of any social reality.

These moments can expand to totality, thus creating a paradigm in terms of the organisation of subjects in the process of becoming protagonists through the struggle for demands and the escalation of protest. But at other times, ideologies overlap in the same society or live in isolated zones. Nowadays, as a result of neoliberal fragmentation, breaking the isolation of ideological representations with emancipatory potential is a permanent task, reaching the precondition of the existence of their core activity, of a political organisation with the intention of profound change.

Faced with all the changes and loss of social rights (Sanchez, 1998), faced with the culture that proclaims the end of ideologies and history, which declares capitalism and its institutions as the only possible reality (Lander, 2002); it is at this moment that the struggle

ideology takes on strategic dimensions for the production of a new historical subject.

It is at this point that the capacity to represent a set of materialisable ideas can be capable of confronting these dominant conceptions on basis of direct action. From ideology, from the power of ideas, it is possible to collectively articulate a group of agents in an expression of resistance and progress insofar as it summons different social subjects and turns them into agents capable of rewriting history and conceiving a new world.



## **4. ASPECTS OF THE TRAINING REQUIRED FOR POLITICAL ORGANISATION AND THE CADRE PARTY**

Before embarking on the subject, it is necessary to set out some of the basics needed to understand its correct development. This chapter seeks to deepen the proposal for political modelling, and it engages in dialogue with the theories and interpretations that have the greatest weight in political science as practised in Brazil and in which I have been trained. It is an exercise in constructing a typification of Political Organisation, a "party model", in accordance with the proposal of the thesis and the study and strategic analysis in the broad sense.

The hypothesis formulated in this chapter, from the perspective of social democracy, is that the accumulation of forces and long-term democratic radicalisation. The model presented here, although it has a libertarian matrix and perspective (as does the entire thesis), does not necessarily have a single ideological bias, but represents a possibility of application within a field of intentions, normative motivations and strategic interests within Latin America in general and Brazil in particular.

We assume certain preconditions that are always present. Every "party model" includes in its modelling the conditions and rules by which this party/political organisation is constrained and where this same institution (legal or not) is willing to go within its medium and long-term goals (we'll look at strategic planning in Chapter 7). To be theoretically coherent, it is necessary to present models that are feasible to test, but that are first and foremost applicable according to the hypotheses raised.

As I said in Chapter 1, the theoretical exercise of a thesis like this is impracticable with the hidden premise of a zero-sum game in the context of a really existing society. The problem that I propose to contribute to solving, particularly in this Chapter 4, is the possibility of building a visible, tangible process, in terms of theoretical systematisation, based on the political practices that actually exist in Latin America today.

In the following lines, the debate will focus on the parameters of political training, starting with the actual training that a political scientist undergoes at the training centre where I myself had the pleasant experience of tough and fruitful theoretical and methodological clashes.

#### **4.1. The debate on the characterisation and typification of the functions of the political party in the democratic regime**

I must emphasise that it is not the intention of this thesis or the chapter to enter into a specific debate about theories of political parties. I recognise that political science has dealt with the subject extensively, that the object of analysis - the political party - is an essential structural unit of analysis for the field and that there is extensive literature on the subject. According to Baquero (2000 p. 22): "The studies produced on parties have been oriented in various directions: those that examine parties from the point of view of the functions they perform; those that are concerned with characterising what parties are; those that analyse them from the point of view of their structures; those that from an ideological point of view, seek to understand parties from their historical role."

I recognise the validity of all these directions of study, but in this thesis and this chapter I am conducting a study that, from an ideological point of view, looks at the party in terms of how its structure works, hence a certain emphasis on the terms and concepts used

by Panebianco (1982). This approach to organic functions is to observe the type of execution that this unit of analysis has in the exercise of the Democratic Radicalisation process. In the text that follows, our analytical axis is the functioning of the political organisation and the training necessary for its projection. What changes is the explicit ideological point of view - and not the implicit, hidden premise type - and the location of the voluntary, integrative social organisation (a political party of cadres endowed with internal democracy) as strategic for the accumulation of forces from a classist and libertarian point of view.

Before returning to the topic of modelling this organisation, it is interesting to have a dialogue with some of the current literature. Specifically, I'll address what concerns the characterisation of the party, the type of participation, the macro-political environment (which democracy?) and the long-term process format in which this organisation is inserted. For the characterisation of political parties, a definition is given by Bobbio, Matteucci and Pasquino (2004, volume II, p. 905) when the authors characterise the party as:

*[...] the party comprises a wide variety of social formations, from groups united by personal and particularistic ties to complex organisations with a bureaucratic and impersonal style, whose characteristic is that they move in the sphere of political power. [...] the associations that we can properly consider as parties arise when the political system has reached a certain degree structural autonomy, internal complexity and division of labour that allows, on the one hand, a political decision-making process in which various parts of the system participate and, on the other, that these parts include, in principle or in fact, the representatives of those to whom the political decisions refer [...].*

Bobbio, Matteucci and Pasquino characterise parties as a type of mass organisation (pp. 900, 901) or mass electoral organisation (p.901) and see them as a phenomenon equivalent to an organisational configuration and as a set of developed functions (p.903). I characterise these functions, among others, as those of political representation, intermediation politics, questioning politics, influence on decisions.

I also understand this unit of analysis as a container that fosters and accumulates social and experiences of protest and contestation. I also understand this unit of analysis as a container that fosters and accumulates social force and experiences of protest and contestation. The function of a hub for strategic debate is the nature of the political party-type social organisation being studied here.

Villalba and Muñoz (2006, pp. 45-47) provide a more complex and complete classification of parties. These would be <sup>66</sup>: charismatic (with strong leadership from an individual, often adopting their name or adhering to this character); programmatic (structured around a programme); monoclassist (whose organisational and representational focus is on a class or sector of a class); polyclassist (claiming to represent interests common to the whole of society); doctrinaire (basing their political practice on a system of moral, political or philosophical ideas, with some discursive coherence); confessional (adherents of a social doctrine of religious origin); nationalist (invoking nationalism, the original territory with ethnic, cultural or religious motivation and expressing a desire for autonomy or independence); cadre (according to the authors, characterised by verticality of command and authoritarianism); mass (according to the authors, characterised by internal democracy and interaction between leaders, cadres and the grassroots).

It should be noted that most of the characterisations and typifications of political parties refer to organisations that operate and compete within constituted political systems. But this institutional engineering is not something "natural" in politics or in societies. The direct relationship between the complexity of the political system and the existence of parties us back to an earlier period of representation. It is important to highlight the stage of the modern state before parties, as a way of reinforcing the criticism of the "naturalisation" of an organisational form. For Bonavides (1978, p.439), the presence of the political party as part of the political, legal and state system was a struggle of positions. "In fact, it was not easy for the modern state to accommodate itself in legal terms to this new, essential and powerful reality that is the political party. It rejected it as far as it could."

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<sup>66</sup> In this quote and the one that follows, the comments in brackets are mine

I understand the importance of returning to a conceptualisation that predates a legal political system, and not just one that is restricted to the social sphere. Because in order to think about non-hegemonic models of social organisation of the political party type, we need to understand that the democracy of political intermediary parties is not absolute, nor is it the only way of exercising the right to organise and express opinions and interests.

The literature on political parties contains different theories, typologies and formats for analysis. I believe that an illustrative generalisation can be found in Villalba and Muñoz 2006, where the authors indicate the following characteristics of political parties: "permanent and durable organisation; complete organisation even at local level; the will to exercise and gain power; the will to call for, attract and obtain popular support; organisation and representation of social classes" (pp. 41-42).

In addition to these characteristics, Villalba and Muñoz 2006 present the levels of participation, according to their reading of Gramsci and Duverger. I would point out that, according to Bobbio, Matteucci and Pasquino, these typologies deal with mass electoral parties. I agree with this characterisation, since these typologies deal with social organisations with open membership. Returning to the characterisation of forms of participation, for Gramsci (*apud* Villalba and Muñoz pp. 42-43), there would be three levels participation: grassroots (they need cohesive force); leaders (they organise part of the cohesive force); cadres (polyfunctional elements) and other organisational elements (in charge of specific and political-technical issues).

In the typology described by Villalba and Muñoz with regard to Duverger's study (pp. 44-45), he divides the degree of participation into circles, which are divided into: voters (a group of citizens who express their preference for a party); sympathisers (confessional voters who openly and regularly express their political party preference); adherents (members with minimal responsibilities in the structure) and militants (active adherents, fewer in number and with greater organisational capacity).

The model understood by this thesis goes back to another tradition, outside the electoral game and which does not fit these typifications. For didactic and comparative, the organisational model refers to a party of cadres, organised by circles of commitment and adherence, and with internal democracy. In the doctrinal field, it sees itself as an interlocutor of a class front (classist, but not exclusive to a class sector); it operates for society through a class and majority bias; it admits and claims national and popular origin and is necessarily programmatic. We'll go deeper into the concept later.

I believe that it is essential, before going on to typify the political party, to look at the macro environment in which it operates. In the working hypothesis of this thesis, the political organisation is not necessarily of the competing party or electoral party type. And it's not necessarily a question of whether or not the insurgent type of exit is strengthened, but rather whether it deepens the capacity for democratic progress within the struggles and disputes for the expansion of collective and individual rights. Supposedly, the model advocates a distributist societal basis and, by logical reasoning, this is impossible without disputes at different levels. But before going into this, it is necessary to debate democracy.

Like most political scientists, I understand that there is no single theory of democracy and that it is in dispute. I also understand as valid the assertion that life in society through the exercise of freedom of expression, assembly, organisation and demonstration are the basic prerequisites for a democratic society. Although essential, these rights are not ends in themselves. And guaranteeing the stability of these rights cannot exist to the exclusion of the social, distributive, legal and economic dimensions of democracy. Thus, I don't understand as "democratic" a society that is full of rights, but where majorities do not have a direct influence on and about fundamental decisions.

Approaching this topic through the unit of analysis political parties, we find ourselves with a fundamental debate. It deals with the rules and behaviours by which the

labour takes a stand. To do this, it needs to debate which concept of democracy we are adopting? For Baquero 2000 (p.17), "[...] despite all the conceptual categorisations of democracy found in political science, two types of orientation have stood out. On the one hand, liberal democracy and, on the other, social democracy." For Baquero (*id*), although the result of controversy, divergences, debates and clashes in the bibliography within the field, both conceptions have the following common points of convergence: "popular sovereignty, human rights, equal opportunities and free expression."

I agree with this generalisable definition of democracy and see that in the advance of liberal democracy, because as neoliberal assumptions advance, popular sovereignty loses ground to agents operating within the logic of the market, the content of democratic regimes is being removed. Simultaneously with the loss of social regulation and the procedural stability of the political regime, other forms of political expression are gaining ground.

There is an extensive bibliography on the subject of popular movements, the "new movements" and their relationship with political parties. At the same time, according to Offe (1992, p. 164), "there is an increase in 'participatory' ideologies and attitudes that lead people to make increasing use of the existing repertoire of democratic rights". This characteristic exacerbates the distancing between established parties, operating within the electoral game and based on formal procedures and avoiding conflict in order to increase these same rights. For Offe (*id*), other factors that strengthen this gap in "formal representation" are "the growing use of non-formal forms of political participation" (such as those I have already described, which strengthen the modalities of protest through mobilisation and the generation of political facts); and "the political demands and conflicts of issues that manage to become 'politicised'".

This is because, as a result of the correlation of forces, there is the ability of a sector of society, an organised social subject (through an agent(s) with this purpose) or a fraction of the class, to succeed in making politically acceptable issues that were at one stage

Previously, they were seen as "moral, private or confessional". This is the case, among many others, with reproductive rights (the abortion issue), bullying (the humanisation of work) and causes directly or indirectly linked to ecology (environmentalist, preservationist, indigenous and peasant demands, among many others).

It is against this backdrop of breaking the monopoly on representation, criticising professional intermediation and being forced to operate in a terrain of fragmented and multiplied identities that the "party" modelling (read specific political organisation) of this thesis is being proposed and developed. The organisational approach of this chapter is seen as a focus for debate, an axis of analysis. It does not see itself as unique, but understands that the ways in which it functions reflect the political project itself, in living form because it is being exposed and reproduced in the midst of social relations and in increasingly complex scenarios.

The focus of this chapter and its modelling is on the organisational analysis and proposition of the political organisation, because "these are the essential concepts to be developed" (Panebianko, 1982, p.17) in order to analyse the political party. For Panebianko (p.15), "naturally, organisations, and therefore parties too, have a set of characteristics that obey technical imperatives: requirements derived from the division of labour, coordination between different bodies, the need to develop a certain specialisation in their relations with their surroundings, among other requirements."

Concluding the presentation of the topic, the modelling of this organisation involves an initial conceptualisation. *"The fundamental concept of libertarian political organisation is concentric circles. This concept is simple and involves separating the forms of action and the levels of commitment. The specific political corresponds to the ideological and is for politically organised militants. As this is not a mass organisation, it has no open membership. It is understood that the political-social and social levels must be massive and open to all grassroots militants. The social-political level is for a sector that is like-minded, that shares a style of work, but is not necessarily a supporter in the ideological-doctrinal sense. On the other hand, the social programme itself is for the classes as a whole*



*oppressed, to the generalisable notion of the people as a whole. It corresponds to the general instances of class and popular struggle, providing the organisation of the social-productive fabric, which is the pillar and ground of the People's Power project, through the process of Democratic Radicalisation."* (Lima Rocha, 2008, i)

## **4.2. The problem of repression must be taken into account**

The model discussed here is that of training middle-level cadres for a minority party, or political organisation with selective entry, with a view to accumulating forces, with the ultimate goal being some form of rupture with the established order, it is necessary for the theory to be coherent with the scenario and at least take into account the repressive aspect. In the case of the model to be presented, this modality fits the parameters of internal defence applied in the current Brazilian case. In every state or concrete social formation, there is a professional or non-professional apparatus for anticipating and defending the conditions given as norms of coexistence.

In the Brazilian case, the characterisation I apply is that we live in a regime of representative democracy in the process of consolidation (after 1985), where the agents of order (counter-insurgency) operate as a strategic reserve (last resort) against the agents of transformation of order (insurgency). In other words, the political and social institutions that exercise the political will of non-alignment, breaking the legal-bourgeois pact and the democratic consensus of competition for shares of real power, according to the definitions of the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (Agência/ABIN<sup>67</sup>), are potential policy generators

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<sup>67</sup> The text is quoted verbatim and its reference can be found in the bibliography at the end of the thesis. I quoted it in full in my final year work in journalism (Lima Rocha, 2001, Introduction), which later became a book (Lima Rocha, 2003, Chapter 1) and whose Chapter 1 has been greatly revised and expanded. It has since been used in training courses and workshops for grassroots movements and political organisations (since March 2003) and as basic material for continuing education courses at Unisinos (Strategies for Communication and Politics, 2008.1 and 2008.2, see: [http://www.unisinos.br/educacaocontinuada/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=170&Itemid=207&modulo=verCurso&class\\_nbr=4277&strm=0545&tipo=NAO](http://www.unisinos.br/educacaocontinuada/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=170&Itemid=207&modulo=verCurso&class_nbr=4277&strm=0545&tipo=NAO) and [http://www.unisinos.br/educacaocontinuada/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=170&Itemid=207&modulo=verCurso&class\\_nbr=4277&strm=0545&tipo=NAO&aba=2](http://www.unisinos.br/educacaocontinuada/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=170&Itemid=207&modulo=verCurso&class_nbr=4277&strm=0545&tipo=NAO&aba=2) archive consulted 09 August 2008).

of confrontation. These possible agents are political organisations and/or popular movements with programmes and/or intentions of rupture.

To specify the agent, these organisations work with sectors of the oppressed (or disadvantaged) class that have just demands. If these demands are not met, they may engage in acts of violence (see Lima Rocha 2001). The hypothesis we'll be working on goes beyond what the Agency claims. Based on the foundations strategic analysis, our premise involves political organisations whose strategic objective is to break with the established social order.

This differs from the Agency's premise that these organisations (which I call movements) could only resort to rupture as a tactical resource if their demands for reform are not met. In other words, the Agency presupposes the problem of anticipation based on the phenomenon of demands, not ideology. At the confluence of the characterisation of the problem, I believe there is conceptual agreement. This is because all arenas other than the finalists have tactical objectives. This implies that the short and medium term are part of the finalist process of the maximum programme.

#### **4.3. The study political organisation and the lack of it in political science**

This paper presents a medium-range theory in which the long-term container for the accumulation of forces in interdependence is political organisation and social institutions (with the profile of popular movements), within which this political institution has penetrated and is inserted. To this end, we will use some of the recurring concepts in contemporary literature, cutting out the tools that are useful for explanation, regardless of school or theoretical matrix.

The specific subject of this part of the thesis, the object of study, is the training cadres of political organisations with intentions of rupture. In our view, this topic is secondary in contemporary political literature. Particularly when it comes to authors and schools whose origins are in the central countries and which are established in universities in peripheral countries

like Brazil. This lack of importance is no coincidence. It is up to the social sciences of the central countries to formulate and serve as a laboratory for their foreign policies, dealing with both state actions and more common actions, inserting academic knowledge into the international division of labour. Unfortunately, many of the study centres at most Brazilian universities end up content to reproduce knowledge as representation, spreading the assumptions that prevent us thinking about autonomous and independent paths for Latin American countries.

I think it's interesting to point out Baquero's (2006, in Baquero & Cremonese, p. 47) definition of this phenomenon, some of its consequences and the possible countermeasures applied by Latin American political scientists:

"In the case of Latin America, 'dependence' on external paradigms has produced a stagnation in knowledge, as well as a paralysis of intellectual creativity in the sense of proposing alternatives to think about our history from autochthonous constructs."

It is precisely in the sense of the above observation and criticism that this thesis as a whole is dedicated, and in the case of party models, this chapter in particular. The following consideration is in line with the reflection I make in the paragraph above. Let's see:

*This does not mean neglecting or failing to analyse the contextual conditions of countries with cultures and economies different from ours, on which theories have been developed. On the contrary, these experiences should be used to identify the specificities of Latin American countries, but they should be examined as counterfactual evidence. This practice, I think, could help to identify the areas in which political scientists could act, going beyond mere diagnosis and normative description, because uncritically naturalising international theories<sup>68</sup> does nothing to help us to envisage emancipatory strategies from our condition as mere reproducers of theories. (Baquero 2006, p. 47)*

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<sup>68</sup> Note from me: I understand that they are international theories because of their strength and gravitation through their origin, i.e. the countries of central capitalism. They are not "international theories" because they apply worldwide or because they have concepts that can "naturally" be internationalised. In the case of Latin America, this attitude affects not only the

Returning to the argumentative development itself, I would like to point out that the intention of this chapter is to establish a dialogue and bring to the debate the background, including the premises, of some of the authors we present throughout the text. In order to maintain a certain coherence and the necessary polemical tone, we debate using some necessary tools that are presented (generically) in the training of post-graduate students in political science. In particular, this chapter is presented with a "methodological eclecticism", while remaining faithful to the object of study and the structure of the Thesis. We argue over the next few pages that an analyst's ability lies in using concepts as theoretical tools, capable of explaining, exemplifying and universalising certain categories, moving between theories without giving up their presuppositions. It is worth repeating that the space of one chapter is a limited approach, so we will choose basic categories for training the cadre of this type of party.

#### **4.4. The polyfunctionality**

Returning to the subject of the chapter, it is only possible to develop the functioning of the long-term agent of order disruption, the political party with this intentionality, if we look at the fundamental element for its functioning. That is, if we study the party's cadres, or according to the *especifista* tradition, the full militants, able to delegate and be delegated to different functions and tasks, with a good political and technical mastery of the activities carried out by the organisation to which they belong.

We are approaching an expanded idea of staff. This is not just the member of an organisation who is responsible for or manages the bureaucratic apparatus. It is necessarily the individual who reproduces and carries out the different tasks chosen by a political organisation as fundamental to its institutional mission. Thus, we understand the party cadre with intentions of rupture as a

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political science *stricto sensu*, as well as political activity itself and its ideal types that are advocated and defended as normatively positive.

individual with a good level of training to carry out polyfunctionality, taking on different tasks according to the institutional bases to which they belong.

By polyfunctionality, we mean that these staff members must be trained to meet the different demands made of them, both within the institution and in the arenas in which the organisation operates. Managing different times in different arenas is a necessary approach for this level of responsibility. In theoretical terms, this means that the elected arena is not necessarily the electoral arena and the competition for a mandate through voting. Historically, most of the parties/organisations that set out to achieve this finalist goal either didn't act in this arena, or had it completely subordinated to other times (Mechoso 2002, p.118).

Returning to the subject of training, the exercise of these responsibilities implies a certain type of training that is quite different from the training of oligarchic, entrepreneurial or technobureaucratic political elites. It is not surprising, therefore, that the subject is little addressed in the literature produced in the area today. We identify political and technical training as the central element in the reproduction and institutional development of these political organisations.

#### **4.5. Characterising the party of cadres with the intention of rupture**

It is necessary to make the necessary generalisation of what we are calling the cadre party, or minority political organisation, with the intention of disrupting order. This organisation is the space where the organic tasks and missions of the cadre are carried out as members with rights and duties in this type of institution.

Our starting point is the strategic analysis approach carried out by a political institution that we characterise as integrative (March & Olsen, 1996, ch.7) and with a maximum programme. This means an option to break away and leave (in the long term) the system of electoral competition (Hirschman, 1973, pp. 31-38) as a necessary condition for trying to achieve (permanent) programme objectives.

To achieve any permanent objective, you need at least one agent who wants to achieve it (collective and organised political will) and a concrete social formation that has this as a feasible possibility, even if only in a latent form. Since this is a collective objective (or at least one that extends to a large number of people), a collective agent (the institution) with the necessary development potential is needed to realise its institutional mission.

The strategic premise we adopt is the same: the objective is subordinate to the method employed, always remembering that the method determines the process by which the objective itself may or may not be achieved. We therefore believe that an organisation must prioritise its temporary objectives and the methods for achieving them. Even if it doesn't achieve them, it must act in accordance with the permanent objective set by the organisation.

By permanent we mean strategic and subordinate to the ultimate goal. Therefore, what is permanent belongs to the long term, and for this it needs a series of positive factors. These have to meet both the organic political will and the opportunity to exercise this will to their ends, such as:

- accumulation of resources: human, technical and material resources (in this scale of priorities)
- organisational expansion: capacity for internal development according to the needs of each historical moment (Clausewitz, 1996, book 8, chapter 6 and Panebianko, 1982, chapter 10)
- K social (social capital) operating on a fertile social fabric: network of social relations transformed into concentric circles of support and influence (see Bourdieu, 1979, ch.8; Borba & Silva, p. 107 and p. 115, *in* Baquero & Cremonese, 2006).

- political gravitation: influence over decisive situations in the collective life of a country (or part of its population)
- favourable junctures: a sequence of potentially favourable moments (opportunities) that are at least partially exploited
- field of alliances: tactical alliances (of agreement on the immediate and/or circumstantial programme) and strategic alliances (of the maximum programme)<sup>69</sup>
- political facts: political facts that can be position marking, resistance or cumulative, thus guaranteeing the public political presence of this political institution.

Considering that this is a political organisation with the intention of disrupting the order, certain structural conditions are necessary for this party have a chance of achieving part of its strategic objectives. These conditions are a crisis in the political system, at least in parts of it, especially in the mechanism of official representation. So that the contradictions of class and domination are realised by a significant number of the oppressed class sectors.

In existing terms, it implies disbelief (not total, but a majority) that structural solutions are possible under any form of non-distributivist economic system and where the central decisions of a country or collectivity are subordinated to private economic interests. Often, these interests are even minimally regulated by capitalist institutions.

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<sup>69</sup>This is a "profane" extension of Bourdieu's idea of the field. It consists of a political and social field of alliances between agents recognised by their respective peers and competitors. Ex1: alliance in the social field consists of common programmes between different agents, segments and sectors of the oppressed class, demarcated by shared political facts, such as unified demand campaigns. Ex2: an alliance in the political sphere can occur when two political institutions share a work front and agree on procedures programmes. When two organisations agree to raise the levels of conflict and use political violence from the same social movement where these organisations act with gravitation.

We recognise that the first stage to be reached for fundamental solutions is in the perception of this disbelief applied to the democratic system of law. This does not mean a dichotomy of sorts:

a) in favour of democracy X b) against democracy

or

a) for the democratic regime X b) for the authoritarian regime

It does mean that this process of disbelief points to a tactical relationship with the regime of legality in force. In this way, the mechanisms of indirect representation (such as elections to the Executive and Legislative branches) would no longer serve as an escape and cushion for the contradictions and fundamental demands. In other words, those that society would need to rethink in order to take on board the demands and identify a feasible model for social order.

The hypothesis of rupture occurs when these agendas are legitimate and legitimised by broad sectors representing majorities and are not feasible within the existing political pact. The current case of Venezuela, considering the *outbreak of* the Caracazo in 1989 as a point of fracture in the agreements between political elites and the electorate, can be a good example of this social condition. The distinction is that at that time, there were no charismatic political leaders or political organisations embedded in broad social movements with mass expressions capable of channelling the rebellion which, from being latent, turned into physical rebellion and attacks on private property and the symbolic goods of the existing order<sup>70</sup> (Rivero 2006).

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<sup>70</sup> A good example of this process duly capitalised on by organised social and political forces can be found in the study by Rivero, María del Carmen Rivero (2006). Specifically, we find conceptual confluence with the Chapter "La Insurrección", which deals with the so-called Gas War in Bolivia, still governed by Sanchez de Losada (2002-2003).



#### **4.6. A possible and feasible scenario for the development of this type of organisation**

In the specific case of Latin America, the area of maximum possible scope for the generalisations this chapter, the theme of independent development is a programmatic precondition for any process of rupture and also generates a society with efficient social indicators. Based on these conditions, it can generate democracy with more substantive participation. It is therefore considered as strategic as the country's type of regime and economic system. There is no determination of importance between what should prevail, whether a country with self-determination or the institutional form - political regime, political system and economic system, mode of economic production - under which this independence will be achieved. I start from the normative premise that one should not exist without the other. Thus, there is no dichotomy between economic and social development and a broad degree of freedom and political participation.

For this joint goal, it is the organisational modelling to which the chapter is dedicated. These premises are for the hypothetical (extended) model of a cadre party. In other words, a political party or organisation that has minimum entry criteria, no open membership and a differentiated scale of internal duties and responsibilities. This party, in its modelling, has the intention of breaking with the established order in the long term and defining a society with indigenous economic development, a distributist basis, a guarantee of political freedoms and individual rights.

We have thus pointed out two structural conditions necessary for a possible change in the constituted order (legal and in the real game):

- the realisation by the majorities that the political regime of democracy under the rule of law does not overcome the contradictions of underdevelopment; the realisation by these same majorities that the economic system is a determining factor in this social justice;

- the same understanding that there is no possibility of fair development without the country's self-determination<sup>71</sup>.

We take into account some positive factors for this project: political will is a precondition (normativity, prediction); political opportunity is a condition to be achieved, including unpredictable conjunctures; and the negative opinions the democracies that actually exist, such as the disbelief and lack of participation of significant portions of the working and oppressed classes in a Latin American country. The sum of these factors provided the minimum conditions necessary for a stage of offensive by this cadre party. To carry out this offensive, two other elements are minimally necessary.

The first element does not concern political agents. These are the set of parties and organisations that converge towards the option of rupture; but rather the notion that these same majorities have the understanding that they must take the lead in this process of institutional disbelief and accumulation. Conceptually, this is called popular protagonism. Since the model develops the hypothesis of a party of cadres as organised political agents, the channel of participation par excellence for these majorities would be popular movements by category, social subject or programme<sup>72</sup>.

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<sup>71</sup> Lacking a contemporary definition of independent development with social justice, since the end of Bipolarity left this hypothesis open and discredited, we only point to a development with a productive vocation, its own infrastructure and technology, with simultaneous income distribution, political participation in issues that are decisive for the country as a whole, freedom of assembly and association, outside international regulatory frameworks (e.g. IMF, IDB, hegemonic military power) and with a development policy that is not aligned with the current Unipolar world (with the US as an almost absolute military power and hegemonic in political and economic terms). IMF, IDB, GATT) and with a foreign policy not aligned with the current unipolar world (with the US as an almost absolute military power and hegemon in political and economic terms). The closest examples are the governments of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela (started 1998), Rafael Correa in Ecuador (started 2006) and Evo Morales in Bolivia (started in 2005). I say this while recognising that these governments are in the midst of a major internal and external dispute and lack this theoretical-programmatic definition.

<sup>72</sup> We are pointing out extended hypotheses of the relationship between party and masses, seeking to go beyond those pointed out by Panebianco (1982, chaps. 5 and 6) in the "classic" cases for the West, such as the Social Democratic, Revisionist Socialist, Labour and Eurocommunist opposition parties of Western Europe during bipolarity and in the inter-war period.

This means that these popular movements have to have a long-term programme and structural demands that minimally converge into a generalised popular programme (Lander 2006). Examples of common flags today could be: land reform, urban reform, an increase in the minimum wage, the right to information-communication and culture, a policy of subsidised prices or tax exemptions or subsidised distribution of basic necessities (famine). This convergence is a precondition for affirming the theme. If these programmes are fragmented, the leading role collective action is undermined by sectorally motivated actions, breaking down unity and leading some sectors to compete against others for the low distribution base<sup>73</sup>.

The second element has to do with the language and intervention tool used in this process. As this is a strategic objective of rupture, the contradictions of class, income distribution and real decision-making power have to be realised by the majority of a country's population. At the same time, in order for a gradual and "possibilist" reform dynamic not to prevail, which would automatically reinforce short-term measures, this has to be a process with a confrontational character. Using a political language of conflict as a demand, rather than collaboration for a "common good" of the generalised equilibrium type.

This is because the supposed "common good" would be universal in scope, and is therefore not taking into account the contradictions pointed out. In addition to analysing reason, it is necessary to make a didactic effort to expose correlations of force as inherent in political relations, increasing the correlation of force of the popular sector itself. At the same time, this correlation must be manifested systematically and increasingly, according to the majority's ability to understand and recognise it.

In material terms, this means using some level of confrontation and conflict, always according to the degree of motivation, persuasion and confrontation inherent in it

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<sup>73</sup> A discussion of the problems of coordination, a theoretical order and already classic and with generic parameters (for the reality of central countries) on the subject can be seen in Olson (1999, ch. 2)

of organised popular movements. This motivation implies that majority of them understand the type of popular contestation that takes place through direct action. It is also necessary to develop the response capacity of the political institutions of rupture. This is because the counter-response, the reaction, is obvious and predictable.

Repressive action by the coercive institutions of the current regime is part of the rules of politics and the existing pact. The difference can be whether or not these forces anticipate the situation, practising infiltration, sabotage or techniques such as the disappearance or kidnapping of militants. This pulsation between movement and regime necessarily implies accurate political calculation on the part of the executive structure of this hypothetical organisation we are modelling. The minimum level to be used is that which can be developed and/or understood by the protagonism of popular movements.<sup>74</sup>

Finally, the accumulation of positive and politically motivated factors must co-exist and be maintained in times of economic crisis and the legitimacy of the current regime, supporting the counter-measures of official institutions, including the repressive apparatus. Both the informal apparatus (of the military type), the generalised apparatus (ostentatious forces such as policing to protect production goods) and the specific apparatus, in this case the intelligence and internal defence agencies.

In classic terms, the group of parties that intend to break away, and from which they derive their influence on the popular movements involved in this process, must be convinced and have the capacity to convince that the benefits of carrying out their project and political programme outweigh the costs of repression that are systematic in the regime (Dahl, 1997, pp.36,37). With this degree of development, a strategic hypothesis is

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<sup>74</sup> Other possibilities would point to a hypothesis of an "armed vanguard", the best-known variable of which in Latin America is called "foquismo". "Classic" approaches to this theme can be found in Guevara (1987a, and 1987b) and Mariguella (1975 and 1979).

an "inversion of foquismo"<sup>75</sup>, pointing to a policy confrontation through mass and organised participation.

The hypothesis of a "classic" Fokist conflict would be a sequence of:  
Political Crisis - Military Crisis - Military Impasse - Political  
Solution<sup>76</sup>

We are pointing to the following general hypothesis:

Economic Crisis - Crisis of Political Representation - Political Impasse - Social  
Impasse - Application of resources on a social, military and political level according to the  
conditions of development of both sets of specific agents (regime and anti-regime).

It is at this last moment that Dahl's hypothesis (1997, ch.1) would be hegemonic for the major political coalitions, the elites who operate the political system itself, the elites of the state bureaucracy who operate the law, the ruling class associations and networks and the high command of the military. It is precisely at this moment that multiple scenarios can emerge, leaving the possibility of victory or defeat open<sup>77</sup>.

In the case of Latin America, they could be hypothesised:

- breaks in unity and hierarchy within the repressive forces;
- US military interventions (directly or indirectly);

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<sup>75</sup> This is a first attempt to test the inverse of the foquista model mentioned in the note above.

<sup>76</sup> It's worth noting that this model, although not foquista, was the one used in Algeria's war of national liberation (1954-1962). In the Cuban case (1957-1959), the final stage was a military victory.

<sup>77</sup> Some openings for reform and partial negotiated solutions are a permanent feature any regime and should never be overlooked. Authoritarian regimes find it easier to galvanise opposition against them, and the opposite is true of socio-political conflicts in regimes with institutional channels of participation that are still open.

- isolation of neighbouring countries, depending on the size and power of the states in internal conflict, even the intervention of neighbours under US supervision;
- the creation of de facto regimes, albeit under an "institutional umbrella", such as the Fujimori government in Peru, 1992-2000;
- an economic crisis of serious proportions, with the circulation of several currencies and the application of multiple exchange systems;
- the establishment of territories of non-control and/or dual power under various controls (including the crime of coordinated metropolitan gangs, as is the case today in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro).

It's worth emphasising that none of these scenarios described above guarantees a certain victory. Rather, it only ensures a crisis of regime and governability in the broadest sense, which could lead to greater autonomy of action and hegemony for the party model we have discussed. This part of the work then points to appropriate scenarios and conditions for the development of integrative political institutions (March & Olsen, 1997, ch.7). These are made up of voluntary members (i.e. voluntary political associations, see: Fontes, 1996) and are equivalent to the political level of a conflict with wider social proportions. The political and social level, in this model, is also made up of voluntary associations, but of an open and mass nature.

The strategic objectives, structural constraints and scenarios projected in this part of the chapter serve as a backdrop for getting into the subject of the type of training appropriate for staff who have to fulfil this type of institutional mission. These are minimum definitions with a basic operational projection.

#### **4.7. On the subject of staff training and the favourable institutional environment**

Since this chapter deals with the hypothesis of the development of a minority political organisation, or cadre party, with the intention of breaking with the established order, the development variables for this type of political institution are conditioned by its institutional mission. As we stated above, we are trying to generalise a scenario of social conflict with the protagonism of the oppressed and working class majorities.

This hypothesis automatically rules out solutions and processes developed through enlightened armed vanguards and/or political proselytising. Since the current situation does not allow for precise and rigorous visualisations of the ideological programme of this type of party, we dare to point out a "generic ideological umbrella" within the political panorama of the Latin American left after the Zapatista uprising (1994) and the overthrow of Ecuadorian president Abdala Bucaram (1997).

In the modelling exercise, I'm looking for something that points towards a social order with fair distribution, national independence and substantive, participatory democracy, with institutional experimentation along these lines. This type of organisation would be the current (post-bipolarity) version of a sum of national liberation and democracy objectives of a socialist nature, added to the accumulations of current or historical experiences in Latin America.

Through binary logical reasoning, if the hypothesis of a "self-declared vanguard" is not considered valid, then the condition of minority organisation has the political style of promoting voluntary social institutions of a mass nature. Since this same hypothesis points to two axes of lowest common denominator - political-ideological specificism and the protagonism of the social bases - they become the foundation for characterising the type of political institution we are dealing with.

Thus, for this organisation, the official political level of competition through elections is not even considered at the tactical level of action. Recent experiences in Latin America have proven the limitations of this type of action for the purposes of disruption. The same applies to occupying state structures in order to try to change the correlation of forces and institutional mission from the inside in order to make them public. Institutional experimentation within the regime of legality is also considered tactical and non-deterministic in order to fulfil its objective. By exclusion, exits by way of rupture are strategic and prioritised.

One aspect is important to emphasise, and that is the theme of the insertion and conditioning of the social bases towards a finalist objective within a permanent strategy. The theme of control by left-wing parties over popular movements is, in the chapter and the thesis, the exact opposite of that developed by Panebianko, when he generalised the experience of European social democracy (chapters 5 and 6). Thus, instead of being inflexible towards its own base and compromising with the parties of the bourgeoisie on the basis of this bargaining chip (the trade union and mass level), this type of party points towards structures of internal democracy, both in its internal bodies and in the class movements it affects and/or hegemonises<sup>78</sup>.

In concrete terms, this political institution defends and applies internal democracy, resolute self-determination and the independence of popular movements from class parties (including the party itself). This space ensures the autonomy of the oppressed social class vis-à-vis all the political institutions acting within and on it. Internal democracy would serve as a prerogative against crystallisation with bureaucratic or oligarchic tendencies (see Michels' characterisation of the issue in

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<sup>78</sup> Required reading on this subject is the interview with the commander of the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement/Tupacamarista Revolutionary Army (MRTA) Nestor Cerpa Cartolini (Cartolini, 1997). This publication describes the experiences of direct and participatory democracy developed by the San Martín Front at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the following decade, in this jungle region 1,000 kilometres from Peru's capital, Lima.



Panbianko, 1982, p.36). This is a device made up of mechanisms and decisions aimed at preventing bureaucratic deformation, both within the organisation and in the organisational structures in the social institutions (class and programmatic movements) where it gravitates<sup>79</sup>.

The binomial of social class autonomy and internal democracy at all levels points to a theoretical discussion that is essential for us to understand. It's about the very idea of a political class and, once it is formed, the possibilities of its development achieving or not both the democracy that is possible and the democracy that is desirable for collective agents. In theory, we would be faced with the extreme options of perpetuation without renewal, the so-called aristocratic option; and renewal without perpetuation, the so-called democratic-revolutionary option (for both see Bobbio, 2002, ch.8).

Based on these established options, I have formulated two more possibilities: one is close to aristocratic, transforming it into oligarchic, in other words, renewal for perpetuation. Another would have the same profile, but would insist on perpetuation of mission with renewal of personnel, which I see as normatively positive for the model presented here. In other words, the theme is that of training as an essential part of the desirable reproduction of a political institution (For a discussion and critique of the theme of the political class in Michels, see Bobbio 2002, ch.8, and precisely pp. 225-227). The discussion is therefore about the mechanism to be reproduced and the type of training needed to fulfil an institutional mission.

Considering previous experiences, this mechanism has to generate trained cadres to ensure internal democracy (at all levels) and the objectives of the maximum programme. The maximum programme, on the other hand, envisages the idea of accumulation and goes against the tactical solutions of minimum programmes, with partial reforms or

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<sup>79</sup> A classic approach to typifying models and forms of development can be found in Panbianko (1982, chapters 4, 9 and 10), for the relationship with the party's surroundings and the areas of control and insertion, I recommend seeing the same Panbianko (1982, chapter 11). The theme of control and bureaucracy is developed in the same classic, Panbianko (1982, ch. 12).

favours one category over another (see Przeworski, 1995, chapter 1). It is this that must be provided by the very political institution that advocates this thesis. There is no theoretical possibility outside of this, and this strictly rules out any hypothesis of definitions of "false consciousness" (Przeworski, 1986, p.81).

These hypotheses would be that if the individual does not fulfil what the party advocates for the class, they are at the level of consciousness of the class itself and not the class for itself. In other words, the party itself has already proclaimed itself the spokesperson for the interests of the people or the working class. We say that class behaviour is mostly acquired through an incorporated trajectory, thus coming close to the concept of habitus (see Bourdieu, 1979, chapter 8). It also occurs through efforts to insert and incorporate into a class other than the one of origin<sup>80</sup>.

This type of training is the fruit of strategic thinking and political will, therefore conceptual rigour and normative motivation. In this political institution, the need to increase analytical capacity is reinforced by identifying the real game (formal and informal rules, within legal and illegal parameters) and the priority arena in which this party is playing. Identities generate the necessary internal cohesion, which in theory reduces the costs of coercion. And identity is reinforced not only by origin, but also by identity as a people (ancestry and belonging to a territory) and class (understanding class also as antagonism).

The technical resources necessary for the proper development of the political institution, such as the discourse and political language chosen for use, are the direct result of training and guided experimentation. In addition to the basic concepts, formulated as analytical parameters and guiding ideas with a normative background, they must be in common use by all the cadres of the same party.

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<sup>80</sup> This concept is recognised by the left tradition as a class option. A Leninist term in disuse is class suicide, often used for university student sectors with the possibility of ascension or social mobility through graduation, or for the part of this sector that goes to university to receive training to renew perpetuation.

#### **4.8. Habitus, mastery and intelligibility of the codes of the classes you are in, the idea of social insertion and adequate recruitment**

We're going to look specifically at the issue of social insertion, both of the institution (political organisation) and of its operators (middle management, full militants). We understand that the issue of habitus also generates identity and cohesion. It is mostly related to sources of recruitment and social insertion. By insertion we mean permanence and institutional development over time and in certain chosen and possible social spaces. It also has a specific relationship with the training of members who have already joined. Coercive, executive, deliberative and sanctioning mechanisms are related to the party's internal structure and organisational development.

Thus, training, developed by an appropriate and determined body with a collective mandate from the political organisation, is, in this hypothetical case, a process with fixed stages, but which develops permanently. Its aim is to equip the potential of the full members (with full rights and duties) a given political institution with a strictly defined mission. The key concept of this training, in addition to the content, is equivalence between the members, seeking to reach a minimum level that is desirable for the group as a whole and which can grow according to the organisation's needs and strategic planning.

Let's consider that this hypothetical party considers it necessary, in order to carry out its programme, to equip the institution with cadres trained and based in social segments of the oppressed classes. We're not talking specifically about factories or slums, but a range of sectors, segments and social territories to be seen as working fronts. There are various organisational possibilities, whether by excluded social subject such as women, blacks, indigenous people or marginalised youth; by category of wage-earners or self-employed workers in the countryside or the city (workers, scavengers, pickers, labourers); excluded geographical space (residents' association in a village, periphery or working-class neighbourhood); within the field of Information, Communication and Culture; or constituting

more organic movements with their own structure (such as the landless, homeless and unemployed workers' movements). Finally, in this chapter we are not considering the possibility of identifying a priority sector to work on<sup>81</sup> in order to organise the whole movement. Considering that these are the kind of sectors to co-organise, via social insertion, getting militants acquainted with responsibilities (cadres) becomes the central issue.

Earlier, we considered that specific political training takes place within the party and over time, and that the central theme is getting acquainted with the social environment you want to work in. Therefore, the determining factor for party work becomes gravitation towards popular milieus, and fundamentally, through the familiarisation of its cadres. We only have to carry out a minimal hypothesis exercise to arrive at the following premise. Those who best placed in a given social environment are those individuals whose trajectories, family origins, tastes, mastery of cultural codes, penetration into the social fabric and generational belonging come from that same space.

In other words, those who have the class habitus already incorporated as a minimum starting point are ahead in the fight for insertion. This is the opposite of cultural capital and knowledge networks for entry into the existing elites, which are prerequisites for social mobility and some form of political entrenchment. Returning to the issue of social insertion with the oppressed classes as the protagonists, the entry of personnel who are already familiar with the sectors chosen for the party to operate in<sup>82</sup> saves years of training (just a few years).

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<sup>81</sup> In the text quoted by Bourdieu (1979, ch. 8), the reference of the habitus is that of the French working class of the late 60s and early 70s. In this article, we point to a variety of work sectors because the example of a party to be analysed is not the French Communist Party, as Bourdieu does, but a party model based on the flexibilisation and deregulation of labour relations, developing in Latin American countries, with a high rate (over 50% in many cases) of unemployment and an informal economy.

<sup>82</sup> We are absolutely not saying in a structural-deterministic way that individuals from excluded sectors, if they have the training and incorporation, cannot have social mobility. What we are saying is that the rule applies both upwards (mobility of incorporation into the elite) and downwards (insertion of individuals with middle-class origins and habitus into popular sectors). Factors of political motivation and institutional opportunity (e.g. scholarships, upwards; university extension work or social pastoral work, downwards) can alter this rule on an individual basis, but they generally exemplify the rule itself.

The ability to interpret these social relationships and empirical information is up to the organisation itself. The ability to interpret these social relations and empirical information is up to the organisation itself to generate the necessary tools, via specific training and interpretative application by its cadres. So we can say that habitus (in the broad sense class and people) is a fundamental characteristic for this type of political institution to develop through its militants in these environments.

As habitus is something that is acquired over time, via a trajectory, the essential issue then is to recruit directly from these same excluded sectors where you want to organise. Political training becomes the organisation's task, adding value and normative political orientation to the uses, codes, customs and preferences that already exist and that are brought in via militants from these social milieus. The integration of habitus, organisational and interpretative tools, together with a set of social capital values integrated into the social institutions of the same territory or class fraction, together with the production of cultural and identity goods that merge trajectories, ancestries and interests, is something that is proper and necessary for an integrative, full-time political institution.

One caveat. This is in no way a theoretical affirmation of the need to professionalise militancy. This is because we are working on modelling voluntary political associations, so professionalisation is not forbidden, but it is secondary and controlled. The same caveat applies to the reinforcement of the integrative character as a fundamental feature of this type of institution.

The conclusion drawn from the above paragraph is that the politicisation of social and cultural life, adding collective meaning and the idea of a common destiny (based on generational and family belonging) for a group of social activists, political activists, political cadres and their gravitational environments is a necessary characteristic for this model of political organisation. Reducing the distance between private and collective life, giving the idea belonging and collective destiny through political and social work, habitus and integrative effort (institution, with political cohesion through the affirmation of values,

norms of conduct, in addition to the party programme and class interests) are just as decisive for the possibility of political success as are situational and specifically political issues (such as campaigns, discourse, organisational forms and the use of violence).

This points to another characteristic, necessary as a theoretical assumption. Recruitment, conditioned by habitus and full-time integrative political life (for its cadres, partial for its orbit), points to the endogenous mode. Institutions of the integrative type, with constraints of force (e.g. the Brazilian Army) and an adverse external environment (like this hypothetical party, which is always faced with desertions, individualistic departures, unemployment among its members and the possibility of repression) should, in this hypothesis, have a recruitment (majority, non-absolute) of the exogenous type, but strengthened, through social insertion, also with family or friendship ties.

This debate would enter here into issues more specific to the organisation, such as loyalty, motivation and understanding of collective objectives. In keeping with the discussion of specific political theory, we say that this type of conditioning is an inhibitor, constraining elements with individual motivations linked to some possibility of private material reward, of the free rider type (see Olson, 1999, chapters 2 and 3). In terms of social costs, the sanctions and condemnations of their peers can make an individual (and therefore their family nucleus and those in their group of direct relations) calculate that the material motivation is not rewarding enough to break a series of loyalties acquired and reinforced over time.

#### **4.9. Returning to the priority arena for this model and its reasons**

Habitus saves the costs and effort of sanctions and training, but it does not overcome the problems of theoretical understanding and the mechanism of how the political environment works. This understanding depends exclusively on training, both theoretical and historical, and on experience, understood through empirical experience analysed in the light of the very reason for the political institution, of the majority of cadres.

Short-term or tactical solutions, such as seeing electoral participation as strategic, class alliances at the electoral level or, at the other extreme, some kind of foquista or massist option, can also be avoided if the tools of interpretation and the policies deliberated by the collective are permanently strengthened and studied. Delegating the militant's loyalty to ideological and party orientations only to individual experience or to the world of ideas (and conjectures of thought) is not strong enough to counter a dynamic that is already, from the outset, hegemonised by the agendas and agendas commanded by the ruling elites of a given regime; and in this case, the regime of representative democracy<sup>83</sup>. An understanding of reality (training), links through the social insertion of the party (through its cadres recruited there) and a load of material experiences and concrete political opportunities form a minimum set to maintain and adapt a political institution to fulfil its maximum programme of social change and breaking with the established order in the long term.

A final aspect necessary for the basic training of the cadres of this type of party is the adequacy of their levels of responsibility, of the priority arenas for the party to launch itself into political life where it asserts itself. For example, if the electoral level is considered tactical, secondary, or even denied, it points to other arenas for this party than the legal spheres of competition for shares of power. Internal theoretical practice is fundamental as a mechanism for strengthening decision-making, as well as providing a permanent conjunctural analysis. To fulfil this internal agenda in a "sharp" way is the

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<sup>83</sup> For a precise discussion of the electoral participation of European social democracy, see Przeworski (1995, pp.39-44). As this article does not deal with moments of rupture, but rather with long-term work under regimes of representative democracy without income distribution and political participation in strategic decisions for the country (Latin America), we only point to the discussion of "reform or revolution" in this work by Przeworski, pp.44-51. In this excerpt from the book, it is crucial to see how the burden of commitments acquired before majority elections (such as, for example, a national-statist transition programme, like the one promoted by Allende, Chile, 1970-1973), since this is impossible to carry out within legality, excludes other rupturist possibilities, since the tool of class organisation (the party, or the political organisation) is sharing portions of central government power, within the bourgeois regime, and with poly-classist responsibilities.

guarantee of the application of this analysis at the social level, which could be definitive for the success or otherwise - or at least the continuity of the work - of this party model.

An outside observer who doesn't understand the strategic objectives of a particular political institution tends to see this type of party as "suicidal" (if they analyse it through the lens of political behaviour) or "infantile" (in a more precarious understanding of evolutionism)<sup>84</sup>. If the priority political game for this organisation is the arena of real power, the understanding changes. The determining factor becomes the raw material of political science itself, which is formed by the power relations in a society that actually exists. In the case of Latin America, a society of classes and social control by the regime's elites over the generally under-represented majorities.

If this is the arena chosen by the organic model, then there is an equivalence of purpose and political conduct according to the programme and analysis of this type of organisation. Contrary to the traditional model of analysis, what we believe could happen is precisely the opposite of the contradiction of the most acute interests of the party base against the central agreements of a ruling elite, as in the case studies dealt with by Panebianco (1982) and Tsebelis (1998), such as the European Labour and Social Democratic parties.

We understand that there is a greater chance of a collective determination not being applied by individual managers, due to motivations of material reward, coercion from their base (direct needs), individual rewards and lack of analytical rigour. To overcome this type of chronic problem, all the constraining factors mentioned above are needed, plus disciplinary measures (organisational coercion, punitive measures and moral sanctions) that vary according to the type of defection suffered and the organic limits of the party in question (Anguita and Caparrós, 1998, part 24)<sup>85</sup>. The

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<sup>84</sup> For a more precise discussion of political suicide in the legal-electoral field see Tsebelis, 1998, (ch.5).

<sup>85</sup> In tougher times, some organisations of this kind even have legal bodies internal, applying minimal to extreme punishments. A good discussion of party legal experience



correlation between the level of confrontation with the regime, the level of violence employed and the level of punishment expected as a factor of internal discipline. The weight of the gravitation and social legitimacy acquired can also endow social movements in this orbit with their own instance of legality, acting as a mechanism of collective coercion in accordance with the institutionality agreed upon collectively, acting with varying degrees of participation and deliberation.

Returning to the issue of political analysis of the arena in which a particular party is playing and launching itself, this can only be understood and analysed if we know the strategic objective of the party and the degree of understanding and loyalty that its militants and cadres have towards their own ultimate objective and the permanent strategy defined. We therefore understand that training begins with and is complemented by strategic analysis in the broad sense, because this model of minority organisation has as its institutional mission a political impact within and through a class conflict. As we said at the beginning of the chapter, in this theoretical assumption, the objective is subordinate to the method and the method develops according to the needs of the moment in order to accumulate positive factors for the long-term objective.

#### **4.10. The ancestry of the organisational model developed here**

The model presented in this thesis and in this chapter in particular is not new to the world of politics. If studies on the subject are new or non-existent, if this way of doing politics has not become an object of study, this has been due to the correlation of forces within the field and academia and the lack of transposition of the debates waged on the global left into the academic universe. As presented in sub-item 4.1, this model deals with the political organisation of militants who specifically adhere to an ideological-doctrinal body. Because it is not a mass organisation, in contrast, it is in the format of cadres, without open affiliation and whose degree of commitment is given through the

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within another regime can be found in the largest and most important political-military organisation of the Peronist left, the Argentine Montoneros, 1968-1980. For a first approach to the subject, see Anguita & Carrapós, 1998, part 24.

concentric concentric circles. In internal internal a legal-political legal-political-administrative division. Although not exclusive, this way of organising is generally attributed to adherents of anarchist ideology<sup>86</sup>. This modality has gained definitions throughout its history, such as: organicism, platformism, specifism<sup>87</sup>.

The federalist form of organisation is not new, as we have already said. In 1868, within the International Workers' Association (AIT, see *Collective Libertarian Struggle*, 2000, pp. 76-79), the so-called federalist wing had an organised political force called the International Alliance for Socialist Democracy (known as the Bakuninian Alliance, see *id*), whose best-known public figure was the Russian militant Mikhail Bakunin (1814/1876, see Cappelletti 1968). The Alliance functioned as a cadre organisation of the "carbonary" type, with the majority of its militants working underground. Some public figures were known leaders within the AIT, and it did not operate within a specific country or territory. It was usual to send delegates and agents to distant countries and regions, both to organise socially, to structure an Alliance cell and for specific insurrectionary episodes.

Another reference experience in this party model was founded in 1891, the Socialist Revolutionary Anarchist Party (PSRA, known as the Malatestian Party, *Collective Libertarian Struggle* 2002, p. 43) and its best-known referent is the Neapolitan anarchist Errico Malatesta (1853/1932, *id*). Although it had a clandestine organisation, the PSRA's party form was more like the usual one. Its militants referred to the mass (social) and current (political-social) levels and political propaganda material.

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<sup>86</sup> The specifist/organicist/platformist form is not the only form of anarchism. Other strands propose the "federation of groups" model (also known as synthesis federation, or synthetist) and also the "affinity groups" form (which can go as far as organising themselves into a federation of groups or networks). Most of the literature, even that ontologically linked to anarchism, deals with the political philosophy of those who profess this ideology, and pays little attention to the organic and administrative structure of their organisations. The focus of this thesis is precisely to start the debate on this structure.

<sup>87</sup> The major divisions of anarchism in the form of political philosophy are better known. The tradition of thought adhering to the specific organisation of anarchism is generally associated as anarcho-communist, coming from Bakunin's collectivists (*Collective Libertarian Struggle*, 2002, pp.10-12). The wing that doesn't understand the need to separate the political from the social-political level has synthesised the ideas of anarchism and syndicalism, resulting in anarcho-syndicalism (for Malatesta's critique of the concept, see Coelho, 2008, pp. 124-126).

Its militants were more of a polyfunctional type, including the types of direct action practised in Italy at the time (from the foundation to the fascist coup of 1922, see Guérin 1968, pp. 127-131).

From the Russian Revolution, acting specifically in Ukraine, came the accumulated experience of mass political organisation in the midst of the civil war (1918-1921). The Ukrainian Peasants' Insurrectionary Army (Black Army, also known as *Machnovicna*, or *Macknovist*, see Archinov, 1976), whose militant leader was Nestor Ivánovitch Makhnó (1888/1934, Libertarian Struggle Collective 2001), had political-military-administrative hegemony over vast swathes of Ukraine, and developed an action based on collectivised production at the head of which was an army based on mobile cavalry, all of whose command posts were elected. There was then a fusion of political organisation and libertarian militia, simultaneously promoting the war of movements, political federalism and socio-economic self-management. With the defeat of the Red Army in 1921, some survivors of the Black Army General Staff regrouped in Paris, France and wrote a political manifesto, recognised as a work of anarchist political theory called the Organisational Platform of the Libertarian Communists (see in full in Dielo Trouda 1997). In this document, which was widely circulated in the 1920s and 1930s, four basic theoretical orientations are expressed for the model to this day: Tactical Unity, Theoretical Unity, Collective Responsibility and Federalism.

The historical experiences and accumulation between and from these organisations could result in a whole thesis. But, to highlight here in this work, what these organisational models have in common is: the selection of membership (cadre party); non-participation in state elections (anti-electoralism); active minority-type action (as opposed to the class vanguard conception); the internal federative structure and defended as a mode of social organisation (political federalism); the systematic use of force, in collective and mass-type conflicts (direct action as a priority means of generating political facts); projection of organised social structures as a priority, eliminating professional intermediation (popular protagonism) and the existence of the possibility of criticism

and internal promotion, with the increase in political responsibilities depending on the degree of commitment of the activist (internal democracy and renewal).

The historical examples given above are non-exclusive references. For this thesis, we have taken as a basis for dialogue the experiences of the Uruguayan Anarchist Federation (FAU, founded in 1956, see Mechoso 2005, pp.313-316) and the Gaucho Anarchist Federation (FAG, founded in 1995, see FAG 2006). At no point is it claimed that the three organisations mentioned here are more important historically than others, and in the case of Latin American anarchism, that the ideology is encapsulated in the specificism practised in the Southern Cone.

#### **4.11. Development of the organisational model outlined here**

First of all, it's worth remembering that this is an approach to the subject of cadre training. The party model studied is the exact opposite of what the hegemonic political science literature in Latin America in general, and Brazil in particular, puts forward as a "model". At the very least, it is the opposite of what we see in our own training as political scientists, belonging to the lower echelons of an intellectual elite subsidised with state funds to develop concepts and cognitive capacities for the benefit of the majority of tax payers in the country.

That's why the dialogue is with the counterpoint to the "single model": aggregative political institutions, with professionalised bureaucratic hierarchies and participating in the competition for shares of legal-constitutional power. At no point did we intend to be normative in the sense of saying that party model X is better than party model Y. Such a statement does not stand up to scrutiny. That kind of statement does not stand up to any rigorous analysis. Better for what? Which institution is suited to fulfilling an institutional mission other than its original one? This is the fundamental debate.

What we are trying to start doing is a theoretical study, with interpretative rigour and intensity like that which the literature (by which we have been trained<sup>88</sup>) applies to majority models. The attempt is to look for models applied hypotheses that can be thought of for and in Latin America. And, within scientific realism, taking into account the determining factors that this implies.

The training that a party model has to apply is in line with its structural needs and political objectives (staggered in time and priority). Since this model of political institution would seek to promote the protagonism of popular sectors, a physical and ideological presence in these circles is fundamental to its organisational success. This leads us to understand the concept of *habitus* as fundamental. In other words, recruitment must be geared towards those who are legitimised in these media, i.e. those who have the *habitus* of the class and segments they want to organise. This hypothesis is not exclusive, but it saves information costs and training efforts (for the social insertion of elements from the middle class or university sectors) that can take years.

However, the ability to make policy cannot be delegated to the origins and trajectories of an organisation's staff. The trajectory is a starting point for the application of strategic thinking, always in line with the institution's objectives. Seeking a complex model of analysis, training factors have to be added to recruitment (already endowed with *habitus*) and analytical training. This is in terms of conceptual training and getting used to the environment you want to organise. It remains to be seen in this chapter and in the thesis itself how much technical training or political-technical application is necessary for any political institution (whatever its model and purpose), such as those listed above.

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<sup>(88)</sup> I'm referring specifically to the so-called *main stream*, or the supposed State of the Art, of hegemonic political science.

#### 4.12. Conclusive aspects on the subject of the party of cadres

I would point out that it cannot be emphasised enough that a political institution of this model depends decisively on the good work of its staff. This brings us to classic discussion of political virtue, which is now analysed under the concept of the quality of political leadership. Both this theme and the political-technical one are not covered in this study, but I would just like to recognise their importance.

What we are saying is that the same effort used by disadvantaged individuals or segments to achieve mobilisation (and social ascension, because mobilisation doesn't necessarily have to be upwards) is used in the opposite direction. In other words, various analytical categories are valid for this type of party model, as long as it is taken into account that the model implies a different objective from that addressed by the hegemonic literature.

As we've said before, the themes in political science are imposed by the needs and desires of the reality around study centres and by the identity projection and ambitions of the producer of this type of knowledge. Thus, we see this topic as increasingly necessary in a Latin American and Brazilian scenario of a changing (neoliberal) model and with obvious and enormous limitations on the possibilities of substantive democracy through electoral competition<sup>89</sup>.

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<sup>89</sup> We are referring to the little room for manoeuvre seen in the 2002 presidential election (which we will look at in Chapter 5), taking as an example the agreements made with the IMF, through the meeting and public commitment made by the four main candidates to then president Fernando Henrique Cardoso, in his last year in office. And, through him, with the global economic regulatory body.

## **5. THE CONCEPT OF THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIC RADICALISATION: A SOCIAL WAY OF DEFENDING, CREATING AND EXPANDING RIGHTS**

In this chapter we address the proposal and debate of a conception of democracy as a social form of expanding rights. The issue necessarily involves creating a concept of a process for democratic radicalisation that is applicable to the accumulation of forces in which the Political Organisation proposed in this thesis operates. I believe that without listing the correct and priority arenas, it is impossible to accumulate forces to empower the social subjects with whom the militant effort outlined in this work aims to organise on a daily basis. In the absence of proper planning, the power of the agenda is imposed by established and mediated institutional arenas.

With the lack of a democratic theory that takes into account the political process of empowering social subjects organised collectively in the form of popular movements, the agenda of these movements will always be reactive rather than proactive. As such, a political organisation that goes beyond the role of intermediary-representation and sets out to serve as a driving force and strategic force in this process makes no sense. The purpose of this chapter is to debate within the field of political science the pillars of a theorisation of the accumulation process for radical democracy (my emphasis), its divergence from the hegemonic current and the convergence of other matrices in the human and social sciences.

## **5.1. In the search for a "paradigm" for an area that is necessarily aparadigmatic**

It is recognised that the statement in this sub-topic may seem contradictory. This thesis states that the social sciences are experiencing a crisis, and that specifically, democratic theories referenced in Latin America have to exercise a constant intellectual struggle to be recognised by their peers. This is nothing new in the humanities and social sciences. I dare say that the struggle over ideas and key concepts, over the choice of macro-explanatory variables to the detriment of others, is something that is constitutive in our field. I assume that we are in a field where the ontological dimension necessarily implies the choices made, the tools of analysis listed as valid and the use of a conceptual body that is coherent with the theoretical and methodological assumptions and the ideological support of the intellectual workers who are dedicated to setting up and operating theories.

These characteristics do not contain any inherent contradiction or conflict. In other words, if we assume that there is no scientific neutrality in humanities knowledge, we admit that analytical precision does not imply a supposed scientism which, if disproved, would universalise one or more particular presuppositions. In the correlation of forces in the academic world of the central countries and its unequal relationship with the intellectual field of Latin America, the opposite is true.

Starting from this position, we want to make our contribution to overcoming a factor that we consider to be a crisis in the social sciences (my emphasis). We assume the condition of a crisis of paradigms and functions in contemporary social sciences based on a statement by Boaventura de Souza Santos (2002). For him, quoting Cuban literary critic Roberto Retamar, "there is no one who knows the literature of the central countries better than the colonial reader". By not looking for new parameters, and by refusing to recognise in their own historical-structural matrix ways out of the crises of the society in which they are inserted and from which they draw their intellectual production, it is up to the social scientist from the colony to play the role translator of concepts and presenter of normative theories that are inapplicable in this part of the world (Santos 2002, p.20).



Following this reasoning and essentially agreeing with Santos (2002), we are radically opposed to the scientific sector that is characterised by arrogant knowledge, which only recognises "alternative" knowledge (i.e. that produced in peripheral or semi-peripheral countries) to the extent that it can cannibalise it. I agree with Santos (2002, p.18) when he says that our activity is corporately autonomous (bringing together the "virtuous circle") and very aware of the use of this corporate autonomy, both to disengage from social struggles and the exercise of citizenship, and to enter into large mercenary consultancy contracts.

Added to these characteristics is the role of this social science as a legitimiser of the current social situation. Adapting (reconverting) to the new situation after the start of the dismantling of the national developmentalist state, Latin America's intellectual elites became unofficial spokespeople for Thatcher's statement: "There is no alternative!" (see Moulian, 2002). Working with the pre-definition of concepts per se, of fait accompli through an "economic" determinism - based on the financial economy itself, by the way, a discourse that defends the "free" movement of capital - they help with discursive elements to colonise the world of politics by political pre-determinations dressed up as macro-economic orientations, specifically neoliberal hyper-structuralism, applied as "scientific thought".

Along these lines, Borba & Silva (2006:103) argue that the application of theories or their disuse:

*Vacancies or waves of theories are common phenomena in the field of thought. Once the analytical possibilities of a "paradigm" have been exhausted, new perspectives and representations emerge to guide the explanation of phenomena. In the case of the phenomenal field in question, however, the speed of the transitions is striking and, above all, the lack of a more careful assessment of the contributions and limits of each of the "paradigms" in question, if it is even possible to talk about paradigms in the context of the Social Sciences.*

I follow the reasoning emanating from this statement and that's why this work also seeks reference in "paradigms" that I don't consider to be outdated, quite the contrary. I understand that "theoretical waves" have multi-causal factors. I identify two of them as relevant to the thesis debate. A "wave" can be the result of both the exhaustion of a macro-explanatory model in the face of historical experience, as well as the correlation of forces that derives from history itself. In the specific case of political science, the rise of Rational Choice was concomitant with the political victories of this way of thinking, with the arrival in political power of operators who advocated these premises and their ontological dimensions. The same had happened with structuralist matrices, hegemonic in Latin America in the period beginning with the post-war period and ending with the end of Bipolarity.

Vitullo (2007, p.17) and Klein (2007, p. 78) state that the gradually hegemonic presence of Rational Choice in Latin American universities, especially in the field of political science, is in opposition to structuralism and developmentalism. Consequently, he points to the analysis advocated by the theoretical and epistemological position of the historical-structural view, "because it pointed to the weakness of the national bourgeoisie, the poor structuring of social classes, the predominance of an authoritarian political culture and dependence on the major international economic and financial centres as factors responsible for the breakdown of the democratic regimes of the past." (Vitullo, p.17)

One of the changes in the "new stance" was a reduction in the focus of analysis. The big themes, the emancipationist stance, the concern for national development and the problem of dependency were left aside. One of the ways in which methodological individualism has entered our continent is in studies of the transition from regimes of force and exception and the consolidation of representative democracy. According to Vitullo (2007), the focus of the analysts of this new approach has been on political elites and their decisions, options and strategies. I would add that the supposedly "strategic" debate is delimited to the tactical framework (emphasis mine) of a

"democracy limited by the outcome of the skills, decision-making and rational strategies pursued by the leading groups and most relevant actors."

The tools used to analyse this are language, comparative examples and analogies. Vitullo (2007) identifies that "from this new perspective, the various political frameworks and situations will depend fundamentally on the 'moves' made by a limited number of participants and their contingent interactions". If we look closely at the justification of "rational choice" in Milton Friedman's original text, we can already find the same analogies.

In his 1990 book, "Hidden Games", George Tsebelis (1998, p: 44) presents the debate on the rational assumption of choice. By asking whether "the rational choice approach is realistic?" he explains the origin of this formulation, which was soon universalised in the field of political science by Anthony Downs (original work from 1957). According to Tsebelis, the most frequent answer to the question would be: "It doesn't matter; people act 'as if' they were rational". The most comprehensive way of answering this question can be found in economist Milton Friedman's article, "The Methodology of Positive Economics". Friedman (1953: 14) states:

*It will be found that really important and significant hypotheses have 'presuppositions' which are **tremendously inaccurate** descriptive representations of reality, in general, the more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the presuppositions (in this sense). [...] To be important, a hypothesis must be descriptively false in its assumptions.*

*Friedman gives three different examples to support the "**F-twist**", as the thesis of 'as if' they were rational.*

- the skilful billiard players who shoot as if they knew the complicated mathematical formulae that describe the optimal trajectory of the balls;*
- firms that act 'as if' they were expected utility maximisers;*

- *the leaves of a tree*; Friedman (1953: 19) suggests "the hypothesis that the leaves are positioned as if each were deliberately seeking to maximise the amount of sunlight it receives.

One of the pillars of the approach of rational choice logic to the variables of politics and its historical-structural matrix is the work of Anthony Downs (1999), "An Economic Theory of Democracy". The original work dates from 1957 and was written between 1955 and 1956. It is interesting to note in the acknowledgements the theoretical, epistemological and institutional support that the economist relied on to write the book<sup>90</sup>.

In this work, Downs (1999, 43) takes the same line as Friedman and states that the Chicago economist's article, published in a work whose title is that of an "essay" ("Essays of Positive Economics", 1953, Chicago Univ. Press) is an "excellent affirmation of this point of view". According to Downs, "theoretical models should be tested primarily by the accuracy of their predictions rather than by the reality of their assumptions." In this way, the author agrees with Friedman and defends the unrealistic assumption as the basis for Rational Choice.

The questioning of these two works is not because their presuppositions are unrealistic. I understand that this theoretical-epistemological stance must exist, but it concerns the ontological (ideological) dimensions of the theory. In the operational field of politics, the ideological dimension, after a long period of development, systematises guiding ideas in the sense of doctrine. These guiding ideas of this thesis and their theoretical, methodological and ontological affiliation have been discussed above. I believe that honesty

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<sup>90</sup> Downs (1999), on page 21 (Acknowledgements), gives the following acknowledgement: "Like all supposedly original works, this study owes much of its content to the thought and efforts of others. [...] I would also like to thank Robert A. Dahl and Melvin W. Reder, who read the manuscript and made many suggestions that I have incorporated. [...] Finally, I would like to thank the Office of Naval Research for the assistance that made this study possible. [Anthony Downs, Stanford University, May 1956".

The intellectual must start from the premise that the "subjective" is irrational because it is linked to the field of affiliations, the unconscious and aspirations. As the unconscious is a single irreducible, it is an object proper to the ideological sphere. Because the humanities and social sciences are aparadigmatic in nature, there are simply no disciplines and knowledge in the humanities that do not contain an ontological dimension in their intrinsic universe, which is therefore non-scientific.

Friedman's way of formulating his thoughts is interesting. When it comes to the "accuracy of predictions", I think the opposite is true. Accuracy in analysing and predicting conjunctures within a framework of constraints is possible. Friedman's term of "tremendously inaccurate descriptive representation" does not guarantee any certainty of structural change in the future. What I mean is that the accuracy of long-term predictions depends on the incidence of the agents and not on analytical precision.

Friedman was "descriptively inaccurate" in the Keynesian period, and in Latin America, in the era of the national developmentalist states. In other words, he used a euphemism when he said that "the really important and significant hypotheses have 'assumptions' that are tremendously<sup>91</sup> inaccurate descriptive representations reality". The text dates from 1953. In the United States, thirty years later, in 1983, his representations were taken into account descriptively with the electoral victory of Ronald Reagan (01/01/1981 to 01/01/1989, see Aguero & Amry, 1996).

As for the "precision of the theoretical models" advocated by Downs, he finds it difficult to reproduce his assumptions. 's interesting to note that Downs, also an economist, states that "however, if our model is to have internal coherence, the government must be at least theoretically capable of performing the social functions of government (in this case, the word government refers to the institution, not the governing party)."

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<sup>91</sup> Note: paradoxical as it may seem, the term "tremendously imprecise" is a verbatim quote from the originals.

In other words, Downs advocates a model where the government can at least be responsive. In the application of the "pure" model of Friedman and his followers, just the opposite occurred. And, to emphasise the intentionality of the descriptive imprecision, Friedman formulated his basic guidelines in the midst of the Welfare State era. A summary of his formula for the non-responsiveness of a government to its citizens can be found in Klein (2007, p.73): "First, governments should abolish all rules and regulations that stood in the way of profit accumulation. Secondly, they had to sell all the assets they owned that could be managed by corporations for profit. And thirdly, they needed to dramatically cut funding for social programmes."

Friedman goes on to specify his guidelines. Like the immediate application of a Grand Strategy, the specifications generate concrete measures to adapt the state apparatus to the tripartite formula: deregulation; privatisation and cuts in social investment. Within this prediction, his choice pointed to tax isonomy, taxing rich and poor equally; free circulation of industrialised products; and a ban on governments defending and protecting their parks. The idea of price was superior to that of remuneration, so the price of labour value would also be dictated by the "market" and not by a legal basis.

The most important thing for this thesis is to show that this "descriptive imprecision" was profound. Thus, what Friedman predicted was not a given, and the existence of this reality was the result of a political effort lasting almost two decades. The agreement programme between Chilean students and the University of Chicago dates back to 1956. In 1965, the experience expanded to all of Latin America, with significant participation by students from Brazil, Argentina and Mexico. While the programme lasted, one in three undergraduate economics students at the University of Chicago was Latin American (Klein, p.77).

The Chilean military coup led by General Augusto Pinochet took place on 11 September 1973. In this regime, with emphasis on its first eight years, the prescription

Macroeconomics derived from the theoretical and epistemological matrix of Friedman and Hayek. Until

the annual meeting of the Mont-Pèlerin Society in 1981 took place in the seaside resort of Viña Del Mar (Klein, p.105). In other words, Friedman's "prognostic" prediction took twenty years to occur and almost a decade more to affirm his model. Apart from any moral judgement that may be made of this application in a given country, I would reinforce the argument that the descriptive imprecision, in my way of seeing and analysing, is nothing more than a concealment of the ontological/ideological premise. I claim that these premises always exist and are unscientific. Therefore, the belief in "rationality" is an ideological construct and its attempt at universalisation is an intellectual arrogance that cannot be proven.

The attempt to universalise corporate thinking can be found in Downs' own words (p. 313)

*Our main thesis is that parties in democratic politics are analogous to entrepreneurs in a profit-seeking economy. In order to achieve their private ends, they formulate the policies they believe will bring them the most votes, just as entrepreneurs produce the products they believe will bring them the most profits for the same reason. In order to examine the implications of this thesis, we also assume that citizens behave rationally in politics.*

The matrix is found in the last sentence, which is reproduced below. "In order to examine the implications of this thesis, we also assume that citizens behave rationally in politics" (my emphasis). And by rationality, it is assumed that the author is referring to maximising gains and minimising losses. The real meaning that these optimal and suboptimal forms of personal benefit may have, considering that "imprecise description can be the source of correct prognosis" is something of very doubtful realisation.

What I understand to be the guarantee of a "high degree of certainty" for these formulas of competitive democracy is the analogy with an environment of competitive capitalism, based on presumptions of a market economy that tends towards equilibrium by the

predictability of the actions of the agents involved in the environment. In his book published in 1965 and reissued in 1971, "The Logic of Collective Action", Mancur Olson<sup>92</sup> (1999) sets out the basis of the universalising claim of his "rational" choice.

Firstly, Olson (1999, p.14) states that the coercive mechanism is an absolute in the rationality of a group to achieve the common good. He goes as far as to say that:

*Even if the members of a large group rationally aim to maximise their personal well-being, they will **not** act to achieve their common or group goals unless there is some coercion to force them to do so, or unless some separate incentive, other than the achievement of the common or group goal, is offered to individual group members on the condition that they help to bear the costs or burdens involved in achieving those group goals.*

Olson later states that this "logic" is the only one to be taken into account, even if there are other conditioning factors. Thus, according to this statement, the co-operation of a human group towards a common goal, even if there is an agreement on methods and a single goal to be achieved, is impossible to achieve without some form of coercion (p.14). To open up the possibility of being falsified and thus maintain an approximation to a scientific theory, Olson (p.14) states the paradox of a logical option that goes against his previous assertion. The sentence is illustrative: "There is, paradoxically, logical possibility that groups composed of either altruistic or irrational individuals can sometimes act in favour of common or group interests." Later on, the author disqualifies

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<sup>92</sup> On page 12 of his book, published by EdUSP, Olson (a professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Maryland) offers the following thanks: " am also very grateful to Professor F.A. Von Hayek, who arranged for the book to be translated into German and contributed a foreword to the German edition. This work was generously supported by the Social Science Research Council, the Shinner Foundation and the Center for International Studies at Princeton University. I am also very grateful to the Brookings Institution, whose hospitality has greatly boosted my work on this book and a previous one."



this argument as a whole, basing it solely on the evidence of the empirical studies in his book: "[...] this logical possibility generally has not the slightest practical importance. Therefore, the usual view that groups of individuals with common interests tend to promote those interests seems to little merit, if any." (my emphasis).

I understand that the claim to a single way of thinking lies in the attempt to universalise a model of analysis, applying it to all situations and areas of knowledge. Not recognising specificities or differences results in "epistemicide", as Boaventura de Souza Santos puts it. The "epistemicide" phenomenon does not come from a lack of "sensitivity" on the part of knowledge producers in the human sciences in central capitalist countries, but necessarily from the position of intellectual submission, also the result of an unfavourable correlation of forces, on the part of knowledge producers and theory formulators in peripheral capitalist countries; a phenomenon that, in this thesis, special attention is paid to what is produced and reproduced in Latin America. But, as Olson (p.16) demonstrates below: "Although I am an economist and the tools of analysis used in this book are drawn from economic theory, the conclusions of the study are as relevant to the sociologist and political scientist as they are to the economist."

The issue of "rationality" as a model comes into contrast with the scale of attitudinal and longitudinal values and behaviours. Thus, a debate that in theory is an analogy to the phenomenon of competitive capitalism, with the application of models imported from economic theories of market self-regulation, is forced to give its opinion on political culture and behaviour. In other words, it is conditioned to enter an area linked to the historical-structural matrices of each particular society. For an assumption that was intended to be universal, its generalisability is very limited. Olson (p.13) states that: "The idea that groups always act to promote their interests is supposedly based on the premise that, in fact, members of a group act out of personal, individual self-interest." This is the "logic" at work in the claim that it doesn't matter whether or not people behave rationally, because they "act as if they were".

As Olson said above, "it's something supposedly based on a premise".

This premise again universalises individuation. From this perspective, methodological individualism has little to do with "strategy" by the definition applied in this thesis, and a lot to do with "competition" and "occasional alliances". With such a reduction in the object(s) and environment(s) of analysis, it is "natural" that the "political game" also boils down to maximising individual interests in a cooperative way by association of interests.

The "economic" determinism - I would say competitive and of individuation - is exemplified in the continuation of Olson's quote:

*If the individuals in a group altruistically disregarded their personal , it wouldn't be very likely that collectively they would dedicate themselves to striving for some selfish common or group goal. Such altruism is, in any case, considered an exception, and self-interested behaviour is generally considered the rule, at least when economic issues are critically involved.*

It's the same reasoning that we'll find later in Chapter 6, when we criticise the structural constraints that Brazilian democracy suffers from. It's the same conceptual mooring of neoliberal hyper-structuralism that prevents long-term vision, hides strategic objectives, says that a pattern of behaviour is the rule "as if" and thus "naturalises" the ontological dimension of "scientific" knowledge, creating "scientificisms" where what exists is belief and normativity.

It is true that rational choice, methodological individualism and neoinstitutionalism have complexified models and arrived at much more sophisticated and less deterministic theoretical propositions. Tsebelis (p.44) recognises the exaggerations of this matrix of economic-political thought and sees in these attempts at universalisation a source permanent tension and theoretical imprecision: "The 'as if' argument maintains that the assumption of rationality, regardless of its precision, is a means of shaping human behaviour. Such an epistemological position of rationality-as-model

is not only partial and unsatisfactory, but is also highly responsible for the polarised situation between rationalist scientists and empirical scientists."

The solution to the problem of the presumption of "rational" behaviour is in line Vitullo's critique of the version of Rational Choice that has taken hold in Latin America since the so-called transitology and consolidology studies. Firstly, the way out is to criticise the use of language that brings politics closer to a competitive game, either by using the metaphor of a game of chess, with simultaneous boards (Vitullo 2007, p.20). Another application of language that carries with it an expectation of behaviour to maximise gains is seen in the analogy of terms applied in a game, such as: "'game', 'players', 'moves', 'moves of pieces', 'board', 'round of games', 'poker match'". In other words, it's a question of comparing politics not with the set of possibilities, but of summarising it within a limited contest with pre-defined basic rules and information costs.

The focus of Vitullo's critique, with which I agree, is seen by Tsebelis (p.45) as a solution to the problem of the presumption of universality of Rational Choice:

*Instead of the concept of rationality as a model of human behaviour, I propose the concept of rationality as a subset of human behaviour. The change in perspective is important: I don't claim that rational choice can explain any phenomenon and that there is no room for other explanations, but I do maintain that rational choice is a better approach for situations which the identity and objectives of the actors are established, and the rules of interaction are precise and known by the interacting actors.*

Thus, the way this author has found to adapt the model and the assumption is to frame it within a reduced constraint, a game-scenario that, although complex, is limited to the set of competitive possibilities allowed. It is well known that in Latin America the legal, government-centred, state and institutional dimension is just one of the key factors.

of the arenas be analysed for, for example, a conjuncture analysis of a specific territory and starting from a complex and incident model.

I agree with Vitullo (p.313) when he says that the categories and concepts that are still hegemonic in political science in Latin America today are unable to offer an analytical framework that is equal to the socio-political processes taking place on the continent, especially in the time frame I set out at the beginning of my thesis. We also agree on the need to abandon the exclusively institutional and procedural conception of political science, precisely because this conception brings with it an intrinsic idea of elitist democracy.

I believe that in order to overcome this hegemony that gravitates in our field, we need an analytical, theoretical-epistemological effort, with explicit premises and the ontological dimension demonstrated from the very beginning of its formulation. The result of this effort, rather a "political analysis of Latin America", is the affirmation of a school of Latin American political analysis, where the institutional dimension is part of the historical-institutional process. But in order to achieve this goal, certain prerequisites are necessary, one of which, as a starting point, is the question of identity.

## **5.2. The importance of identity; when the epistemological matrix is also political and aesthetic**

We concluded the above topic by affirming the theme of criticising the use of "board game" language as a tool that carries a supposed epistemological truth. This truth, which, even when sophisticated, ends up being supposedly universal, points to the "behaviour of citizens as if they were all rationally logical". This same language assumes itself to be the bearer of absolute rationality, analogising political parties as competitive capitalist ventures. Therefore, this same assumption presents the maximisation of gains and minimisation of losses as the only valid logic, making the material retribution of individuation the only real gain. As Olson said (p.14): "the customary view that groups of individuals with

common interests tend to promote those interests seems to have little merit, if any" (my emphasis).

The fact that this school of "rational" choice is hegemonic in Latin American political science, especially in proposing theory, institutional arrangements and democratic proposals, seems problematic to me. We call the above a crisis, both of the "scientific" paradigm and of its position in contemporary class society. Crisis in its broadest sense, the typification of which we agree with and use that presented by Heinz Dieterich (National Identity and Globalisation. The Third Way. 2002). According to Dieterich, saying that the social sciences are in crisis is tantamount to saying that the social subjects and individual actors who produce them are also in crisis (p.11).

This is because, faced with humanity's great problems, these producers of scientific knowledge end up being part of the problem themselves and not the solutions. Acting as a courtly intelligentsia, they end up generating products from the virtuous circle (academia) or the media, where the obvious is reaffirmed, with the once critical and forceful interpretation serving more as a mechanism of containment. Today, this same intelligentsia is the manager of the state, an auxiliary class fraction of the de facto powers, the bosses and top echelons of large companies and multinationals. At the same time, it staunchly defends its position of power and control over the process of producing symbolic and discursive goods from the university.

Dieterich (p.12) also typifies five general causes of the submission of the global intellectual class, all of which apply perfectly to Latin America. They are:

- a. *Their privileged access to forms of power, such as money, media and influence;*
- b. *Its relative separation from the real living conditions of the majority;*
- c. *Their assimilation of the value systems and "ways of being in the world" of the dominant and ruling elites;*

- d. *Its inherent dynamics of professional deformation, particularly the insistence on the compartmentalised work of the monodisciplinary scientific organisation of the 19th century and the rejection of interdisciplinary work with researchers from the natural ("hard") sciences;*
- e. *The absence of a profound political-epistemological research paradigm that justifies, inspires and guides the day-to-day work of the social sciences.*

Dieterich pays particular attention to the last topic, a concern with which I agree. The absence of a transformative paradigm, whether to affirm it or criticise it, ends up generating two watertight and worrying practices. One is canonical, where ideal types and absurd comparative forms are reaffirmed, as if it were possible to establish or use as a parameter public and private institutions generated in another context, in central countries, of which, by the way, Brazil and Latin America are the periphery. This can range from experimenting with concepts that are the scientific version of the current paradigm: utilitarian, of the lesser evil, of the inevitability of neoliberal processes, of applauding liberalism as a way of living in society and praising order.

In this more operational version, in consultancies of various kinds, where the absence of transformation paradigms doesn't prevent the modelling of fairly precise analyses, but which serve the interests of clients and contractors. The latter version seems to me to have more vitality, even though I work at opposite ends of the spectrum within the same profession. I can point to a . The criticism is not of modelling, but of the models that are used and applied. We can do modelling in various forms and conceptual frameworks, including prognoses of the economic situation, knowing and informing what type(s) of structural constraint(s) the scenario is inscribed in.

I understand that the role of (strategic) symbolic analysts depends on the "deep political-epistemological paradigm" that each takes as their analytical basis. The result of the analysis varies according to the paradigm and the matrix of thought, not to mention the tools, which can be variable. In any case, the product of the analysis,

whether in the form of a consultancy, the analytical section of a particular corporation or the figure of an organic intellectual at the service of a particular political organisation, is always more vivid than the assumptions of the prescription type.

Returning to the subject of the crisis, it is on the basis of the recognition of this, the ontological position to which I subscribe and the affirmation of the need for an episteme geared towards the radicalisation of Latin American democratic processes that I develop the framework within the field, specifically in this chapter. It is in the theoretical experimentation of correct modelling that we are searching for a different approach to affirming social conflict, especially at the neuralgic point where a new accumulation of forces takes place within the period I have cut out for the thesis.

In this sense, the issue of identity has a decisive gravitational weight and conditions the producers of "academically valid knowledge" on the continent. This is because, located on the periphery of the West, our region, Latin America, has identity as one of its assets and also its fundamental problem. We consider this to be a fundamental value and bring Dieterich's reflection (pp.142-144) to bear on the subject. He provides us with nine considerations on the subject. We have highlighted two of them for reference.

The first outstanding consideration, presented in the book as point 4, states:

"Identity as a property of a cybernetic system has to balance two tendentially contradictory functions: a) the conservative one, of defending the system's idiosyncrasy in the face of its surroundings; b) the adaptive one, of evolving the system according to changes in the environment."

Dieterich's typification is perfectly adaptable to the reality of the oppressed classes occupying urban-metropolitan areas. This false contradiction between the maintenance of identity, which leads to the emergence of conservative thinking and attitudes, as opposed to the place of "anything goes and almost anything goes in order to survive", leads to the increase in

war between the poor, the criminalisation of poverty and the division between the working class

and new poverty. We can say that in the time frame of this thesis, we are living in a moment where the adaptive identity is hegemonic, being countered by the conservative stance. Both reflect the immediate, parochial and disorganising political behaviour of the lower strata of society. Both "imbalances" are also averse to a mentality of social change.

The aforementioned author goes on to consider the problems presented by the imbalance of both functions. "If the former is autonomised, the system perishes through conservatism; if the latter is autonomised, the environment is dissolved: it survives through adaptation, but loses its identity as its own entity: it ceases to be a subject and loses its *raison d'être*."

In point 6, Heinz Dieterich gives us the context in which the theme of identity manifests itself:

"Since identity is the set of subjective conditions that govern the reproduction and evolution of every social entity (individual, company, political minority, nation, etc.), the control - through violence, co-optation and alienation - of Latin American identity by the world centres of power makes any national economic project for the benefit of the majorities impossible."

We want to comment on and transpose the concept through the three dominant *modus operandi* cited by Dieterich. Violence, co-optation and alienation, often in a coordinated and systematic way, are part of the resources used to dissolve the political will of Latin American majorities.

According to Buvinici, Morisson & Orlando (2002), Caciagli & Hernán (1996) and Hernandez (2002), a pattern of everyday situations and episodes is presented:



- violence and police abuse, simultaneously with the absence of the police as an enforcer of justice, either to repress and/or to investigate; the absence of the enforcer of justice leads to neighbours operating as vigilantes, at least defending their extended families and other family groups with whom they have a direct relationship; in some localities drug trafficking or older criminals operate as an enforcer of justice, according to the codes of the villages themselves.

- co-optation of local leaders, from social activists who aggregate social capital - such as in a mothers' club - to councillors, councillor candidates, election cables and local politicians; recreational activities that aggregate social capital, such as amateur football clubs, are the target of clientelistic action on the part of professional political operators: e.g. directors/local leaders of these clubs sell tickets for a meal in favour of the institution, and the food has been offered by a certain candidate X. The candidate gives the food but demands a speech from him or some electoral cable. The candidate gives the food, but then demands a speech from himself or some electoral supporter at the time of the collective meal; the presence of notorious low-income criminals in political campaigns; the recruitment of local leaders and activists for indirect entry into the intermediation offered by an unresponsive state, such as the small bureaucracy of local administrations, which involves the recruitment of activists for positions of trust (CCs) and/or income directly linked to ministerial projects and/or state or municipal secretariats.

- In the case of drug addiction, the presence of licit drugs, such as alcohol, and illicit drugs, particularly crack, are cheap, widespread, easily accessible, erode the foundations of coexistence among peripheral communities and are rapidly addictive.

In this context, the operators of institutional politics have an interest in disorganising the institutions of the social fabric of the oppressed classes, increasing their fragmentation, subordinating them to institutional politics and reducing their stock of social capital. It's enough to understand the pressing idea that those who associate do so out of interest and we'll have a diffusion

of "rational choice" in the lower and subaltern strata of contemporary societies.

The counterpoint to this subordination from an organisational point of view is that of class independence and its consequent strategic autonomy on the part of popular movements. This decision-making autonomy is the focus of tensions, and diminishing this capacity is the target of the political operators of most electoral-institutional parties. In this case, the model we presented and the evidence presented above show that this behaviour runs through the party structure, being a conditionality above any ideological hue. The subordination of the logic of the class and the people to the logic of the party (whose priority arena tends to be the electoral arena) and its own agenda is a consequence of this submission of the popular initiative. Add to this the absence of political parties and/or organisations with the intention of change and a strong social impact and we have the right scenario for a parochial political culture based on the very short term.

Without a political reference, the space is free for the incorporation of the institutionalised, reformist and mass left, in the specialisation of the bureaucratic control of local public authorities. Grassroots organisations are emptied, and their most capable human resources are recruited to co-manage the structure which, in theory, these movements should force to be responsive. Conflict over the expansion of rights is exchanged for a zero-sum game. The roles are reversed and the political practices of the electoral-institutional right and left are brought closer together.

Thus, political resources such as clientelism, added to the criminalisation of poverty, conflict between the poor and the spread of the illegal economy (led by drug addiction), further fragment the metropolitan social fabric, lower its stock of social capital and reinforce individualistic, parochial and immediate political behaviour.

The actions of the mass media accentuate the political behaviour described above. Symptomatically, the concentration of media outlets is increasing, while official advertising funds and the refinancing of the debts of large conglomerates are maintained

of the medium. The media with political coverage is segmented and expanded (especially via the internet), but these media resources do not reach large audiences. This same media reinforces the role of fragmenting the social fabric of poverty and works with structural disinformation<sup>93</sup>.

By structural disinformation, I mean the concept of Dines (2003) when he states that: "it is understood not only as the consequences of the industrialisation of journalistic activity, resulting from submission to the needs of a new actor - the market - but also the disqualification of the material circulating in communication channels by party-political interests." This is because, according to Dines, the most basic forms of the communications industry are not being achieved in Brazil. For the author, these two forms are: *informing* about ongoing changes through news (reports or relations) and *forming* some kind of knowledge. Dines (2008) concludes by analysing the situation of the sector that provides symbolic goods in communicational formats for a large audience (producing tangible goods that are informational and cultural content). "The moment this process of enlightenment is subjected to and confused with an economic process and a political process (not necessarily of the same origin), a functional, organic *deformation* is created. The result is structural *disinformation*."

The concept of fragmentation of the social fabric is central to this chapter and to the theorisation I am proposing. It's interesting to look at the article by Mauro (2007), in which the Peruvian researcher applies a descriptive analysis that seems to me to be universalisable to the process indicated here in this chapter.

*In general, it is postulated that the fundamental problem of our society is the inability of the party system - if perhaps there is one - to represent the citizenry at all levels, be it macro-, meso- and, above all, micro-, local . This situation would limit the possibilities of building a climate of*

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<sup>93</sup> For a complete survey of data on media concentration in Brazil, the reference site is the Owners of the Media Project, coordinated by researcher James Görgen. All the concentration data can be found at: <http://donosdamidia.com.br/>.

*minimum governance as well as to give way to the economic and social development so sought after by men and women in the various localities of our country (in this case Peru).*

This consideration is true of a climate of ungovernability in a country with a high level of social protest, and I believe it is the opposite of what is happening in Brazil. This is not because the political parties in Brazil are not in disrepute (as we will see in the research below), but because of the lack of channelling of this political multipolarity. What is hegemonic in the urban-metropolitan fabric is a parochial political culture which, combined with the capillarity of local political operators, empties grassroots organisations and mobilises resources for very short-term interests. This *modus operandi* contributes to collective distrust and lowers the stock of social capital in the immediate surroundings where each specific activity of collective interest takes place.

I understand that social fragmentation occurs in different ways and has direct and indirect effects on urban networks. In order to locate just two hypotheses for the development of this way of disorganising society, among several that exist today, Veiga's (2008) contribution is valid, when the Uruguayan author discusses two possibilities for fragmentation, which he calls economic, social and cultural.

*As a frame of reference for the processes of socio-economic fragmentation in cities, it can be assumed that "different dimensions and manifestations of globalisation" impact on different sectors of society and areas in contexts of growing "deterritorialisation" of economic economic e decisions.*

*Another hypothesis proposed is that "globalisation involves the problem of socio-economic diversity", insofar as local communities are inserted into stages of uneven development and, consequently, economic, social and cultural fragmentation. In many cases, there can be a "globalisation of national problems" and, at the same time, a "singular specificity of cities and regions" insofar as things, people, values, etc. are deterritorialised and space, time and ideas fragmented (Giddens, 1990; Ianni, 1995; apud Veiga, 2008).*

I understand that the opposition of fragmented social subjects, but located in the same social fabric, can, based on unique and achievable tactical objectives, serve as a unifying pole and thus generate the necessary social capital. Setting themselves in motion, once these different subjects are organised by grassroots organisations and have the non-electoral political organisation model advocated here as their strategic strength proposal, can be a way of generating the class unity needed to forge a common sense. The logic of the accumulation of forces implies freeing up combats that can be won, overcoming the merely reactive way of doing politics from the oppressed classes.

Accumulation can imply confronting strategic issues of the expansion of common rights and/or the defence of popular sovereignty, such as a struggle for the preservation and self-management of a non-renewable natural resource. By looking beyond the moment (and therefore the tactic) and visualising some common strategic enemies, you can reinforce or recreate current forms of class struggle. Recreating these forms of class struggle can imply an increase in participation and a structural constraint where the limit of the zero-sum game lies. This can generate limit situations for both the political system and the concept of representative democracy. This is the process of democratic radicalisation that I point out in the work in general, and at the end of this chapter in particular.

### **5.3. The dialogue between social capital and "civil society": the redefinition of this concept applied to a new institutionality**

As part of the tools needed to carry out a certain type of work, intellectual activity needs referents and presuppositions where concepts can be applied. Let's think of concepts as the tools of a specialised craftsman. The concept presented here, that of social capital, we believe is the necessary tool for bringing together the concluding concept, that of social fabric or social-productive fabric as a link that connects and strengthens personal relationships at the base of the organised social pyramid, and the academic tradition of the sub-area of political culture. Our approach to this sub-field is based on a study into the construction of

a post-transition Latin American democratic political culture when Baquero (1994, p.36) states:

*Firstly, it is important to point out that the process of political socialisation (internalisation of norms and values - in the political dimension) seems to be reproducing attitudinal patterns typical of politically unstable systems, in other words, disbelief and distancing [...] disenchantment with democracy [...] the elements that have been identified in post-transition political culture are that we are once again witnessing the emergence of a social order that is both more stable and more uncertain than in the past.*

This behaviour of distance, disenchantment and disbelief with traditional political participation (through legal parties operating in electoral arenas) leads to a contamination of the idea of political participation. In this way, interpersonal trust is impregnated with individualistic values, and personal relationships are instrumentalised in order to meet demands and perks (advantages), whose agenda is a "competitive advantage" for professional political operators. Institutions of political representation that make use of a mechanism marked by parochial, unsophisticated behaviour, with high information costs and a disincentive to critical participation have an advantage in the competition for representation. This advantage is exercised in relation to political forces that seek to institutionalise themselves on the basis of grassroots organisations and do not prioritise the electoral arena.

I say that professional political operators are strengthening themselves by disorganising civil society and making a type of behaviour that is marked by personal relationships rather than by a horizon of ideas and collective achievements transversal. This is happening at the bottom of the social pyramid, and the role of political parties operating in intermediary arenas is being increasingly de-ideologised. According to Baquero (1994, p.36), what should be investigated in Latin America is whether political parties are in fact representing sectors of civil society, and this is much more important than the duration of a political system and the stability of the political system.

rules of competition between political parties. The aggravating factor in the existence of weak political parties with a personalist profile is the abandonment ideological bases and the transfer of "politics" to the universe of symbolic goods - such as packaging - transferring the resolving power and the party-base relationship to electoral marketing laboratories (idem).

A counterpoint to this collective distrust can be found in some of the recent works that have addressed the concept of social capital. I recognise that it has a long tradition in political science and a trajectory that goes back to Robert Putnam's studies in Italy, including the work included in the bibliography of this thesis (*Bowling Alone*, Robert Putnam, 2000). This theory, as developed by Putnam, is based on the idea that there is a positive correlation between certain cultural patterns and a society's economic and political development indicators (Borba EM Baquero 2007, p.157). Also in Borba's commentary on the assumptions of Putnam's work, he highlights the three sets of variables that can be operationalised by social capital: interpersonal trust; institutional trust and civic participation.

Of the three concepts, I would emphasise two as being important variables for rebuilding the social fabric at the base of the social pyramid, which is occupied by the oppressed classes as a whole. The first is interpersonal trust, since it is almost impossible to trace a long common and collective trajectory, as personal relationships are corroded by various conflicts and disputes over non-strategic power shares. The second I would emphasise is civic participation, which we can take to mean political participation on a large scale, admitting collective responsibility for common destinies. This variable goes hand in hand with democratic radicalisation and seems fundamental to me. As for the institutional trust variable, I think it should be fairly relativised. If institutional trust is applied to grassroots organisations, popular movements and forms of representation of social segments and class fractions, trust in non-electoral political organisations (such as those advocated by this thesis), I see it as valid. On the other hand, trust in the official institutions of political representation and in the institutional framework of the state, I understand that the attitudinal stance must be the opposite. In order to achieve the model of political organisation that fosters a process of

democratic radicalisation, including increasing the non-state public space and publicising the state, the attitude must not be one of trust, but of distrust and permanent vigilance. An attitudinal stance on this scale will not fall into notions harmonisation between the state, capital and society, but will understand how the process accumulating forces involves limiting the movements of capital and the obligation of the state to be responsive to its citizens. The expansion of rights is necessarily achieved through a process of mobilisation, contestation and conflict. In other words, through organisational unity and a relationship of strength rather than collaboration. This applied attitude is the accumulation that obliges the state to meet demands and be responsive to the basic rights and needs of communities.

I recognise the importance and the almost inaugural nature of Putnam's work, but I will make the cut with four other authors. In this thesis I'm going to stick to a recent debate, drawn up with theorists whose contributions may be more fruitful, as they are better localised and more appropriate to the political scenario I'm working on. A definition of social capital that I understand to be operationalisable, but which reproduces trust (interpersonal and institutional) is that produced by Hemerson Luiz Pase (EM Lima Rocha, 2006), who defines this concept as:

*Social capital is a capacity that empowers the citizen, whose trust enhances democracy, produces institutional development when it constitutes clear rules of behaviour with sanctions for defectors, produces economic development insofar as it enables access to information and stimulates solidarity, and builds a political culture based on humanitarian values.*

This definition also needs to be understood as the instrumentation of a way of life in society. Experiences typical of regions with strong family ties, a land structure based on family farming (the origin of which is the smallholding in the colonies) and bonds of social integration operating at an ideological level (both in terms of values and behaviour). In order to turn these initiatives into far-reaching public policies, taking them to the whole state, it is necessary to take the construction of these networks as the main goal.



I believe that at the bottom of the social pyramid lies the solution for both improving representative democracy and some kind of distributist policy. I believe that at the base of the social pyramid lies the solution improving representative democracy and distributist policies, as well as the driving force behind a process of expanding rights and radicalising democracy. Both processes require a high level of social capital and the establishment of bonds of interpersonal trust, in which the complicity and common identity of its members overcomes the political process and its daily mishaps.

Despite repeating the variable that I see as having a double meaning - that of institutional development (which comes from institutional trust) - this same variable can be understood as the self-development of institutions under the direct control of their members. This would guarantee that the participants play a leading role in their own trajectory and, going further, represents, as Pase rightly defined, "a capacity that empowers the citizen, whose trust enhances democracy".

Another source of definitions of social capital and its application to strengthening Brazilian democracy can be found in Cremonese (2006 in Baquero & Cremonese, p. 96). In this book, the author states that "through social capital, strategies can be devised to restore credibility in institutions before the demands of citizenship". Later on, Cremonese applies a formula that is in line with regaining credibility, when he says that "the democratic consolidation of a country depends on a dynamic and participatory civil society, orientated towards valuing institutional norms and supported by polyarchic principles".

Once again, I recognise the validity of this formulation for strengthening institutional norms, but I also see it as perfectly applicable to strengthening solidarity between equals, institutionalising a new set of participatory democracy norms. This is based on the foundation of empowerment, the active participation of all the sectors organised at the bottom of the social pyramid and with strictly democratic values among them. Thus, the democratisation of democracy takes place

through interpersonal ties and trust in mechanisms for taking turns to occupy key positions and subordinate responsibility from natural leaders to the collective norms democratically defined by the new institutionality demanding the expansion of rights and the publicisation of the state. Later, in Part 2 of this chapter, we'll see how this process applies to the concept of Popular Power.

As we are referring to the unity of action and interpersonal trust, we also understand the relationship with intersubjectivity. For this item, the intersubjective nature, which is essential in the construction of an interdependence that has the ideological as permanent, unique and indivisible, it is necessary to debate the issue of affiliation, the individual and symbolic adherence. Some authors believe that this is the criticisable part of social capital, since the source of controversy in this concept is its very metaphorical definition. The metaphor of social "capital" is intrinsically polemical, because in this figure of speech the analogy with capital (circulating and accumulative) is obvious. It is interesting to discuss the alternative offered by Vizer (1999) when he offers the metaphor of social cultivation as a substitute or complement to the idea of social capital. According to the Argentinian epistemologist:

*The notion of social cultivation is intended to emphasise both the ideas "communion" and those of "adscripción" and affiliation [...] The first refers to the origin and constitutive belonging of individuals; the second, to an election, an elective "adscripción" of individuals and groups to social and symbolic networks. This occurs both in the sense of communion or affiliation to processes and systems of culture and communication of an intersubjective nature that express the functioning of both the processes of identity and affectivity (communion) and those of "affiliation" to a community or institution.*

The sense of belonging to which Vizer refers, I believe, goes hand in hand with the degree of unity needed at the bottom of the social pyramid ("*those at the bottom*", or, "*below and to the left*"). We locate Vizer's debate with a tradition that has been recognised in Brazilian academia since the 1980s. My intention in this study is to open up debate and dialogue

of the concept of social capital and its recognised accumulation, and applying it according to the precepts of strategic analysis, subordinating the method to the objective, thus applying it to a process of accumulating forces. A similar study can be found in the debate carried out in the work by Borba & Silva (p.103):

*The field of studies on non-state and non-party forms of political organisation in Brazil already has a notable number of theoretical and empirical works. [...] The 1980s were dominated by research based on the concept of "social movements" (Gohn, 1997). In the 1990s, the analytical category that began to guide the work was the concept of "civil society". At the beginning of the 21st century, it is the concept of "social capital" that has galvanised the attention of scholars and analysts of forms of social and political association.*

I believe that this sequence of studies "on non-state and non-party forms of political organisation" is applicable to a group of grassroots entities that seek to represent and demand different segments of society (mostly located at the bottom of the pyramid) and also defend different and specific rights. As we saw earlier, in the model of political organisation proposed in this thesis, this group of social and socio-political associations plays a demanding role. Their leading role in the political process precisely requires a concept that encompasses the multiplicity of representations and reunites the fragmented social fabric. Thus, political organisations whose strategic objective is a process of democratic radicalisation and the expansion of rights, seek to insert themselves and act in an organised way within the following set of non-state social institutions, which according to Borba & Silva are:

*Civil society actors<sup>(94)</sup> include social movements, non-governmental organisations, residents' associations, grassroots and mutual aid groups, philanthropic associations, trade unions, student bodies and all those forms of*

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<sup>94</sup> In the thesis, I use the name and concept of agents for associations. The term actors applies to individuals, to the political actor and/or individual operator within these non-state institutions.

*associations (even sporadic informal ones) that, in some way, fight to solve social problems, expand political rights and awareness of citizenship, as well as changes in the spheres of individuals' values and behaviour. These associations bring together men and women who are interested in assuming their role as citizens in an active way, with the aim of taking action in society in search of change.*

#### **5.4. The limitations of representative democracy and the theoretical location of democratic radicalisation**

The gathering of men and women interested in assuming full citizenship comes up against citizenship on a nominal level and the lack of popular participation in defining strategic directions for a nation. Being present and represented in the fundamental decisions of a society, I believe, characterises participatory democracy. In this sub-topic, we'll look at the lack of participation and trust in the institutions of political representation and social regulation.

Following the pattern of the work, we sought the best academic concept applied by a contemporary Latin American author. We have used two passages from one of Baquero's works<sup>95</sup> (2000). In Baquero (2000, pp.50-52), the author shows us the growing incompatibility between guaranteeing governability and political representation and citizen participation in control and oversight at different levels of government. In other words, in the countries of the region, the much-defended and predicted *accountability* is something of an ideal type of democratic model, in reality unattainable through the hegemonic procedural model. According to him, the institutionalisation of means of participation and control by the majorities would be one of the mechanisms for democratising the liberal-democratic procedure.

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<sup>95</sup> Here's another note, aimed exclusively at potential readers at the university. It is not our custom to have umbilical relationships with people in higher hierarchical positions. The quote from the professor who is also our supervisor is of our own choosing, and that's why we're doing it. It's a choice of affinity of thought, not corporate interest or anything like that. Those who know my way of working know that I have a lot of "talent for rebellion" and no aptitude for physiological relationships.

We would add that the three factors identified by Dieterich as the *modus operandi* applied against national-popular identity are also destructive of the social fabric of the classes under oppression or exclusion. Formal democracy coexists peacefully with an exclusionary and unequal universe. Societal control goes beyond the control of resources. It is in everyday life that subordination manifests itself, naturalising a situation that is essentially unjust and anti-democratic. In the sum of these behaviours, elitist and parochial, traditional practices such as political clientelism and state assistance tend to predominate.

Add to this the fragmentation of identities, operated by violent vectors. We therefore have the basis of the elitist pattern of Latin American societies, where ordinary citizens do not assume their citizenship and identify the state as a means of direct accumulation for the ruling elites. In practice, the theft of public resources and the elitist identity linked to the central countries are naturalised.

A characteristic of our countries has been the normalisation of the democratic ritual and its disassociation from economic and political progress. As we have seen, ideologically this tends to generate scepticism, passivity, apathy and sometimes hostility towards the institutions of representative and indirect democracy. The longitudinal behaviour of Latin American majorities, "*la idiosincracia*", such as a lack of civic education, tendencies towards authoritarianism that are born in the culture itself, a certain tendency towards submission, a penchant for charismatic and messianic leaders, added to social disarticulation and illiteracy (total or functional) would be one of the reasons for democratic discredit.

We understand that these same characteristics can be catalysts for another type of political behaviour, one that is contestatory and democratising in its own right. The sense of popular messianism in Brazil generated two large-scale peasant wars (Canudos and Contestado) and countless smaller rebellions. The same is true of the catalysing of "populism" for strategic causes and issues. The most recent example is Chávez in Venezuela, but the classic phenomenon is Peronism, with or without Perón, for example.

right and left in Argentina. What we do recognise is that the catalysing of these popular sentiments by vigorous political movements with a strategic political movements generally ends in long-term social conflicts, if not civil wars.

Returning to the specific issue of social capital and representative democracy, in countries where the state does not actually function, and where informal networks operate as a decisive factor in public affairs or any other large-scale event, other informalities have to be taken into account (Baquero 2000, p. 54). Latin American social development implies an increase in interrelationships based on trust, ethics, even religious precepts and other codes of a moral nature (such as sense of belonging to a class). What needs to be taken into account, and we agree on this, is the capacity for the aggregate impact of the increase in the stock of social capital in Latin America (p.56).

A fundamental question needs to be asked (p.57), which is: "what are the elements that can concretely enable associations to connect with society and that can be democratising?" These relationships include unity and tactical support from one association to another, whether formal or not, without having to become a client of the state. This is because, in general, conventional clientelism tends to reproduce itself in different contexts, by co-opting popular leaders to occupy key positions in the state apparatus, to have clientelist relationships with bosses, the government or professional political intermediaries.

It is worth emphasising that the cohesion of popular values and identities, when intertwined with projects of political will and economic advancement, generate a high degree of social conflict. We see this as a fundamental factor in the analysis, perhaps the most important of all, and one that we have been developing throughout the thesis. This is the characterisation of the interdependence of the Ideological, the Economic and the Political. In other words, just as a high stock of social capital can be a brake on majorities moving away from the state, the same stock can be channelled into strategic plans to leave and break the system.

There is no direct relationship between rupture and authoritarian political practice, so the same process of empowerment can be the main vector for democratising society through another political institution, the affirmation of national-popular identity and material well-being for the population<sup>96</sup>.

In another study, Baquero (2004, p. 121) presents an obvious idea, but one that is strangely assimilated in political analysis circles. He tells us that the tension between the decrease in physical, material and financial resources, on the one hand, and the increase in societal demands, on the other, is imminent. The system itself becomes illegitimate because it is unable to provide the basic rights predicted in its own legal bases<sup>97</sup>. The data found in this book speaks for itself. Just to illustrate this idea, according to data from Cepal (2001, *apud* Baquero 2004), there were 41 per cent of Latin Americans below the poverty line, rising to 44 per cent in 2000. In Brazil, there are 53 million poor people and another 22.6 million indigent. In proportion, 34 per cent of the population is poor and 14.5 per cent indigent. Of the latter, 45 per cent are under the age of 15 (Arbache 2003, p. *apud* Baquero, 2004, p.121).

I reiterate that the class societies of Latin American countries are unequal to each other, but that they have some of the same axes and bases. One of these is the situation discredit in which the "pure" mechanism of democratic representation finds itself. Regardless of the degree of political development, the level of dissatisfaction with representative democracy is high. This data is more than proven by surveys carried out over the past decade by Latinobarómetro<sup>98</sup>. Also in a very recent survey carried out by the Ibope Institute

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<sup>96</sup> A material example of this can be found in the interview with Néstor Cerpa Cartolini, found in the bibliography, where the MRTA commander explains what the political institutionalisation was like in the San Martín Jungle Front, Peru, at the end of the 1980s until Fujimori's coup in 1992.

<sup>97</sup> This statement is based on the constitutional precept of the minimum wage. In Annex I of the preliminary draft, we reproduce the table made by DIEESE, showing the difference between what the Constitution orders and the reality of the macroeconomic constraint.

<sup>98</sup> BASÁÑEZ, Miguel, LAGOS, Marta and BELTRÁN, Tatiana. *Report 1995: Encuesta Latinobarómetro*, May 1996.

(published in the weekly *Brasil de Fato*, issue of 25 September 2005)<sup>99</sup>, the interviewees were asked the following question:

- "Do you trust the following institutions or not?"

The following results were presented in descending order of confidence:

**Figure 4**

Table showing the level of trust in categories and institutions

and categories of society	level of trust
Doctors	81%
Catholic Church	71%
Armed Forces	69%
Newspapers	63%
Television	57%
Radios	56%
Evangelical churches	53%
Labour unions	51%
Lawyers	48%
Judiciary	45%
Entrepreneurs	37%
Police	35%
Senate	20%
Camera	15%
Political parties	10%
Politicians	8%

One observation is in order. We recognise that the political crisis that engulfed the Lula government following the accusations made by Roberto Jefferson, a member of the PTB-RJ, influenced the results of this poll. Let's remember that it was carried out during the disarmament plebiscite campaign. But the results themselves, regardless of when the poll was taken, reveal an underlying problem.

Two sets of motivations come into play. One would be the lack of decisiveness, self-regulation by a political elite (sector of the ruling class) that is incapable of punishing itself, and finally, the government's disassociation of the will expressed in the vote with practice

<sup>99</sup> See LIMA ROCHA, Bruno at

<http://www.estrategiaanalise.com.br/artigos.php?artigosel=ed3cf7222f6d1f65af4fb406c417d1d1> (electronic document consulted in March 2006)



of the ruling elites (including the political elite itself). Another factor behind this disbelief would be the inequalities in the region - which have extreme degrees - and it is clear that this factor contributes to disbelief in the political mechanism.

It is well known and notorious that extreme inequalities between social classes are a pattern in these societies. Whole swathes of the population are either deprived of their basic rights or receive little assistance. Far beyond the contradiction between capital and labour, we live in conflict between those included in the formal labour market and those totally or partially excluded from it. This generates layers of so-called "new poverty", often not so new. The terrain where this widespread social conflict develops is in urban-metropolitan areas where the relationship with the state and the provision basic services is, at the very least, absent and ineffective.

Thus, the configuration of today's class society is fragmented and fragmenting. This way of life has been structured since the end of the so-called lost decade ('80s), the decade of the apogee of the neoliberal reforms (restorations) and which, even with some resumption of growth in some of our countries (Brazil is excluded by its derisory rates), in the first decade of the 21st century the situation remains the same. The degree of informality averages 50% of the labour force throughout the region.

It is obvious that the majority of Latin American populations are in the classes that suffer from the integrated mechanisms of economic exploitation, marginalisation and social exclusion, and authoritarian-administrative domination, thus making up the group of oppressed classes. In this class picture, the absence of greater unity among the oppressed classes facilitates de facto domination, although it makes the institutionalisation of representative democracy difficult. The opposite is true: when there is greater unity in the lower classes, and there is a strategic interest, representative democracy may or may not be strengthened by this unity.

This current configuration of fragmented classes also implies current forms in the class struggle, which continues to exist, but in a more complex form than during the

bipolarity and industrialisation. This current class struggle in Latin America permeated by issues of identity, national and ethnic formation, territorialisation disputes over the concept of democracy, with varying degrees of violence, disputes over the national project and other forms of struggle associated with the economic struggle<sup>100</sup>.

For political science, the question arises as to whether the apparent vitality and durability of procedural democracy is the constitution of a new way of doing things or a rehash of the old politics. (Baquero 2004, p. 129) The proposition is thus sought that political systems depend on support that goes beyond the formal, partly through the psychological pre-dispositions of the masses. Although new in political science, this perspective is historically consolidated and arises from the study entire societies, through the approach of analysing the "national character" or "psychocultural" (the same as above).

Although new to political science, this same perspective is practised by more sophisticated military thinking. Once again we see Golbery (Silva 1981) and his analysis of the psychosocial level. At this level, the general analyses popular and class predispositions to obey or not, to adhere to the regime, calculating the stimuli of the "economic miracle" and the "incentives" for this adherence stimulated by the firm presence of the repressive apparatus of internal war.

We understand the relevance of studying the social fabric and applying the concept of social capital in Latin America. We also understand that the study of political behaviour goes far beyond support for or rejection of a government, and that there is often no correlation between class independence and electoral behaviour. We repeat here the need to go beyond the concept of social capital, bringing the perspective of class and popular identity to the study of longitudinal behaviour as a preponderant factor in attitudinal behaviour towards a political procedure or even a regime as a whole. To this end, it is

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<sup>100</sup> A classic case of an entire country in dispute over its economic model, form of government and conception of democracy is Bolivia from 2000 onwards.

The theoretical development of the idea of the structural interdependence of the Ideological-Political-Economic is necessary, a task that has been tackled throughout this thesis.

Personally, I have nothing against this concept, quite the contrary. However, I prefer the idea that comes from popular movements in the Río de la Plata, calling social institutions more grassroots, as those that make up the social fabric. Fabric or social capital, the effect is the same and the definition almost identical. As a final resort against extreme individualisation, increasing the stock of this beneficial capital is an essential factor in the development of a society of participatory democracy.

Emphasising, as Vitullo (2008, p.59) says, the intrinsic presence of social conflict as the basis for the development of increased popular participation:

*We would add that conflict is an unmistakable sign of the social density achieved by a democratic regime (my emphasis), which is an absolutely opposite view to that defended by the dominant political science theorists, for whom conflict is synonymous with illegitimacy, illegality, danger, instability, and for whom democracy must be synonymous with law and order. [...] A democratic theory cannot remain oblivious to rupture and its transformative potential, otherwise it will fall into a partial and incomplete analysis of socio-political realities. (p.59)*

## **5.5. Disorganised territory, fragmentation and reorganisation of the social fabric. The essential conditions for democratic radicalisation**

In this chapter of the work, we use key concepts such as identity, fragmentation, social fabric and social capital. The following concepts are fragmentation and social fabric. We understand that fragmentation operates on a terrain, a social fabric of majorities that do not automatically recognise each other. Close operational definitions for these concepts are:

Fragmentation: the current form of class domination, after more than a decade and a half of deindustrialisation, (neoliberal) state reforms, denationalisation of the economy, privatisations and the absence of the state from the regulation of everyday life, manifests its existence in a society of fragmented classes whose very structure is generating more fragmentation<sup>101</sup>.

Social Fabric: we can say that this term is similar to Social Capital. The difference is one of origin, as it has been used by sectors of the Argentinian and Uruguayan popular movement (respectively, sectors of *piqueteros*<sup>102</sup>, social centres and community radio movements). The decomposition of the social fabric has the immediate phenomenon of increasing the so-called war between the poor. The recomposition of the social fabric is necessary in order to generate any kind of social change, whether the intention is to break up or consolidate democratic institutions.

Since we are going to develop the idea of fragmentation applied to the social fabric, it is necessary to delve deeper into this second concept. Considering that academically, and particularly within the field of political science, there is a whole development of the idea of social capital. Our main interest is in bringing together the academic concept and the operational concept already applied by political operators active in Latin American grassroots movements. In order for them to be able to interact and be endowed with explanatory capacity, we start from the intention and assumption of a theory that is up to this challenge and within the reach of those who can be its users. This is the main motivation for seeking an episteme applicable from a Latin American perspective, underpinning

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<sup>101</sup> The concept of fragmentation is the opposition to the concept of social fabric. The idea of the fragmentation of the oppressed classes is the centrepiece of the work in of the radiography of what we could call "the class itself" today. In this preliminary draft, the concept is minimised. Throughout the thesis, we will develop it by looking for reference in collective social agents whose political work is based on countering fragmentation.

<sup>102</sup> A classic, albeit recent, example of *piquetero* action is the MTD book Aníbal Verón, Mesa Nacional, *Dario y Maxi, dignidad piquetera*. Avellaneda, Ed. 26 de junio, 2003. One source that I will look at in depth throughout this work is Gabriel Eduardo Vitullo's thesis, "Beyond transitology and consolidology: a study of Argentina's actually existing democracy" (PhD thesis in political science, UFRGS/PPGPol, August 2005). The most interesting aspect of Vitullo's work, in my opinion, is the focus on the real and not the formal-institutional processes of popular democracy practices in the Argentine Republic in the post-Menem era.

Thus a theoretical proposal built on reference authors and actors present in the continent's conflictive scenarios.

The operationalisation of these concepts requires a theoretical and epistemological stance (critical, interpretative and incidental) that has a direct effect on the way open social science and the specific political science I defend here are practised. Vizer (p.311) offers a definition that I consider to be essentially correct, when he says that:

*We must stop thinking that our objects of study are objects (even if they are theoretical). They are subjects, and above all they are subjects in "relationship, within sets of 'complex processes'". We can think of them "from the outside", from the epistemological position of classical objectification, as a set of agents within complex systems; from both a systematic and historical perspective (Vizer, 1998), investigated both with a "classical" scientific methodology, but also with a critical and interpretative methodology and epistemology. (p.311)*

With this definition of the dimension and form of intervention of the political scientist in the role of ontologically motivated strategic analyst in his theoretical formulation of the process advocated here, I close this first part. Next, I present a formulation of the process of democratic radicalisation, taking up the very concept of conflict in democracy and the construction of a new institutionality through one of the interpretations - that of the libertarian matrix - of Popular Power.

## **Part II: The perspective of Popular Power and the forces of accumulation**

### **5.6. The perspective of Popular Power as a way of accumulating forces in the process of democratic radicalisation**

In this second part of Chapter 5, I will exercise theoretical formulation, proposing a process of accumulation of forces, based on the debate so far, guided by the recomposition of the social fabric and the consequent struggle against class fragmentation

oppressed. The ultimate goal is to build a process of democratic radicalisation, based on the accumulation of power by all the forms encompassed by the open concept civil society (as mentioned above in Borba & Silva, 2006). This stage of the work has the significance of an accumulation of formulation, exercise, practice, advocacy and teaching in the area that has now completed seven uninterrupted years. From now until the end of the chapter, almost all the concepts are my own.

### **5.7. The concept of independence from class**

"In any society, multiple power relations traverse, characterise and constitute the social body. These power relations cannot be dissociated, established or function without the production, accumulation, circulation and operation of discourses." (Michael Foucault, 2000, p.34)

A concept and practice of popular power has its own specific production, universe and output. In order for it to play as a transforming force, conditioning conjunctures and producing destructive advances, there is a necessary condition: it must maintain its independence at all times. Class independence, as we used to say at other times in history. Today we can say, in keeping with the new context: independence of the oppressed classes is the same as independence of all popular movements.

However, when emphasising this category, we have to take into account the particular characteristics of each social formation, its history, its transformations, without neglecting what it has in common with other countries, especially those in the same area (Latin America) and obviously the conditioning factors established by world power structures. It's well known that the meshes of dominant power incorporate and shape what gravitates around them. They insert parties, ideologies, movements and histories into their midst, transform them and then return them as reproducers of the present. The mechanism repeats itself over and over again. And different forces revolve around this *modus operandi*. It is on these

This thesis adds to the effort to trigger proposals and action with a different content. With a coherence that allows us to stand firm.

It cannot be emphasised enough that the endless circulation of the same dynamics and logics cannot create something new, only recreate what already exists, with greater or lesser fantasy. To make other social relations possible, the facts seem to indicate the need to use other materials for this new construction. Another approach, perspective, logic, practices and mechanisms. This process must rest and continue on the basis of the strong independence of the oppressed classes, at the pace of a people who are building their destiny at the pace that historical conditions allow. Choices, relationships, tactical and explicit alliances must be made from this perspective of independence. As it cannot and must not isolate itself, as it must be in the midst of the people and the complex and variable social events, this factor acquires a strategic importance of the first order.

We see it as a positive feature that the people carry out their protests and demands outside the traditional channels. This is the *Jacquerie* model mentioned in Chapter 3. However, it is not only the large-scale struggles that have brought down governments or prevented coups that are positive, but also the direct action struggles for various specific issues and sometimes the exercise of popular justice. This latter modality takes place both through legal pluralism and through the use of force through unofficial channels.

In the period covered by the thesis (from 1 January 1994, Latin America), it has been neither social democratic parties nor governments that have effectively halted the advance of neoliberal destruction. The social forces that have really acted to block this advance, resisting and even overthrowing neoliberal regimes, have been forces from the movements of the oppressed classes. The way they took to the streets, forcing a situation of contestation and accumulation of forces, delegitimised a series of anti-popular governments. I say that the electoral repercussions of the types of protests that have taken place in America

Latin America, starting with the Zapatista uprising and the overthrow of President Abdala Bucaram, only has an indirect effect on elections.

Betting on the path of political integration and respect for institutional norms takes advantage of the energy and stock of social capital, directing them towards domesticated attitudinal behaviour. I understand that propositions anchored in the paradigms of a bygone welfare state, which no longer exists, end up channelling this popular expression so that they base their struggles on authorised channels. This means not wanting to be convinced that these forms of institutional adherence amputate political participation and diminish the capacity for protest. These forms only domesticate bodies and are perverse in terms of meeting popular needs and demands. They end up pushing social energy into circumstances where there are no ways out beyond the channels of participation that adhere to institutionalised norms.

A process of progress, with the accumulation of forces through democratic radicalisation aimed at building a new institutionality with popular power, is the work of certain practices that allow for a real formation of consciousness and purpose. In this process, solidarity (trust in interpersonal relationships and elevated to the level of institutionalisation) will play the most important role, as will the mobilisation and organisation of the different popular expressions of this whole universe of the underprivileged.

We know that participatory democracy, achieved through the radicalisation of protest and the conquest of rights, cannot be decreed, nor will the parties that programmatically define themselves with this objective do so on their own. A political organisation in tune with its time and with the popular movement has a role to play, but the strength lies with the people themselves. Both before and after the elections.

The independence of the people's movement and all its organisational forms (self-management, self-organisation, effective participation and federalism) is what will give solidity to the process and real possibilities for a change to the conditions of counterbalancing constituted power by people's power. One caveat, however. Protest beyond the streets



is part of an endeavour and is not the manifest destiny of a new form of life in society. Any political process will require the organisation and will social forces to bring about profound changes, to mark a line in a consequent process.

### **5.8. The hierarchy of priorities and the need for coordination in the process of democratic radicalisation**

A process of democratic radicalisation and the building of popular power has as a condition of existence that its direction is from the bottom up and not the way around. From below and above does not mean hierarchy, but social organisational bodies, made up of the people themselves (the base of the social pyramid), those from below, those who resist, create and seek organisational forms to defend themselves. This also implies that the militants produce a culture for their development in the proposed social change. It also involves certain changes in behaviour, internalisation of the project and conviction in the style of work (militant process and behaviour).

For a process like this to be effective, the task of removing what is structured and shifting it is a daily task, not a one-off or episodic one. Every political and social force is part of the constitution of a conjuncture and its utilisation depends on what we have done before. This is a daily task which, according to the objective outlined in the thesis, must be carried out within the various popular expressions (grassroots organisations) and seeking the greatest harmony with the concerns and urgencies felt so that this necessary condition of popular participation is present. These should not be the practices of a loner (like a "*free rider* on the left") or of those who, by operating on the fringes of popular sentiment, only succeed in making the sectors that should be getting closer, move away. We're not saying that we have to imitate the habits imposed by centuries of building a subject for a system, but rather that we have to change these habits on a basis.

It's attacking structures that have their genealogy, their unfolding and reside in in different "territories" of the system. A task within the framework of enemy territory, linked multiple resistances and struggles, most of them demanding improvements. Calling for reforms in relation to what exists. But the difference between reforms is how they are acquired. Whether it comes as a conquest of rights, the result of a massive and politically didactic process, is different from increasing a right or an advance in material reward through professional intermediation. In short, the question is not whether improvements are achieved, but in what spirit, with what background.

I agree that achieving reforms is not the same as being a reformist. What we are building in terms of democratic radicalisation has to have a permanent goal: popular power. Without this goal, there will be no strategy, because structural change and an emancipatory future will be abandoned. This process of building popular power can lead to improvements and is not in tune with the somewhat magical premise of: "the worse, the better". Nor with "so much the better, so much the better". Because the latter premise has posed a difficult problem, especially in highly industrialised countries: there has been an increase in institutionalisation, a high degree of integration into the system by certain popular sectors, especially in the salaried sectors.

Why am I defending a process of this scale? It's not a random or excessively normative choice. It is an unashamedly rational and logical position. It is based on a logic of strategic analysis, on understanding the need to balance means and ends, and on refusing to be bound by a political formula that says: representative democracy + zero-sum game. I understand that participatory democracy advances on a more infinite sum game board, that material reward is accompanied by the expansion and universalisation of rights. And that only through contestation and conflict can progress be made in this essentially democratic (democratic radicalisation) and political (hence popular power) process.

A one-off struggle, localised within a process on this scale, takes place on different levels. You can win economically, lose in urgent politics and win in

ideological advances in trade unions or entire sectors. On many sides, popular pressure has generated an atmosphere of belief in one's own strength, no matter how bad the policies of supposedly progressive governments are. What we have to take into account is that enthusiasm and social organisation from below already generates, by the very fact of existing, another situation.

All these struggles, demands and confrontations imply a process of active participation by the population. This involvement increases the accumulation of knowledge based on experiences and approaches that ferment into legitimate solutions. The degree of legitimacy in the model proposed here is the adequacy of size between the depth of the claim and the force available for it.

In this context, political organisation continues to be of the utmost importance for breaking away from the existing order of capitalism and starting another process on a different basis. But this importance is different. The understanding of politics from below locates this organisation (cadre party) as a distinct level (circle) of this same struggle. Its existence is an essential condition. This organisation must act from within this process. The model of political organisation proposed in this thesis disputes its political positions by exercising its role as an active minority. This implies complex coordination between the political, social-political and organised social levels. The degree of complex coordination implies maintaining levels of internal democracy, planning efforts for each moment and characterising the immediate conquest as part of the process of democratic radicalisation.

## **6. AN ECONOMIC CRITIQUE OF THE CONSTRAINTS SUFFERED BY THE EXCHANGES OF BRAZILIAN DEMOCRACY TODAY**

This chapter is divided into three parts. In the first part, it presents the main ideas and guiding ideas behind the debate on neoliberalism as opposed to a welfare state and its Latin American developmentalist version. This latter model of state, with some basis in social regulation and imposed distributism, acted as the structural constraint that ended up conditioning or animating the democratic regimes of the post-World War II era.

Using historical circumstances analysed according to general models of democratic regimes and economic vocations of the state, the narrative discusses the premises of this debate applied to contemporary Brazilian society. The conclusion of the clash of ideas, within the circumstances of the momentary victory of neoliberalism, implies the flexibility of political rights, the limitation of the state as a regulator of society and the consequent failures to deepen the exercise of political rights and the possibilities for socio-economic development.

In the second part of the chapter, we present another digression, when in the middle of the last decade (the 1990s), the key concepts of neoliberalism dominated discussions and the theoretical framework applied at almost all levels and universes of knowledge. Brazil, in particular, had the expectation that, after more than fifteen years, it would have a stable currency and a government with a high degree of coherence. In contemporary politics, this debate runs through the entire conceptual framework.

The continuation of this chapter seeks to contribute to the effort of challenging the conceptual basis of neoliberalism, generating a set of concepts capable of deconstructing a status of truth with pretensions of inevitability. To this end, the second part revisits the transition from 2002 to 2003 and the first four months of Lula's government, with Antônio Palocci at the head of the Ministry of Finance and Henrique Meirelles already president of the Central Bank of Brazil. In the third and final part, we apply two empirical examples through case studies.

## **6.1. Visions of the state as a social regulator and in macroeconomic definition. Assumptions and temporality**

We understand the contemporary moment, Post-Bipolarity (from 1989/1991 onwards), as subsequent to the period of history that has elapsed since the Post-War period (1945-1989/1991). Specifically, in this part of the thesis, we refer to the theoretical, philosophical and programmatic clashes that took place in the capitalist West and which dealt with the formation of the Welfare State and the current of political philosophy organised around the Mont Pèlerin Society.

The landmark book of this Society is "The Road to Serfdom"<sup>103</sup> (Hayek, 2004; the original work was published in 1944), by Austrian Friedrich Hayek (1899-1992), a pioneer in this field along with fellow economist Milton Friedman (1912-2006). The discussion forum, located in a small town in Switzerland, formed a veritable nerve centre for liberalism in its manifestations of economic policies and political philosophy for the central countries.

From this perspective, it is essential to understand the role of a decision-making centre, the accumulation of critical mass, the politics of alliances through *policy makers* occupying key positions in centres of knowledge and, in the future, global decision-making. To this end, it is important to know the characterisation of the first meeting convened two years after the end of World War II and in the midst of the Marshall Plan in Europe destroyed by the war.

Second

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<sup>103</sup> HAYEK, Friedrich August Von. *The Road to Serfdom*. Rio de Janeiro, Bibliex, 2004.

According to Professor Paulani (2004), the movement known as neoliberalism has its organic genesis in:

*On the movement's birth certificate, the year of registration is 1947, when Hayek convened, to a meeting at Mont Pèlerin (Switzerland), those who shared his creed. Among those who responded to the call were Milton Friedman, Karl Popper, Lionel Robbins and Ludwig Von Mises. The purpose of the Mont Pèlerin Society was to combat the reigning Keynesianism and solidarism and lay the groundwork for a new capitalism in the future, a hard capitalism free of rules. For these believers in the unrivalled virtues of the market, the egalitarianism promoted by the welfare state destroyed the freedom of citizens and the vitality of competition, on which everyone's prosperity depended.*

According to Mattos (2001), the so-called Welfare State marked a period of economic and social prosperity. Economic and political factors acted as determinants of this period of prosperity. It was this model of macroeconomic arrangement that neoliberalism fought against from its inception. The members of the Mont Pèlerin Society criticised the social and productive pact, which played a decisive role in nation states. This state model was targeted by the neoliberals for two reasons:

- the establishment of the Welfare State (and the subsequent generalisation of its activities);
- the hitherto unprecedented expansion of public spending, which in turn guaranteed the continued expansion of aggregate demand and created favourable horizons for the capitalist calculation of the private sector.

Still according to the Unicamp economist, "the greater participation of national states in developed capitalist economies was also manifested through the expansion of public employment, in the context of the expansion of activities brought together in the Welfare State."

In the liberals' counter-offensive to this pact within Western capitalism, the ideological and political frameworks for professing the economic thinking of its founders configured. In order to understand the formation of neoliberal economic thinking, Paulani (2004) makes an important contribution:

*After the disastrous experience of the crisis of '29, a state interventionist practice is gaining momentum that finds its theoretical matrix in the General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, published by Keynes in 1936. This created a kind of consensus on the need for a degree of regulation outside the system itself, which added to the loss of social space already experienced by liberalism [...]. The ideas implicit in this consensus found their natural habitat in the welfare state, Keynesian control of effective demand and Fordist regulation of the system, and capitalism glided along smoothly for three decades, growing steadily throughout this period.*

In this context, authors such as Hayek and Friedman stood out in the fight against the so-called "Keynesian consensus". It is important to understand the meaning of this consensus, an arrangement of organised political, economic and social forces, which according to Machado (2006) can be summarised in three basic orientations:

*1º) Defence of the mixed economy, with strong participation by state-owned companies in the supply of goods and services and the increasing regulation of private sector activities through government intervention in the various markets private of the economy; 2º) Establishment and expansion of the Welfare State, guaranteeing extra-market income transfers to specific groups in society (the elderly, the disabled, children, the poor, the unemployed, etc.) and seeking to promote some kind of distributive justice. justice; 3º) An active macroeconomic policy to manipulate aggregate demand, inspired by Keynesian theory and aimed above all at maintaining full employment in the short term, even at the cost of some inflation.*

At the turn of 1970s into the 1980s, the current of economic, philosophical and political thought known as neoliberalism was victorious, starting with electoral victories in England and the USA, preceded by the experience of the first years of Pinochet's government in Chile. Following the end of Bipolarity, this victory became a global hegemony, influencing the institutional design of the state throughout the West. The counter-part to the "Keynesian consensus" can be seen in the so-called basic "neoliberal prescription".

We are not going to focus on studies of the states of so-called Real Socialism, although they were also contemporaries of the post-war period and Bipolarity. The victory of neoliberalism began with the electoral victory of Margaret Thatcher of the Conservative Party in 1979 and the subsequent victory of Ronald Reagan of the Republican Party 1980.

The relevance of these two political victories can be understood from the moment experienced in the 1970s by political and academic operators in the developed countries of capitalist West. In this regard, according to UFRGS researchers Caldeira, Cunha and Ferrari (2007), they state that:

*From the 1970s onwards, the "Keynesian consensus" broke down in academia and politics. Rising inflation and unemployment undermined confidence in the alleged ability of policymakers to fine-tune macroeconomic adjustments through fiscal and monetary policies (especially the former). For the new generations of academics, there was no longer the ghost of society being torn apart by the indomitable forces of free markets.*

According to Caldeira, Cunha and Ferrari (2007), "the ideas of the pre-Keynesian world had only just gone into hibernation". The victory of the conservative reflux signalled by Ronald Reagan (USA) and Margaret Thatcher (1979) had ensured the victory within the developed West of the system of ideas marked by a liberalism that had reorganised itself after the Second World War. This new macroeconomic consensus was based on the theory of rational expectations and "the idea



that active macroeconomic policy would be redundant because it was subject anticipation on the part of economic agents." (*id*)

The framework for comparison is between the Neoliberal State and the Welfare State, and in the case of the Latin American subcontinent, specifically its National Developmentalist version. We compare designs and attributions that are the result of different factors (outside the causal relationship). The time period of the Latin American neoliberal state is the 1990s and 2000s, before the advent of the new national and interventionist governments. It is interesting to observe the political and societal effects of the prescription applied in the 1990s in Latin America, and generalised in the article by Paraguayan professor Victor Barone (1998), according to the author:

*The processes of social fragmentation are advancing and structural unemployment is consolidating, converting workers into informal, self-employed and lumpen. Cities and the countryside are populated with emergency slums, and societies are polarised between the very rich and the very poor, gradually liquidating the middle class. The effects of neoliberalism are similar to those experienced by farmers and small home-based manufacturers at the dawn of early capitalism, who saw how the emerging capitalist market required the intervention of the Victorian state to turn peasants displaced from their land and displaced workers into criminals thanks to the "vagrancy law" that sent them to the "WorkHouses" to produce free of charge. fund reproduction reproduction for o nascent capital."*

The beginning of a counter-hegemony in Latin America in relation to neoliberal domination would be marked by the government of Hugo Chávez (1998), and this anti-neoliberal profile would be accentuated after the defeat of the coup attempt in April 2002. The advance of proposals social regulation through macroeconomic state intervention is also part of the advent of left-wing elections in Latin America. The debates on populism, neopopulism and economic populism are discussed below.

## **6.2. Analytical premises on the relationship between democratic limits and state design**

As stated throughout the thesis, the position of the researcher-author is seen by us as a central element in the production of knowledge. Following a tradition of multi-causal analysis, he delves deeper into the subject and takes on a renewed perspective of the form of analysis proposed by Mexican professor Pablo González Casanova (1967) in his work "Democracy in Mexico". The author starts from a point of view that rejects the comparison between ideal types of economic development in the central countries and the supposed "anomalies" that occurred in Latin American countries.

Casanova states that these comparisons have a "programmatic, utopian and ritual function" (1967, p.9) and foresees the urgent task of confronting orthodox, official legal models with reality (p.9). Thus, on the basis of the observations made, we set out the following model of analysis (Casanova p.8):

- I - the relationship between the formal political structure - the theoretical and legal models of government - and the real structure of power;
- II - the relationship between national power - the nation-state - and the international structure;
- III - the relationship between the power structure and the social structure, with macro-sociological groups, strata and classes.

We would like to reinforce the idea that the state models and forms of economic and democratic development applied in Latin America are not "anomalous" in relation to the democracies of the central West. Thus, the use of state models applied in the debate on democracies that actually exist, always finds in the Latin American scenario a reinvention and readjustment of the ideal-type models.

To get to the root of the debate, it's worth looking at the comparison of proposals and the functioning of the capitalist state according to Adam Przeworski's (1995) criticisms of the Keynesian and liberal vision. It is worth emphasising that Przeworski states that "what is new in the

(neo)liberal ideology is the dominant role played by technical economic theory" (p.241).

Thus, we can affirm the difficulty of analysing the state if we start from the hegemonic concepts influenced by "liberal economic science". It is common to say that economic knowledge has been colonised by others. The fruit of this colonisation, according to Przeworski himself, has been widely applied since the late 1970s. This came about with the "theory of rational expectations", isolating the agent and giving him a greater degree of autonomy than the contingencies and scenario in which he finds himself. Przeworski highlights the universalising capacity of economics and its way of "colonising" and subordinating other knowledge:

For the author: "Economic theories are rationalisations of the political interests of conflicting classes and groups, and should be treated as such. Behind economic alternatives lurk visions of society, models of culture and moves towards power. Economic projects imply political and social projects." (Pzeworski, 1995, p. 243). Having said that, we present the following models, according to the author quoted above.

#### Keynesian State (Social Welfare)

This model emerged as a way out of the crisis of the 1920s, as a solution for the aftermath of the Crack of 1929 and was applied on a large scale in the post-war period. It is based on an agreement reached in a compromise between classes. In the central countries, this model of state functioned under a regime of competitive democracy. The compromise between classes and the bargaining power that came from the mobilisation and electoral power of the formal working class made it possible to levy high taxes as a way of running welfare and social security networks. Private property was thus reconciled with the democratic management of the economy. And in this context, the civil service has a strong role as the executor of public policies. The same goes for the intervention of state-owned companies in the production of goods and the country's basic infrastructure. For this model of society, the search for full employment and the presence of strong social democratic parties representing the labour force were fundamental.

### Neo-liberal state

The justification and driving force behind the implementation of this model is the way out of the fiscal crisis of the late 1970s. Its implementation means breaking the commitment of the class pact in the central countries. As well as breaking the class pact, the neoliberal model subordinates state decisions to technical (ideological) parameters, reconverting the technocracy into policy operators for big . One of the standard measures of this technocracy in control of key positions for the economies of the central countries that adopted this model was to lower the tax rate and free up greater circulation of floating capital. This movement also had an impact on the tendency for companies to merge, generating greater concentration, creating or reinforcing monopolies and increasing the financialisation of the economy. The increase in the gravitational weight of financial agents and concentrators in the economy, as well as an economic technocracy that trusts these capitals, leads to the constraint of party programmes, yielding to the pressures of global contingency. This position guarantees the tendency to particularise general interests and generalise "inexorable" goals, thus creating an idea of the "inevitability" of implementing certain standardised economic policies. The balance is thus tipped in favour of relations that are more dependent on private institutions rather than political institutions.

As economic policy is one of the axes of analysis in this chapter, in addition to institutional arrangements and the possibility of strategic concertation, we move on to the debate from another point of view. We will discuss the models of democracy applicable in Latin American states, whose democratic regimes are institutionalised as a form of transition from authoritarianism, based on Moisés' (1995) critique and characterisation of the minimalist and maximalist models. Moisés sets out the absolute models and, at the end, ponders them in perspective. For the author, the minimalist model of democracy, presented in narrative form, would be this:

Minimalism:

This model applies without preconditions and does not require the existence of substantive pacts. Above all, it is an institutional arrangement based on the will and commitment of key players in the country's transition and political environment. Because it has no substantive pact and is a model built on the strategic choices of the actors, both the causal relationships it contains and the results of the democratisation processes are uncertain. There is a generalised notion that democracy is a causal factor for social progress and not the other way around. In this way, both the game and democratic institutions are detached from distributist policies – the improvement and increase of the population's income. That's why these institutions are concise. This form of democracy is categorised as the only possible way out at a given moment in history.

Moisés says that the agreement or pact that established democracy, as in Brazil and Chile, is incomplete or insufficient. As for Casanova (1967), the term democracy is more persuasive than comprehensive and needs to be analysed carefully. Democracy must be accompanied by an analysis of economic and social development. In short, there would be no democracy for its own sake, nor would it be married to a corresponding social structure. An example is the Punto Fijo Pact in Venezuela, which began to break down with the Caracazo uprising of 1989, then with the coup attempt by then Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chávez and deepened after the counter-coup of April 2002.

Returning to the debate on models of democracy, the maximalist model would be the sum of the structural conditions for democracy to be institutionalised. Thus, the maximalist model, set out in narrative form, would be this:

Maximalism:

This model is characterised by economic development and distributist policies that guarantee a minimum income. In this case, democracy is a factor in the modernisation of society, in which political leaders and actors work towards a pact and consolidation, but must be accompanied by a minimum division of power and wealth.

As part of the substantive pact, there is a need to solve problems perceived as pressing, such as: political deadlock; the prevalence of private interests over public interests; the state as a provider of justice; and the generation of a sense security. In this case, economic, social and cultural conditions are not determinant, but they form the indispensable basis for the emergence of democracy as a stable regime. In this way, development broadens the base of the middle class, pluralising interests, and expands the segments of the "political market" interested in its diversification.

Moisés concludes by predicting a balanced model, where institutional arrangements operate in conjunction with a political will on the part of the non-elites to accept democracy as the common denominator. Experimental intentions are left out of Moisés' text, which foresees the existence of a political culture as an influencing factor. According to the author, the presence of the media and the programmatic retreat of political and social parties and actors must also be taken into account. In this way, Moisés foresees perspective analysis as the first condition for precision. It should be noted that the size of the state and its role are an indispensable condition for providing economic and social development. This is why its role, functions and institutional designs are so important.

### **6.3. The Latin American version and state models: neoliberal and developmentalist**

In order to understand the effects of the set of ideas shaped around the Mont Pèlerin Society, we have to take into account the fact that they are given universal coverage by the status of scientific truth. But these truths are essentially based on political premises, inspired by philosophical ideas and applied in language and economic prescriptions. The power of language applies a jargon in which the reader-recipient is obliged to accept the speaker's rules for debate. This *modus operandi*, massively disseminated through electronic media, is one of the ways in which today's economy turns (Biz & Guareschi, 2005) and acts as a "concept carrier", making its dissemination the very way in which it is operationalised.

Thus, concepts from economics, particularly the financial economics advocated by Friedman (1981) and Hayek (2004), have entered fields that were previously the domain of politics and culture. The adaptive effort of the critique where these policies were most felt took on a specific shape in each part of the world where it was articulated. In the Brazilian case, counter-hegemonic thinking worked with a certain intensity soon after the implementation of the Collor plan, by former USP professor and then Finance Minister Zélia Maria Cardoso de Mello.

There's no denying that it was the economic policy of Fernando Collor's former minister that ushered in Brazil's first step towards a minimal state, or the direct subordination of the state's interests to support the growth of private capital. It should be noted that the delayed effects in Brazil occurred right at the end of Fernando Henrique's government, unlike Argentina, for example. This is because, in the southern country, the inauguration of the military, led by General Videla in 1976, brought with it the economic operators led by Economy Minister José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz (Seoane, 1997).

Having overcome bipolarity and won the War of the Ideological Frontiers (Castro & D'Araújo, 2000), the world politics called for by Thatcher-Reagan arrived in our country after the crisis of the state in the second half of the 80s. The state model, together with the limits of democracy, became the subject of current debate. In order to criticise it, counter-hegemonic thinking took the task of dissecting the neoliberal premises and pointing out a model for this format and its counter-models.

The debate on the democratic model became disassociated from the state model. In this way, even though it took on a form and tradition of conservative modernisation, the Brazilian state built by the military met the aspirations of national development, without considering the problem of political freedoms and rights. The countermeasure is the application of the neoliberal prescription through a formula of procedural rather than substantive democracy (Vitullo, 2005).

To summarise to summarise in this part of chapter, we seek a model of model. For this reason, we have taken as our basis the text resulting from Anderson's conference and the comments by Oliveira, Netto and Sader (1998). I believe that the contribution of these authors can be incorporated into the day-to-day critique of the defences of neoliberalism, which allows for a more assimilable understanding. Below we look at the phenomena of the state model in Brazil, describing them in narrative form:

#### National Developmentalist State

This model has the presence of state-owned companies as key players in the economy and society. In this institutional design - the Brazilian case - political freedom is generally subordinated to distributist or developmentalist policies. As such, it ends up being considered a secondary value. Society sees the state as an agent of modernisation, which can be conservative (as in Brazil) or transform society. In the form of conservative modernisation, there are social protection laws, but the capacity for protest and participation is restricted. The model is led by a strong executive and a subordinate technocracy. In the case of Brazil, there has been growing indebtedness. In addition to indebtedness, the form of financing is based on a high tax rate, intended to fund infrastructure to finance industrial expansion. For the national developmentalism that existed in Brazil, economic growth was more important than financial and political stability

#### Neo Liberal State

In this state model, there is increasing privatisation, followed by the loss of control over part or all of the country's infrastructure and services. On the other hand, political freedom is guaranteed, with the participation of various political actors and social movements. Although there is an increase in participation, there is a loss of the state's capacity to intervene in the country's strategic policies. This removes the political decision-making power of agents mobilised from counter-hegemonic positions. At the same time as privatisation, which generates a loss of control over infrastructure, there is financialisation of the economy, gravitating towards exchange and production relations and conditioning the country's economic policies. In this case, fiscal capacity operates as



guaranteeing both "austerity" and the payment of debt services. As a result of "austerity", public policies are timid and selective, aimed at electoral markets. Political and economic stability is greater than the country's growth.

One of the aims of this thesis is to criticise neoliberalism and its colonisation of political science, but also to fight against the premise that the only way to regulate and organise a distributist society is through the state. The focus of the debate in this part of the thesis is on the possibilities for development and the responsiveness of the state to its citizens. We believe that a structural analysis implies an ideological debate based on the set of values identified in political culture, and the institutional design outlined in the models of state superimposed on the models of democracy that actually exist. To this end, the entire foundation of the historical-structural matrix is necessary.

#### **6.4. Characterising the macroeconomic situation and democratic design in which we live today in the subcontinent**

The functions and attributions of the capitalist state of the 1920s, enshrined in the post-war period as the pact between classes financed in Europe with the Reconstruction Plan (Marshall), refinanced by the European Common Community for the countries of southern Europe that were democratising at the end of the 1970s, were fought against and partially sold by the current of political thought called Neoliberalism.

Fundamental to this was the electoral victory of Thatcher (1979) and Reagan (1980), the defeat of the Soviet bloc, and before that, after the Oil Crisis (1973), the breakdown of the dollar-gold standard, with world finance now being regulated by the standard. Thus, the US public (internal) debt ended up regulating the global economy. This remained absolute until the rise of the second unilateralism (under Bush Jr), the economic growth of China and the return of more left-wing governments in Latin America.

Simultaneously with the crisis in societies governed by neoliberal prescriptions, the Brazilian state has been experiencing a dichotomous situation. On the one hand, the democratic regime is asserting itself, with various spaces for participation (councils of all , consultation of civil society) and some institutional experimentation (PBs, plebiscites, popular initiative laws). There is also more organised and less channelled participation through institutional political parties.

It is important to note the starting condition, the macro-structural scenario of the Brazilian economy, emphasising the occupation of labour at the time of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's electoral victory and the beginning of his government. I believe it is important to note these conditions in order to expose the real scenario and the constraints (conditionalities) imposed by the living conditions of the majority of Brazilian society. It's worth looking at the data on labour occupation in Brazil presented by Kon (2004):

*Analysing the diversity of occupational and regional conditions specific to the informal labour markets deserves special attention, given the significant and growing number of people employed in these informal situations in the Brazilian economy, as a result of the decline in the dynamics of job creation in the formal labour market. Suffice to say that of the total number of workers in Brazil, around 58% were employed informally in 2002, of which 18.5% were workers in companies without a signed work permit, 5.7% were employed in paid domestic services without a work permit, 22.3% were self-employed, 7.4% were unpaid and the remaining 4% were workers for their own consumption.*

This factor, among others that we will examine, means that the strategic commitments of the state, through its managers and major operators, are unable to offer the social regulation that is their responsibility. An example of this is the absence of public policies alongside the tax surcharge and the direct funding of conglomerates and oligopolies. On the other hand, the judiciary and the public prosecutor's office allow for a wide range of social protests, demands and intra-institutional disputes. In other words, the world economic order does not prevent specific protests, however radicalised they may be.

What hasn't changed in the country is the restriction of access to fundamental rights and the absence of public policies.

When it comes to competition and alternation of political operators, the Brazilian state is quite permeated. Congressional renewal is high, with 43 per cent of seats in the Chamber of Deputies in 2002 and 48 per cent in 2006<sup>104</sup>. The renewal of representatives not a problem for Brazilian democracy. As for the country's structural problems, understanding the dispute over the role of the state, which should be the "inducer" of growth for some and the "provider" of growth for others, they are generally solved in favour of the former.

The idea of democracy is at its limit in contemporary Latin America. After a decade of stable regimes, the mechanism of competition between parties is limited by the structural constraint defined by political philosophy, transmitted in the form of doctrinal thinking and prescriptions, applied in the form of macroeconomic concepts. These concepts reflect an ideological horizon called neoliberalism, which began as a counter-offensive to the Keynesian consensus.

The axis of analysis starts from the post-war, bipolar world, within its debates between the defenders of the Welfare State and the Liberal or Neoliberal proposals. With the end of bipolarity and the partial victory of the second proposal, I criticise this victorious side and observe its direct effects on the political, economic and ideological spheres in Brazil and Latin America. The debate also discusses the limits of the democracy that operates in the current state and its possible reforms or ways out. I have emphasised the state as a societal phenomenon, a synthesis of political power and a conditioner of the structural margins in which it operates.

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<sup>104</sup> See the statement by Antonio Augusto de Queiroz, an analyst from the Inter-Union Department of Parliamentary Advice (DIAP), for the UOL portal, in GUTIERRES, Marcelo. *Chamber renews itself by 48 per cent, but 12 involved in scandals return*. Electronic document at <http://eleicoes.uol.com.br/2006/ultnot/2006/10/02/ult3749u914.jhtm>; electronic file consulted on 08 June 2008.

## **Part II: Analysing economic policy when the government changed from Fernando Henrique to Lula and the constraints on structural changes**

### **6.5. The transition from consolidated representative democracy to the state Neoliberal**

This part of the chapter and thesis looks at Brazilian economic policy during the transition from the Fernando Henrique Cardoso government (FHC, 01/01/1995 to 01/01/2003) to that of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (01/01/2003 to 01/01/2011) and the first few months of Lula's government. I start from studies carried out in the second half of 2002, where I was able to observe and analyse the economic policies promoted by the Brazilian central government since the Opening. I noticed mutual interference between the market, economic agents and political agents, and the constraints promoted by the central countries, specifically the United States of America (USA), in addition to the mechanisms global regulation by this hegemonised power, prevailed over all these actors. I also had the opportunity to follow the electoral contest for president and state governors (as well as the House and Senate of the Republic and their respective State Assemblies) and in this process, the possible structural changes that could occur with the alternation of government.

In the following text, we expose a series of structural constraints that reduce the Brazilian central government's room for manoeuvre to a minimum. This condition, within the parameters of hegemonic thinking, means that the little capacity for movement is independent of changes in the party and coalition occupying the executive branch of the Brazilian state.

This is a theme that is reiterated throughout the thesis, one of the neuralgic problems of political science, which is the condition of self-determination of a government elected through popular vote as a mechanism of representative democracy confronted with the

constraints suffered by states. Under the current rules of politics in Brazil, the form of citizenship enshrined in the constitution is the primacy of suffrage over other forms of participation. But this same vote does not serve as a source of decision-making for the country's long-term decisions. So the question remains:

- How can a democratically elected government make strategic macroeconomic decisions if the state from which it governs is sovereign over its own resources, but does not exercise this sovereignty to its full potential?

In this part of the chapter, the first question leads to two others, a direct consequence of the one mentioned above. The first concerns international regulatory frameworks and the direct interference of macroeconomic regulatory bodies, the most influential of which between 2002 and 2003 was the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The first follow-up question is:

- Do the structural constraints of Brazil's indebtedness (internal and external debt) and the target plans pre-agreed with the IMF prevent the realisation of long-term policies?

The second question, on the other hand, deals with the set of commitments and limitations for the political exercise of the power to govern a state that is or should be, at least in theory, sovereign. It concerns the levels of commitment of economic policy and the respective international commitments, effectively subjecting politics to the economic level of decision-making at national level. The second follow-up question is:

- What room for manoeuvre is therefore possible without breaking away from the current model (e.g. primary surplus, target plan, fiscal adjustment, etc.), but also from the dictates of the international institutions and the central states that hegemonise them?

As you can see, this chapter's approach is consistent with the concerns to be elucidated by the Theory of the 3 Spheres. In particular, the concern throughout this chapter in its three parts is the gravitation of neoliberal thinking, starting from an "economic" prism, equipped with a lexicon and vocabulary of "technique", as superior to political debates. I disagree with this way of conducting the debate and substantiating decision-making. There are technical limitations in all areas of public life, but this technical universe - that of limited technological resources, specialised labour and a suitable environment - cannot override the potential politics. This statement has a higher status of truth when it comes to a country Brazil's size and resources.

This is why the issue of the loss of popular sovereignty through the constraint exercised by economic and financial operators must be deepened and elevated to the level of a political problem. I understand that the issue is dealt with by the corporate and specialised media, as well as by Brazilian academia, but above all in a way that, once again, empties politics and subsumes it into a "technical" form. The counterpoint pointed out here and throughout the thesis must be the approach of development strategy and the increase in sovereignty of a collectivity of citizens as a way of altering a balance of forces that is unfavourable to the popular mandate. The context of this concern is located here.

I realise that the novelty of this text is that it focuses on a moment of government transition and the affirmation of an elected mandate with the symbolic capital of popular leadership. I address the period that covers the first four months of the Lula administration, when there has been no significant change in the macroeconomic level of government. Considering the opposition character that the head of state and his party (Workers' Party, PT<sup>105</sup>) have always had, we therefore have evidence of permanence, even in the first four months of the government.

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<sup>105</sup> The Workers' Party has been in opposition to the federal government since 1980, when it was founded in the midst of the political opening and party re-organisation that took place during the government of cavalry general João Baptista Figueiredo. It won power in the Executive twenty-two (22) years after its foundation.

at the beginning of the first government, of the economic policy patterns of the two FHC governments.

As I write this part of the thesis<sup>(106)</sup>, I am observing the same behaviour of the government in relation to the Brazilian economy. This is after more than five years of Lula's government, noting the *continuity* in those little more than 4 months of presidential power with the 96 months of the same exercise during the previous government. It is also clear to see that the concrete policies being implemented today are a continuation of the previous government. How much structural constraint operates in these government resolutions is implicit in the *continuum* itself.

## 6.6. Factors and agents constraining the exercise of power political

To develop this theme, we will focus on what the literature and political and economic journalism conventionally call the 2nd Washington Consensus. In the 1st Washington Consensus, a meeting that took place in November 1989 and was attended by US government officials and international financial regulatory bodies (Auditoria Cidadã da Dívida, p.22), the set of guidelines generally consisted of a package of macroeconomic reforms and adjustments.

These measures would be spending cuts, considering social investment as "spending", and the implementation of state reforms, including social security reforms. On another scale, it involved microeconomic adjustments, relieving private capital of its burdens and obligations towards labour. Finally, they included the progressive dismantling of the post-World War II industrial growth model, which had been achieved through the developmentalist state. This package of adjustments, to be implemented primarily on the periphery of the capitalist system, was allegedly designed to clean up and stabilise inflated and stagnant economies (Fiori, 2001, p.85).

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<sup>106</sup> Week from Tuesday 01/04/2008 to Monday 07/04/2008.

The 2nd Consensus, on the other hand, was allegedly motivated by a proposal for dependent growth in these peripheral economies (Bresser, 2002, p.87). What is recognised and referred to as the 2nd Consensus is a recipe for dependent economic growth, coming from the same centres that proposed the adjustment programme that claimed to remedy the stagnation of the 1980s (known as the "lost decade").

At the time of the 2nd Consensus, a statement was made that I believe to be wrong. According to Bresser Pereira (2002, pp.86-87), the premise of growth through external indebtedness is false. This is because the central countries' claim that the periphery of the system no longer has the resources to finance its own growth is not true. At least, it's not an absolute truth. Going further in opposing the idea of indebtedness, this growth has "short legs" and little or no strategic scope. What we see is an underlying problem, leading us to question the very premises this form of economic-political thinking.

The root of this problem lies in neoliberal hyper-structuralism, which, when applied at macro-economic level, makes policy itself disappear - and/or render it innocuous - and the need for long-term vision. Returning to the subject, financed growth is simply deepened external indebtedness. Instead of reinforcing domestic savings, the countries with the best conditions for development on the periphery of the system will seek foreign currency abroad, further increasing their degree of dependence. And secondly, if indebtedness decreases, without changing the fundamentals of the economy, the primacy of financial capital is in the remuneration of government paper (debt securities), sold and bought by the government itself, and in the setting of a real interest rate above the country's productive capacity.

Bresser also exposes the bankruptcy of the premise when he says that countries like Brazil and Mexico have the national resources for their development (p.87). For Bresser, both countries have carried out their primitive accumulation and have a state and economic elites capable of channelling domestic savings into national investment. It is clear that the premise of the 2nd Washington Consensus is false for Bresser due to eminently important factors



political. And it is this very lack of preponderance of the political level - or the political level controlled by macroeconomic fundamentalism - that does not generate any decision-making capacity capable of countering the also political designs that come from the centre of capitalism<sup>107</sup>.

In line with Bresser's assertion, and agreeing with the false premise that growth is impossible without foreign aid, Fiori (p.90) states that the 2nd Consensus justly advocates a strengthening of state power. And this in order to ensure the inflow of foreign investment so that it can supposedly finance growth in countries like Brazil. What the 2nd Consensus doesn't say, but leads to through its concrete policies, is that these investments reinforce the internal weakening of national governments. This is due to the fact that these governments have almost no autonomy in deciding whether or not to bring capital into the countries they govern.

What does exist is a capacity for indirect influence. These are the conditions that would generate "credibility" in volatile (speculative) capital and the very management of both the Fund and private creditors in the emerging country. In the Brazilian case, the most common measure, which has been in place since the first FHC government, is the placement of trusted operators from the financial system, people with high professional calibre and a track record of loyalty and competence in banking. This factor, the national operator of economic policies, meets classic conditions such as:

- If by any chance the target plans and agreements go against what the IMF or the risk analysis agencies have indicated;

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<sup>107</sup> It is important to emphasise that we are not making an apology or panacea for political will, also pejoratively called "political voluntarism", at least at this decision-making level, in relation to the real forces of the economy and society. On the contrary, we are saying that it is precisely these real elements that can make the eminently political role above government decisions that proclaim themselves to be technical and gain an almost unquestionable status prevail.

- If the country continues to go into debt, issuing public debt securities to remunerate the speculative capital that enters and leaves the country without being taxed;
- If by any chance the Union government puts executives who are "trusted" by creditors and financial investors in key positions to control the economy.

If all this happens, then, according to the current language criticised by Fiori, the political level will be "positively influencing" the inflow of capital that will help internal growth. In our view, these statements are a denial of the executive's political decision-making capacity and autonomy vis-à-vis the state and the political and economic systems over which it governs.

The quest to fulfil these target plans during only part of the second Fernando Henrique administration gives us figures that confirm these statements. In order to guarantee the entry of these capitals that would "come to finance Brazil's growth", the FHC government the domestic debt (in public bonds)<sup>108</sup> to 20% per year in 1999, 21% in 2000 and 35% until November 2001. The total figures are for the years in question (in billions of reais): R\$ 464.7bn; R\$ 555.9bn and R\$ 675bn. Following the path of this government-financed capital, through which the country has become indebted, we arrive at the other end of the "Brazilian commitments". In terms of interest and amortisation of the foreign debt alone<sup>109</sup>, the country paid its creditors the following amounts - in other words, it took money out of the government's coffers, decapitalised the nation and stopped investing in long-term plans and goals - in 1999 and 2000 respectively (in billions of dollars). Interest was US\$15.24 and US\$13.97. Amortisations were US\$49.12 and US\$31.69.

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<sup>108</sup> The figures come from the National Treasury Secretariat and the Central Bank, cited by the Citizen's Debt Audit, page 15.

<sup>109</sup> These figures come from Central Bank bulletins and Conjuntura Econômica magazine, quoted by Auditoria Cidadã da Dívida, p.14.

We have to consider a logical argument. The target plans agreed with the IMF included a primary surplus on the part of the Union of around 3.5 per cent. In order to achieve this target, 34% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was channelled into taxes (Auditoria da , p.18) and this tax overload aimed at amortising the debt already incurred. The 2nd Consensus recipe implies more dependency, because the capital that comes in doesn't just come to finance growth. But also to continue rolling over the debt to which these capitals are creditors. In its dependence on the inflow of these volatile capitals, the government has signalled "positive" factors, demonstrating "good will" and "solidity" to honour its commitments. In reality, thinking and executing according to this logic, there is no alternative but to maintain and increase its own indebtedness.

We resume the debate from the point of view that the premise that national growth is not possible with internal savings is false (according to Bresser, with which we agree). We will see that this author places the existence of an economic elite, together with a leading layer of the state, capable of channelling the volume of circulating capital from the financial system to domestic savings as a fundamental factor for this growth denied by the 2nd Washington Consensus. Fiori's assertion is that this premise is true precisely because there were no Latin American elites (in the case of the "adjustment" of the region's countries) with such decision-making autonomy. For the author, there was no Latin American elite with an independent will and decision in the second half of the 90s. What happened was quite the opposite: Latin American political and economic elites fully adhered to the theses advocated in both consensuses (p.199). This alignment with the government and guidelines of the central power represents, in figures, the very negation of the countries in the region. The average growth rate in Latin America during the entire developmentalist period (1937-1990, Fiori p.191) was 5.5 per cent per year. In Brazil, between 1945-1980, it was between 7% and 8% per year. In the 1990s, the decade of economic adjustment and "sanitation", the rate fell below 3% a year, lower than in the so-called lost decade (the 1980s).

Still on the false premise that Bresser stated, this thesis affirms that it is false because of the capacity of natural resources, primitive accumulation and technological advance. But that the premise of the impossibility of growth with internal savings is true, precisely because of the strategic function that would be exercised by the elites that automatically align themselves with the theses of the USA. This supports Fiori's assertion (p.193) that there has never been any real strategic coordination in Brazil between the bureaucracies and ruling elites of the state and the dominant classes on an economic level. In the absence of these coordinated actors, there is an absence of the long term. The state bureaucracies, in the absence of their own strategy, end up giving in to the short-term pressures of the dominant and conservative classes. At the strategic level, they are subordinately aligned to the hegemonic strategy to which the country is subject.

The factor of permanence is that the automatic alignment the era of bipolarity and ideological borders remained in the 1990s and early 2000s. The difference is that in the new stage of capitalist and Western supremacy, the alignment comes from Latin American elites (such as Brazil's) in search of political agents who are partners in the central countries. Bresser (2002, p.91) reaffirms the direct alignment, saying that the Brazilian elites have lost the ability to think for themselves, reproducing the theses of the 2nd Consensus in their entirety. When these same elites focus on the Real stability plan (1994), the anchor of the new currency is the dollar standard. As a result, an entire country became hostage to the Federal Reserve's (Fed, US Central Bank) designs. Based on the principle of the need to "signal" the government's intentions to the central country, it is logical that key positions should be occupied by intermediary elements between Brazil, international economic organisations (such as the former executive at the World Bank<sup>110</sup>, FHC's Finance Minister Pedro Malan<sup>111</sup>) and the major international economic and financial agents (such as the former director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Pedro Malan<sup>111</sup>).

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<sup>110</sup> For a summary of Pedro Malan's activities, see the following electronic document: <http://www.palestrantes.org/palestrante.asp?id=48>, file accessed on 07 April 2008.

<sup>111</sup> At the time of writing this part of the thesis, former minister Pedro Malan holds the post of president of the European Central Bank. Board of Directors of Unibanco, one of the five largest banking institutions in Brazil. To see his strategic position of command, consult the electronic document located at: <http://www.ir.unibanco.com/ing/sob/org/index.asp>, file consulted on 07 April 2008.

operations of the Soros Fund, former president of the Central Bank, Arminio Fraga<sup>112</sup> and later CEO of Gávea Investimentos<sup>113</sup>). We'll see in part 3 of the chapter, and also a little further on, how this pattern of permanence is repeated in the Lula government and its economic team.

Going back to Bresser's own argument, we realise that it is not the lack of internal savings (at least potential) that prevents Brazil from developing more autonomously and nationally in the 1990s. What does stand in the way is the strategic coordination factor (as Fiori states). It's the absence of ruling elites (political and techno-bureaucratic) who, together with Brazilian economic elites (the national ruling class), would work together on the basis of government programmes and plan growth. It is inevitable that since the 1930s the search for a "national developmentalist bourgeoisie" has been underway, but this fraction of the ruling class has not established itself as an option for national development. Various political forces adjusted their strategies according to possibility of this emergence decades ago and this socio-economic phenomenon did not take place<sup>114</sup>.

Without the strategic coordination of the central agents of a capitalist economy and system, there is no possibility of strategic realisation. From this realisation, we move on to a fully aligned political discourse and practice, stating that "there are no alternatives". It's a logical sequence. It's worth quoting Sallum Jr. (1999, p.31) verbatim. This author states that "a dominant class does not become a leader unless it manages to universalise its interests in society"; and this "does not occur unless political leaders find a 'political formula' that allows the majority of the political forces present to adhere to it". When this structural analysis reaches the real levels, one realises the

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<sup>112</sup> To see Arminio Fraga's publicly displayed CV, see [http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arm%C3%ADnio\\_Fraga](http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arm%C3%ADnio_Fraga), electronic document consulted on 07 April 2008.

<sup>113</sup> To see Fraga's position in the company he founded, see the electronic document at

<http://www.gaveainvest.com.br/Default.aspx?link=66&tabid=63>, file consulted on 7 April 2008. <sup>114</sup> In order not to extend the comment, I'd like to make an analogy. A reactionary army will hardly be and risk its capacity for internal intervention in a war against an external power. Not to mention the recent example of Baath Party troops in the 2nd US invasion of Iraq, it's worth remembering the Falklands War (1982); when Argentina's best troops stayed on the continent to contain potential popular dissatisfaction.

strategic bankruptcy. Brazil's entire economy depended (and depends) on "goodwill" of the international financial system and the large transnational companies that operate here (Sallum Jr., p.31). This "good will" manifests itself as Brazil's government, elected in law in a sovereign and democratic manner, makes its political will the political will of the external hegemonic agent.

The Real Plan was allegedly created to stabilise the currency and then perhaps generate some growth. This was anchored in the unrealistic exchange rate and dollar reserves. In other words, the source of debt financing is the issuance of public bonds with very high returns to speculators. Despite "all these signs", even when there is the possibility of revising some of the IMF's targets, the country has weakened. This is evidence of the lack of national strategic coordination. In theory, it is the head of state who is elected by law and by vote. But the hegemonic weight lies with those who coerce, which in the Brazilian case, from an economic point of view, during the FHC government was the IMF and the major creditors, and during Luiz Inácio's government, it can be seen that there is never a loss of real and net gain for the financial system.

As just one example of this *continuum*, the second largest private creditor in Brazil at the time of Lula's inauguration was the Fleet Bank of Boston<sup>115</sup> (Bank of Boston). It is no coincidence that this private institution, in agreement with the IMF, nominated Henrique de Campos Meirelles<sup>116</sup>, a federal deputy elected by the PSDB-GO (in the 2002 general elections), to be president of the Central Bank, and he took over in January 2003.

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<sup>115</sup> The Bank of Boston was originally created as the Massachusetts Bank, founded in 1794, merged with the First National Bank of Boston to become the Bank of Boston. After another merger, with BayBank, it became BancoBoston (1995/96), followed by another merger with Fleet Financia Group (1999), forming Fleet Boston. In 2004 Fleet Boston was acquired by Bank of America. For further information see: <http://www.nndb.com/company/124/000057950/>, archive consulted on 07 April 2008.

<sup>116</sup> For Henrique Meirelles' academic and professional CV, see: <http://www.bcb.gov.br/pre/quemequem/port/henriqueMeirelles.asp?idpai=diretoria>, file consulted on 07 April 2008.

Logical reasoning then makes us understand and agree with Fiori when he compares Argentina's automatic alignment with the pretences of continuity relations between the FHC government and the Brazilian PSDB and Clinton's Democratic Party government. Proportionally, the "carnal relations" with the US and the De la Rúa government's fulfilment of its "homework" (Fiori, p.233), resulted first in a white coup (when Caballo took over as super-minister) and then in the overthrow of the elected government. De la Rúa's fall saw the dismantling of the Alianza, the base of the Unión Cívica Radical, and the partial dismantling of the political system.

When Menem's former economy minister, Domingo Caballo, who was defeated for the presidency (he lost to De la Rúa and was runner-up to Duhalde), takes over the super-ministry of the economy, Fiori calls it a "white coup" - a statement with which we agree. Strategic decisions for the country, which in 2001 necessarily involved (and still do) macroeconomic decisions, are now concentrated in the hands of the "man of confidence" of the transnationals, the creditors and the IMF. And yet, these international agents withdrew their support, created illiquidity in the country and broke down remaining domestic savings. This led to the confiscation of savings and deposited money, known as the *corralito*. By doing this "homework" and giving up the basic points of his government programme, De la Rúa first gave in to the white coup of the international agents and then was overthrown by the popular rebellion. The sentiment woven into the alliance between the unemployed *piqueteros*, the working class and the lower middle class culminates in the *cacerolazo* rebellion<sup>117</sup>.

Fiori also uses the alignment of the PSDB and Clinton's Democrats as a comparative example (p.221). FHC staked his hopes and projections on multilateralism, with the US at the forefront. He did all his "homework" and positioned Brazil with some prominence in this subordinate order in which the country finds itself. If the master changes, the vassal loses his support base. That's exactly what happened. This is an example of the lack of conditions for making strategic decisions. The fate of decisions

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<sup>117</sup> For a good chronology of the events of the Argentinian rebellion of December 2001 and the necessary understanding of its historical roots, read the article by: IÑIGO CARRERA and COTARELO (2006).

he fundamental government of the Brazilian state was centred on an alliance whose fate did not depend at all on the country itself.

By relegating its international expectations - of insertion into a regulated global order - foreign aid and assistance is delegated to the central political agents of the USA. With the Republican government of George W. Bush, financial support for national crises was interrupted, as the US gave to Argentina in 1990, Mexico in 1994 and Brazil in 1998 (Fiori, p.223). In this unilateral order that has been set up for the short term, what weight would Brazil have in the bargaining and power play? How could it assert its position on the international stage if its decisions and internal economic direction belong to the target plans stipulated by the agents who coerce the country? The country simply cannot remain at the mercy of external decisions - even when they are made from within the Brazilian state - and the role of the government becomes to be the agent that exerts coercion from international mechanisms, for the benefit of financial capital operating within political and economic systems. Added to this is the classic role of containing social forces as an essential factor in, according to the lexicon used, "calming investors".

In the absence of long-term projects, in other words, in the absence of a strategic project, "homework" is reproduced, accompanied by "expert comments" and a dozen euphemisms such as psychological reinforcement and media pressure to fulfil target plans. Thus, the fulfilment of targets stipulated by an external agent coerces and withdraws resources from the country. The short-term solution is more renegotiation and external savings, further increasing the debt itself, in this case the domestic debt. This leads to a vicious circle that will not end unless this same logic is broken.

Just to give you example, the Union's total budget (forecast for 2001)<sup>118</sup> was R\$418.5 billion reais. Debt services totalled R\$ 142.2 billion. Interest and charges totalled R\$71.6 billion and amortisation R\$70.6 billion. The total budget

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<sup>118</sup> All this data can be found in LIMA ROCHA (g); in a paper presented at the AUGM Conference for young researchers, La Plata, Argentina, September 2003.



had been reduced by a third (1/3) with foreign debt charges alone. On average, in 2001, 1 out of every 3 reais collected was used to roll over Brazil's foreign debt. This is simply the absence of sovereignty over one's own resources. In other words, the elected government does not decide on the wealth produced and circulating, which is taxed and sent to foreign creditors in the proportion described above. In 2000, this figure reached 34 per cent of GDP in terms of tax burden. In fact, in this model, there are no conditions for national development, much less on the basis of non-existent internal savings. The conclusion is obvious:

- "How can you have what you can't accumulate?!"

## **6.7. The permanence of embarrassment and strategic impossibility**

The premise on which we base this part of the chapter comes from economist Celso Furtado (2003). In an interview given to the weekly newspaper *Brasil de Fato* and reproduced in the magazine *Caros Amigos*<sup>119</sup>, Furtado states that when the political debate is centred on the economic bias, Brazil is already in too subordinate a position in the world economic system (p.30). It is understandable that the position of the political agents who execute the destiny of the economy, members of the executive branch of the state, from an economic point of view, already starts from a position of submission, which is therefore non-strategic. Even when dealing with the exclusively bias, Furtado states that economists who apply the IMF's prescription or act in direct favour of financial capital, "think in terms of microeconomics and apply it in macroeconomic terms" (p.30), thus reducing the medium and long-term outputs.

That's why the purpose of debt services is to amortise a quota in order to raise more debt and roll over the debt that comes in, and so on. The premise is that the country has to define a national project (or at least a minimum project of the forces that make up a national project).

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<sup>119</sup> FURTADO (2003), published in the monthly magazine *Caros Amigos*, in an interview between pages 30 and 35, February 2003. In this interview, the economist discusses economic models, the debate the country's development and the nation's strategic possibilities.

government), identify the space that exists for this project and seek autonomy of manoeuvre to carry it out. He identifies that, for example, the case of the Central Bank "is a surrender to big international capital" (p.30). Therefore, there is no direction or route mapped out through a more autonomous position. By exclusion, if there is no minimum decision-making autonomy at a high level, there is strategic impossibility (my emphasis).

The debate would therefore go in two directions. The understanding that the country has an economic system (p.32) and, conversely, the denial of the management and long-term projection of this system is the "sterilisation of the economic debate" (p.32). The economy, through the prism of the prevalence of its financialisation, increases in importance as long as no developmentalist bias is maintained. The "technical" mastery of the economy is simply an affirmation of the premises of a global economic system in which the country is a subordinate player. This is the strategic impossibility, since there is no theoretical resource for developing the national economic system. The possibility exists, but it cannot be implemented in a "technical" universe dominated by the prescriptions of the neoliberal economic thought matrix.

In real-world practice, the high interest rate, already reaching 26.5 per cent in the first four months of the Lula government, maintained the pattern of the Selic rate since March 2003 (see Benjamin 2003<sup>120</sup>). The central government was aiming for a surplus of more than 3.75 per cent. Even so, it was no longer covering even 1/3 of the interest that Brazil paid (and continues to pay) to the capital that entered the country. All this means an "absurd decapitalisation of the economy" (see Dowbor, 2003). This leaves one more basic question:

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<sup>120</sup> In this article, at the end of the text, the Rio Janeiro economist César Benjamin (Caros Amigos, March 2003) makes a budgetary comparison. The finance minister at the time of the article, the former mayor of Ribeirão Preto, doctor Antônio Palocci, claims that the 1% rise in interest rates was due to "unexpected inflationary pressures". This 1% rise is equivalent in real terms to more than R\$5 billion reais in the rolling over of Brazil's domestic debt. This amount, equivalent to 1% interest caused by (unexpected pressures), totals the funds earmarked for three times the Zero Hunger Programme (of the federal government, launched at the very beginning of the mandate). The figures therefore indicate that, if not the declared priority, there is little real possibility of carrying out minimal social inclusion policies if the model is maintained. Considering that these figures and data are from the first four months of the Lula administration, Furtado's premise is therefore valid.

- "How is economic development possible if the economy and real liquidity is sucked up by the financial system?"

Talking about internal savings, therefore, without changing the development model based precisely on external indebtedness, becomes unfeasible. Since domestic savings are the only resource of foreign currency that a sovereign state can have without increasing its indebtedness even further (and therefore without increasing its dependence on and impediment to the use of its own resources), and since these same domestic savings are prevented from being used (by the model applied), there is no strategic possibility of development.

Comparative notions are always useful in order to have a real idea of this impossibility. A country's reserves are one of the measures of its wealth. Dowbor (2003, p.12) gives us the following comparative data in his article. In January 2003, Argentina had around US\$ 10 billion in foreign currency. Brazil had US\$ 30 billion. On the other hand, a large investment and "consultancy" company, such as Merrill Lynch, from the United States, managed around US\$ 1 trillion. An average private investor, such as Edward Jones, also from the US, managed around \$255 billion. Since Merrill Lynch is an investor and guarantor of investments in the country, how can there be a minimum balance between a sovereign state and a transnational investment and speculation company? It simply can't, and the country is subject to the interests and constraining capacities of the transnational company.

Dealing specifically with the structures of continuity, we see Furtado's premise of sterilisation of the economic debate manifested in the first Finance Minister, Antônio Palocci<sup>121</sup>. According to Dowbor, the latter reaffirms that the Central Bank's decisions (Palocci apud Duarte, 2003) are eminently "technical" and not subject to

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<sup>121</sup> Palocci held office from January 2003 to March 2006. He had previously been a state deputy for the PT and mayor of Ribeirão Preto. His professional background is as a sanitary doctor. He was elected federal deputy for São Paulo (PT-SP) in the 2006 general elections. For a summary of the former Finance Minister's CV, see: [http://www.palocci.com.br/biografia\\_01.php](http://www.palocci.com.br/biografia_01.php); archive consulted on 07 April 2008.

"political judgements". This technical statement points to the continuity of Malan's tripod and Fraga (respectively finance minister during FHC's two terms and president of the Central Bank during his second term), with the aim of containing high inflation and a currency crisis. The tripod is based on the policies of:

- free exchange;
- high interest rates;
- fiscal tightening.

The policies presented by Palocci and the president of the Central Bank, Henrique Meirelles (as we've already said, a federal deputy elected by the PSDB-Goiás) at the start of the new government were strictly the same. So were the allegations, with "technical" necessity and fear of external vulnerability prevailing.

This concept of external "vulnerability" is manifested in the dependence on the flow of fast-moving capital in and out of the country, "indicating positive signals for the world market". This makes it possible to "lower country risk indices", endorsed, among other companies, by Merrill Lynch herself<sup>122</sup>, who was even one of the guarantors of the Vale do Rio Doce mining company auction, and to keep our debt rolling. If, by some "chance", something happens - such as an economic policy measure - that doesn't please the creditors and/or the risk guarantors and/or the IMF, which at the time was the central guarantor, there could be "a flight of short-term capital" and "a rise in country risk". We could call this an attack (or speculative attack), depending on the point of view and the premises, if

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<sup>122</sup> This particular company, Merrill Lynch (ML), was the subject of a federal investigation by the US government, the evidence of which came to light between 1999 and 2001. ML was accused of carrying out a financial fraud of enormous proportions. For an archive of the fraud data, see <http://www.merrilllynchfraudinfocenter.com/information.php>, archive accessed on 07 April 2008. For ML's official website, see [http://www.ml.com/index.asp?id=7695\\_15125\\_17454](http://www.ml.com/index.asp?id=7695_15125_17454), archive accessed on 07 April 2008. For the official complaint by the US government's Federal Securities and Exchange Commission associating ML with the Enron fraud, see: <http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-32.htm>; <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18038.htm>, <http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch031703whd.htm>, and <http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch031703smc.htm>, all files consulted on 07 April 2008.

"political" (like that of the economist Celso Furtado), or "technical" (like that of the doctor and former mayor of Ribeirão Preto, Antônio Palocci).

In order to reduce external vulnerability - in other words, to maintain a favourable opinion of Brazil's economic policy - interest rates were raised in 2003. And where does this interest come from? Issuing money, generating inflation, is not possible. Increasing the tax burden (which ended the second FHC government at 34 per cent of GDP) was not always indicated, although it can happen. What happens in practice (and is happening) is budget cuts, or similar resources such as contingency or untying.

The measures follow the pattern of reducing state investments, the transfer of funds, social inclusion programmes - such as the comparative data of Fome Zero and the 1% rise in the Selic rate - in addition to the fact that public administrators have already been brought within the framework of the fiscal responsibility law. Add to this the lack of internal savings, and how can we point to growth outside the hegemonic recipe? Since Brazil is in a subordinate position within the hegemonic recipe generated precisely by those who hold the hegemony of the world economic system, how can it make strategic decisions? For our part, the logical conclusion is, if not the total impossibility, then the extremely low probability of this happening.

Just to reinforce the evidence of the continuity of strategic absence, let's look at the proposal for the "autonomy of the Central Bank in the Lula government" (BC, see Arbex, May 2003), a topic that has been on the agenda since the beginning of the current president's first administration. Since the Central Bank is the *locus* of excellence for executive decisions - of political and not just "technical" origins - how can it be given autonomy by the sovereignly elected executive?

Another basic question is what economic premises will be applied "technically" in a political decision-making space for the national economy. The Central Bank regulates and manages the financial system that operates in the country. If it is autonomous, who will do it? Which hegemonic country has been granted full administrative autonomy and the implementation of

financial policies the body that regulates its own country's currency? Logically, if there is an understanding that the Central Bank is a space for strategic decisions, and to make these decisions autonomous is precisely to give up any room for manoeuvre in the country's financial policy. This means giving up not only resources (as happened in 2002 and 2003 with debt services and in 2008 with the rollover of the domestic debt<sup>123</sup>), but also the decision-making management of the country's financial resources. This is evidence of the continuity of strategic absence in the change of government.

## **6.8. A conclusive debate on the limits of the democratic dispute within a structural constraint that prevents a strategic option**

We should now return to a question that arose at the beginning of this Part II:

- How can a democratically elected government make strategic macroeconomic decisions if the state from which it governs is sovereign over its own resources, but does not exercise this sovereignty to its full potential?

We believe that all the valid arguments to answer this question have already been set out in the previous paragraphs. We therefore affirm that a state that is not sovereign over its own resources - including political, economic, human, natural and energy resources. - is incapable of making strategic decisions. This is because it has to respond, always in the short or very short term, to external demands, whether they come from creditors, guarantors or investors from the central countries or from transnational funds.

<sup>123</sup> In July 2008, the public sector's primary surplus was 82% of the formal target for the first half of this year.

This means a total of R\$86bn in savings in the first six months of 2008 alone, earmarked for interest payments. The record net debt this month (July 2008) is 40.4 per cent of GDP, the lowest figure since 1998. The figures prove all the concepts in Part 2 of the Chapter and reinforce the assertion that there is no strategy for sovereign national development. For further information, see MARTELLO, Alexandro. *Saving to pay interest reaches R\$ 86bn in the first half of the year*. Portal G1, Economia & Negócios, Contas Públicas. Electronic document, at: [http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/Economia\\_Negocios/0,,MUL705800-9356,00-ECONOMY+FOR+PAYING+INTEREST+REACHES+RECORD+OF+R+BILLION+IN+THE+HALF+YEAR.html](http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/Economia_Negocios/0,,MUL705800-9356,00-ECONOMY+FOR+PAYING+INTEREST+REACHES+RECORD+OF+R+BILLION+IN+THE+HALF+YEAR.html); file consulted on 08 August 2008.

We also recognise that, both in 2008 and in the first four months of the Lula administration, there is no immediate possibility of the full exercise of sovereignty. But with political intent, the ruling class can reverse external hegemonic dominance in the medium to long term. What we are saying in the strict sense is that the national economic system is much more complex and complete than the impossibility given by "microeconomic hyper-structuralism".

The search for autonomy in energy sources, for renewable energy (biomass, for example), production chains within the country, guaranteeing exports of processed products (not raw, as is the case with iron ore, for example.), the resumption economic growth based on domestic savings, the expansion of the Brazilian consumer market, the strengthening of social inclusion through wages (which is income and not a benefit from the state) are all obvious solutions, at least in the medium term (which, according to the planning described in Chapter 7, is between 4 and 6 years).

But in strategic terms, the logic leads us to conclude that hegemony will not be broken unless there is a counter-hegemonic intention materialised in concrete decision-making. Returning to the premise of the necessary strategic coordination (Fiori), we understand that this is impossible if it has to come from the economic elites and the political and technobureaucratic class that is conformed as the ruling class. These have long been aligned with the matrices and don't appear to be "misaligned" in the short or medium term.

Seeing what happened in Argentina, before betting on a national project, the economic elites migrated liquid capital within a week, thus breaking the country. Given this evidence, we affirm both the strategic impossibility of the absence of sovereignty over resources and the lack of strategic coordination between central political agents.

In conclusion, we point to the second piece of evidence of the need for strategic coordination that comes from the initiative of a class coordination, which is the *de facto* representative of the majorities.

centred on the political axis. We thus return to economist Celso Furtado's premise, affirming the need for a political project that thinks about and strategically designs the country's economic system. The detail, according to Furtado, is that without an inclusive and distributive logic at the social level - therefore negating the zero-sum game - there is no political and economic project that will work in the country. The discussion so far suggests that this is the logical conclusion.

### **Part III: Two examples that support and demonstrate the logical conclusion**

In this Part III we conclude Chapter 6 by demonstrating with empirical examples. The narrative style is in line with Fiori's book (2001), demonstrating the concepts presented in Part II of this chapter with raw data and deductive reasoning.

#### **6.9. Economic and political stability" and the costs of generating direct employment<sup>124</sup>**

This sub-topic points to a direct correlation between the costs of so-called economic stability and the way in which direct employment is burdened in the current economic model (the current period is equivalent to the six still incomplete years of the Lula administration, first and second terms). The permanence of macroeconomic patterns can be seen in the permanence of factor maintenance:

- institutional stability;
- willingness to meet the costs of governability;
- economic performance.

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<sup>124</sup> The examples and data are based on a weekly article I wrote analysing the situation for journalist Ricardo Noblat's electronic publication. The extract presented here comes from the text by LIMA ROCHA, Bruno. *O Custo da governabilidade para a vida real*, electronic document, found at: [http://oglobo.globo.com/pais/noblat/post.asp?cod\\_Post=77376&a=112](http://oglobo.globo.com/pais/noblat/post.asp?cod_Post=77376&a=112) (October 2007); archive consulted on 07 April 2008.



These factors remain in place despite the successive political scandals fuelled by negative media coverage, which have accumulated since 2004 and were accentuated by the political crisis of 2005. It's a common argument to say that this is due to the "maturity" of Brazilian democracy. This is partly correct, but one of the factors in this maturity is unequivocally the maintenance of structural constraints on the sovereignty of the country and the popular mandate.

We have already experienced a cycle of political stability that is longer than the two previous periods. The military dictatorship in its three phases lasted 21 years (1964-1985) and the previous democratic regime lasted 19 years (1946-1964). The return to democracy began indirectly in March 1985 and did not go through any limit situations. The debate I believe needs to be held is to identify the factors that lead to this continuity and its high costs (Pereira, 2004). With this example, I'm saying that the real economy and employment and income policies are being subordinated to the demands of the financial system. I present some publicly known figures so that we can accurately analyse the size of the problem for the majority of Brazilians.

Brazil insists on generating more profits for the sectors that employ the least. In the first half of 2007, the net profit of the 24 largest banking institutions reached a record (Maximum 2007) of R\$14.52 billion. In addition to the interest rates charged on credit, banks reach these marks through charges for operations. In the same period, this sector generated only 4,320 jobs. If we divide the companies' profits by the direct jobs they provide, we find ourselves in a disparate relationship. Each job, lasting at least six months, has a gross cost of R\$3,361,111.00.

According to Maximo (2007), the two largest banks in the country in 2007, Bradesco and Itaú, made a profit of R\$4.007 billion for 180 days of operation respectively. The average profit generated by a day's operation is R\$22 million. While the two largest private banks reached these marks, Banco do Brasil (BB) closed the six-month period (Ribeiro 2007) with R\$2.5bn. That's an increase of 14.9 per cent on the second half of 2006, but a fall of 36.3 per cent over the year. A

he capillarity ratio of the banking system is inverse. BB is the leader in number of account holders, total assets and service network.

According to Ribeiro (2007), when it comes to dividing up the economy's profits, the banking sector is the leader in terms of surplus and growth among listed companies. It surpasses oil, which earned R\$11.39 billion, and mining, with R\$10.99 billion. Banks make 22 per cent of the total profits traded on the Bovespa. It's a simple equation. Whoever makes the most money increases the burden on the real economy and creates the fewest jobs. If, on the one hand, personal credit increases, for consumption in instalments, on the other hand, these same reserves don't work as a support for growth.

According to Ribeiro (2007), at the bottom end of the table, the trade and construction sectors make the least profit, with an average of 0.7 per cent. At the same time, they generate the most jobs. In the first half of the year, the commerce sector earned R\$433 million and generated 97,051 direct jobs. Between gross profit and the cost per job generated, the cost of employment in commerce is R\$4,461. Construction has similar levels, earning R\$370 million and generating 97,751 jobs. The gross cost per job generated is R\$3,792 in the first half of the year.

These figures offer us a material dimension that goes beyond the discourses that underpin neoliberal hyper-structuralism. The daily profit of the banking sector in Brazil averages R\$80.6 million. And Brazil is among the countries with the highest real interest rates in the world. Just to illustrate this, let's take a look at the data obtained when reviewing this empirical example of the loss of government capacity through a lack of investment. In a ranking from March 2008<sup>125</sup>, considering the Selic rate for the period at 11.25 per cent, Brazil's annual rate for 2008 is 6.73 per cent. Turkey's real rate is 6.69%, Australia's 4.89% and Mexico's 4.18%.

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<sup>125</sup> VIEIRA, Fabrício. *Brazil returns to the top of the ranking of real interest rates*. Electronic file found at <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/dinheiro/ult91u378775.shtml> Document consulted on 07 April 2008.

The logical and obvious conclusion is that just by investing public resources in the form of interest paid on the financial market, much of the potential wealth generated in Brazil's GDP is lost. The counter-sense arises when we take the concepts of development, based on those stipulated by Fiori (2001) and with which we agree. According to Fiori, any nation needs a few basic factors:

- raw material for steel and derivatives;
- abundant fossil or renewable energy;
- liquidity, surplus and internal reserves;
- versatile and qualified workforce;

Considering that Brazil fulfils these factors, I believe that the concepts set out in Part II of this chapter demonstrate the reasons for the lack of sustainable growth and sovereign development.

### **6.10. The cultural consumption habits of Brazilians and the volume of state investment in this area, through the budget of the Ministry of Culture**

Here we point out a deductive reasoning<sup>126</sup> that correlates Brazilians' cultural programming habits and the Ministry of Culture's (Minc) budget for 2008, which will be R\$1.1 billion (Saldanha 2008), compared on a scale with the state's spending on rolling over the domestic debt. We took the survey on Brazilian consumption of culture as the basis for our data.

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<sup>126</sup> The extract from the data and analyses in sub-item 6.3.4 comes from an article I wrote published weekly in journalist Ricardo Noblat's electronic publication. LIMA ROCHA, Bruno *O vazio cultural dos brasileiros*. (26/03/2008). Electronic document located at [http://oglobo.globo.com/pais/noblat/post.asp?cod\\_Post=94971&a=112](http://oglobo.globo.com/pais/noblat/post.asp?cod_Post=94971&a=112); file consulted on 08 April 2008.

commissioned by the Federation of Commerce of the State of Rio de Janeiro (Sistema Fecomércio-RJ) and published in the 24 March 2008 edition of the newspaper O Globo<sup>127</sup>.

The first statement affirms a habit that cuts across all classes. 2007, 55% of Brazilians did not have any type of consumption or leisure based on cultural programming. 69% of the sample of interviewees said they didn't read any books in 2007. Of every two citizens in Brazil, one hasn't read a book, or been to the cinema, the theatre, an art exhibition or a dance or music show! Lack of habit was the primary motivation for classes D and E (58 per cent) and A and B (57 per cent). In second place as a motivation came "I don't like it", in third "I don't have access" and only in fourth "I can't afford it".

The lack of cinema-going habits, as well as other entertainment, is due to the price factor. The cost of tickets and cultural products is perceived as expensive and abusive. According to the interviewees, a cinema ticket should cost R\$8.00, a theatre ticket R\$14.00 and the average price of a new book would be R\$19.00. A direct result of this perception plus the habit of watching film productions in private was that 87% of Brazilians did not go to the cinema in 2007.

As far as cultural facilities are concerned, the lack cuts across the organisational base of one of the three levels of government in Brazil. Only 8.7% have a cinema; 21.2% have theatres or concert halls and bookshops exist in only 30% of them. A simple ratio shows us that out of every 100 municipalities, there are cinemas in 8, theatres in 20 and bookshops in 30.

The volume of investments in memory, ancestry, records and narratives that make up a nation's history project is an important variable to analyse. As an example, only one institution in the United States, the Smithsonian Institute, is equivalent in budget to Brazil's Ministry of Culture (Minc).

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<sup>127</sup> For access to the full survey data see: <http://www.fecomercio-rj.org.br/publico/media/Pesquisa%20Cultura.pdf> ; file consulted on 08 April 2008.

Only the Smithsonian Institution, a complex of memory and culture, holds 19 museums, 9 research centres and a zoo. Its budget demanded of the US Congress <sup>128</sup> under current and mandatory expenditure (salaries and maintenance) alone is US\$ 588,400,000.00. The 2008 budget for this item was \$562,434,000.00 and the 2007 budget was \$536,295,000.00.

If we take into account the importance of a civic and identity culture, the correlation between popular participation and ancestry, both as factors to increase the quality of the democratic process in its entirety, in this respect too the Brazilian state does not fulfil a distributist role. In addition to the comparison between the Smithsonian Institute and the entire budget of the Ministry of Culture, there is another correlation of spending whose disproportion is evident. As has already been explained here, for the 2008 financial year Brazil allocated the Minc's budget to R\$1.1 billion reais. While the Minc has this volume of investment for 2008, R\$248 billion has been earmarked for interest payments and amortisation of the federal debt (Ávila and Fatorelli 2008). In proportional terms, Brazil spends 248 times more on the movement of financial capital than on the country's memory, culture and aesthetics. If the degree of investment is an indication of priorities and possibilities according to the constraints suffered by the political agent, this is the correlation given, in absolute numbers, of the strategic goals for building a civic culture in Brazil.

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<sup>128</sup> See [http://www.si.edu/about/budget/2009/08-SE\\_Mandatory\\_Pgm\\_No\\_Yr2Yr\\_R2.pdf](http://www.si.edu/about/budget/2009/08-SE_Mandatory_Pgm_No_Yr2Yr_R2.pdf); file consulted on 08 June 2008.

## **7. STRATEGIC STUDY IN ITS FULLEST SENSE THE APPLICABILITY OF THE THEORY OF INTERDEPENDENCE IN THE GROWTH OF POLITICAL ORGANISATION**

The first step towards studying the foundations of general strategy in the full sense of the word is to find an adequate and realistic notion of what strategy is. After World War II, with the advance of *marketing* studies and other forms of business and government management, high-level planning took on ideological contours as an example of modernising capitalism. In this way, planning for competition and the scramble for capital and markets, reproducing planning for these activities, increasingly became part of the corporate common sense of strategy. Over time, opinion formers, including the media, have become accustomed to labelling everything that involves competition, planning, detail and a level of confrontation as "strategic".

In this way, strategy would no longer be a science of conflict, but a knowledge applied to any and all conflicts, even those controlled under legal and class parameters. The work addresses precisely this, the difference between the strategic and the competitive. A symptom of competitive capitalism, disputed on basis of "anything goes", such as the purchase of tapes by ABIN, was discussed in Lima Rocha (2003). This book states that the dispute for control of the Telebrás system relied on strategic knowledge, but the Agency was used simply as a competitive differential. Its action was secondary, lateral, according to the Agency's own conception.

## 7.1 What is strategy?

Assuming that strategy is by definition the science of conflict, we consider it important to present the opinions of some recognised strategists, who have both formulated their hypotheses and tested them in the hard and raw truth of the struggle itself. Léo Hamon is a Frenchman who took part as a guerrilla in the French Liberation Forces (he was a *Maqui* for short) against the Nazi occupation, and went on to a political career in the Republic (becoming a senator) and then a law professor. His definition of strategy is simple and direct. "To speak of war or strategy naturally implies an opposition, a struggle, a confrontation; however, these confrontations can take different forms". (Hamon, 1969: p. 41). The author highlights a definition of this science by the Prussian general Clausewitz, which we feel is appropriate to explain. "Strategy is the art of using battles to achieve the end pursued through war". (Hamon, p.51).

Thus, it can be seen that strategy is necessarily the science of war, understanding war as any type of conflict with different underlying interests (objectives) between the antagonists. As Hamon said, strategy includes different forms of confrontation, whether this takes the form of conflict between states, classes, civilisational models or any other situation of irreconcilable interests (which is not the case with competing capital). Golbery (1981a) is precise about the notion of strategy applied to social conflicts and emphasises their permanence, regardless of the war between states:

"Expanding the area of this science of war to place it on a level similar to that enjoyed today by General Strategy itself as an art that has equal use in both war and peace (obs: the gen. refers to the warlike conflict between States), we could well imagine a more general science of social conflicts." (Silva, 1981a, p. 437)

## 7.2 War as an extension of politics. Politics as an expression of total war

Therefore, strategy always goes back to the theme of permanent conflict, with its application in a war effort being one of its facets (perhaps the most dramatic), but only one of several. Marked by the hypothesis of its application in a war, modernly realised in the integral effort of state against state in its total power (at all levels, economic, political, social, military, ideological, diplomatic, in global alliances, etc.), general strategy is a science centred (either in application or in reference) on the study of war.

Following the accumulation of military sciences practised in Brazil, we sought the definition of war according to the Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG) and its Academy, which is suitable for both civilians and professional military personnel.

War as a human phenomenon can have many different names. We have chosen to select a few designations below from a list drawn up in Brazil (ESG/ADESG, 1992, chapter IX, "elements of war", pp. 185-188, ):

- *Social phenomenon: because it can only happen collectively, implying collective reciprocities.*

- *Act of Violence: reaching the entire social group (our note: the political institution that wields it, and/or the collective political agents themselves who operate the *kampf*); war can also be an extreme resource of coercion (our note: the most drastic of coercive political resources, and, if it takes place in a context of internal war, even more traumatic).*

- *Dialectic of Wills: as a social act, it presupposes the opposing political wills of two or more conflicting collectivities; violence is the means, but the end is to impose the will.*

- *Strategic Game: a game (note ours, of using all the resources of a collectivity and/or political institution) that requires calculation, never excludes risk (integral, of physical elimination) and includes the probability of failure or success.*



Here we have to make an analogy with strategy applied to politics (we'll go into this in more detail later), a dialectical relationship, since war is politics by extension and politics is struggle and dispute by nature. If the capitalist order, nourished by violence and domination, generates a greater sense of order, then control over this violence that can generate order is the central object of this very generation. It seems to us to be too much of a stretch to determine any idea of the first origin, whether of war or of politics; but there is something central about this relationship of dialectical existence between . And this central relationship is the very continuity of the sense of *politics-fighting-kampf*, through strategic use, which has functions in both peace and war, which according to Golbery do Couto e Silva, "could be imagined as a more general science of social conflicts" (Silva, *apud* by Lima Rocha, 2003). I see the form of social control by the ruling class as a form of constant, low-intensity conflict.

War, as we have seen before, can take place with varying degrees of intensity, including its variable in the internal politics of a country, that is, civil war. This variable includes the configuration of class struggle, of the political project of People's Power, in other words, civil war with revolutionary ends. War is therefore associated with the permanence of conflicts and disputes in society, in other words, politics. There is no war without political ends, and there is no politics without conflict (distinct relations of force, ordered or not, in a legal or illegal, juridical or dictatorial framework, conciliation or class struggle). Political relations are therefore essential to the unfolding of any warlike situation, and have no reason to exist without a political foundation. According to Clausewitz (1996, p.870), "war is only a part of political relations, and therefore by no means independent."

It can thus be seen that there is no possible conception of the "pure logic of war", "absolute military folly", "independence of the fields on all levels" and other allegations that "demonise" the military sectors and exempt their respective regimes or the hegemonic capitals that support them. What can be said is that there is a specificity to matters of war, just as any field has its traits

and others common to all fields. And since political relations are what is permanent in any society. Politics is not necessarily associated with disputes over corporate or electoral interests. Clausewitz provides a definition that is analogous to the Real Game of Politics.

*On the contrary, we say that war is nothing more than the continuation of political relations, with the addition of other means. We say that new means are added to it, in order to affirm at the same time that war itself does not cause these political relations to cease, that it does not transform them into something entirely different, but that they continue to exist in their essence, whatever the means they use, and that the main threads that run through the events of war and to which they are linked are nothing more than outlines of a policy that continues through war to peace. (Clausewitz, 1996, p.870)*

Clausewitz is emphatic about the absurdity of imagining that a situation can exist on its own. It's not a question of conspiracy theory, but of understanding the processes that lead to war or any other form of conflict as a symptom (and not as a culmination, at least not necessarily). It cannot be emphasised enough that: "one can therefore never separate war from political relations, and if this were to happen at any point in our statement all the strands of these relations would be in a sense destroyed and we would have something deprived of meaning and intention." Clausewitz, same above)

The Prussian strategist goes so far as to compare the use of war by politics to a simple instrument of its designs. The war effort, he says, is like the different shapes and weights of a sword, from the very heavy medieval sword to the curved scimitar, the speed of a foil or the practicality of a Roman gladius or the Thracian sword of Spartacus. The development and utilisation of belligerent structures can lead, through politics, to the absolute form of war. As we've seen before, war (or the capacity for systematic conflict) can take the form of armed forces, as well as the military.

of a vigorous police apparatus, intelligence agencies and other more or less militarised forms of control.

The absolute form referred to by Clausewitz has the danger of structural development (of the belligerent forces) beyond the political necessity that formed it. This is a fairly recurrent phenomenon in internal defence and political repression, when these bodies develop beyond their need, or the "accordion effect", when once the internal enemy has been overcome, there is nothing to do with such a large specialised contingent. Although it doesn't have total independence, the military field (and its related areas) has its own logic and sometimes conditions the societies that generated it. The Moderating Power (of the Armed Forces) is seen as a factor of stability in third world countries (including Latin America), and is often chosen as an ally by the foreign policy of the so-called imperialist powers. It is worth pointing out that we understand imperialism generically as a set of practices for imposing will (especially in areas of interest to transnational corporations) and global regulation mechanisms (by these powers, such as the International Monetary Fund, IMF; World Bank; World Trade Organisation, WTO; among others).

This same logic also tends to occur in the "atrophy" of organisations with revolutionary intentions, when their belligerent structures are developed beyond the political necessity that led to their creation in the first place. Agreeing with Clausewitz, even on the extreme left, if politics is not the determining factor the design of war, it loses its meaning, inverting the logic of operations and losing the objective of the conflict itself.

As has been said before, war (or any form of systematic conflict through physical violence, no matter how intense) is a continuity and instrument of political relations. In order to function, both politics and war need a cut-out of reality, something that orders and makes sense of (collects, processes, analyses and operates) the immense amount of empirical information that is perceived in reality as such. Considering that a single, pre-conceived reality simply doesn't exist

(naturalising its conditions, as if to say: "this is the way it is because it is", "the market insecure"), it is necessary to cut out reality and divide it into levels of analysis.

### **7.3. The strategic concept and the Grand Strategy**

This creates a tool for analysis (structural), which includes the tactical plan (of the moment), making it possible to analyse the situation. Its *raison d'être* is none other than to understand and interfere with reality, whatever form it takes. If there are tools for analysis and operational capacity (however modest), there will be the possibility of interference. In the absence of the former, the capacity for action will have nothing to act on, so it won't be able to accumulate force. If it doesn't have the latter, the analysis is reduced to an advisory role, with no autonomy to implement its own policy.

The structural analysis and the intervention tool generate the strategic concept, which is the matrix of the levels of analysis. The doctrine is built on these, and its consequent use on reality in the short, medium and long term. Marked in the country's recent history, the national security doctrine precisely fulfilled all these steps. It is worth highlighting what Golbery says about what he was the creator of: "We thus have, at the summit of National Security, a Strategy, by many called Grand Strategy or General Strategy, an art that is the exclusive competence of the government and that coordinates, within a fundamental Strategic Concept, all the political, economic, psychosocial and military activities that are concurrently aimed at achieving the Objectives." (Silva, 1981: p.25)

To facilitate understanding, we will adopt the same levels of analysis and interference applied by Golbery in his work. Therefore, the political, economic, military and psychosocial levels (the last of which, according to the general, includes the media) are those considered by Couto e Silva. The levels we chose are explained below. It is important to emphasise that the conception of the levels is something stipulated to help in operation on reality; it has no dilettante intention of merely observing society.

The use of the doctrine stipulated for the activities has the function of fulfilling certain predetermined objectives. The long-term objectives are called end goals, and therefore define the strategy (fundamentals, purpose of doctrine and use); and precisely because they have a stipulated end, they are inflexible. Once these strategic objectives are altered, everything changes, including the very organisations in charge of implementing them.

Citing a finalist objective, we understand private property, control of the means of production, social control, the wealth and poverty gap, the appropriation of labour power, the exclusion of those who don't sell this same power and other essential factors as inflexible for capitalism. The Brazilian and Latin American armed forces are situated within this framework, and it is a great mistake to confuse them as synonymous with the dictatorial regimes in which they usually play a leading role.

Considering that "we must conceive of the contemporary state as a human community that, within the limits of a given territory, claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical violence" (Weber, 2000: p.56), it would be a considerable mistake to assume that the constitutional guarantees of a democratic system of law are inflexible for capitalism in Latin America or any other third world country. The level of repression, be it social and/or political, varies according to the size of the threat and the process of accumulation and domination that this same society exerts over the oppressed classes, i.e. the people of that country. We can therefore understand the establishment and permanence of regimes of democracy under the rule of law as a tactical objective for the hegemonic forces of capitalism.

In military terms, strategy defines war, while tactics refers to the moment, victories in battles, movements, manoeuvres, the accumulation of forces and other basic rules of any type of armed conflict. It is therefore understood that the strategic objective is the permanent one, and that what is strategic immediately becomes inflexible. What is tactical has tactical autonomy or not,

is flexible, as long as it points to some stage regarding the strategic victory of the entity in the conflict. The agent is secondary in this definition. It can be an army, state, trade union, party, political-military organisation, transnational corporation or any other human grouping with a belligerent interest and capacity.

Speaking in operational terms, the objective defines what is strategic and thus subordinates the method. The strategy, in turn, defines the possible tactical variables. In classic military concepts, the objective provides the doctrinal frameworks that generate employment options. In a general sense, the objective subordinates the method (and its concepts/tools considered valid), which in turn subordinates all forms of discourse (public or veiled).

In the affirmation of a permanent objective, ideological influence is always present (ideological level). It is from this influence that the characteristic premises of these plans of action have manifested themselves on the social, political and economic levels. Contrary to what may often appear, at the state military level there is no "professionalism without patriotic ideology", without convincing the belligerent force of a way of life to fight for. If this doesn't manifest itself in the rank-and-file troops, the high command is certainly convinced of it.

In a comment, which I think is brilliant, the often quoted Golbery affirms the ideological premise in the strategic formulation of the American Mahan (theorist of US naval supremacy at the end of the 19th century). For the general from Rio Grande do Sul (he was a native of the port of Rio Grande/RS), this ideological influence is a political perspective, according to which "well-defined hypotheses about the future balance of forces in the international political field, in fact, constitute an estimate, a basic strategic premise. What is this if not a political perspective on the world?" (Silva, 1981: p.29)

The political perspective, according to the Brazilian military officer, is added to the ideological one and is influenced by it. Since the subject being discussed is strategy and conflict, it is necessary to have an idea of the permanence of these factors. In other words, in Golbery's conception, with which

we agree, conflicts have a permanent ideological influence, they are formulated through from a political perspective of the world (or any other scenario, be it a neighbourhood, city, state, region, country or subcontinent such as Latin America). Although so-called neoliberalism tries to affirm "economic objectivity", this is nothing more than the affirmation of a single premise, associating human behaviour with the production and control model of today's capitalism. "In truth, the ideological factor (emphasis added) has never ceased to be present in any human conflict, whether in a clear, coherent and highly suggestive formulation, or only in a fluid and almost, so to speak, inarticulate and naive form." (Silva, 1981: p97)

What we are trying to establish here are the minimum and basic premises of the science of conflict. Thus, it is understood that the permanent objective is established through a political perspective of the world - and of the scenario in which it is intended to be achieved - always influenced by an ideological perspective.

The permanent/finalist objective is what is known as the strategic objective. Therefore, the strategy comes from the objective, thus defining what is inflexible within the strategic frameworks. The tactical framework refers to everything that is flexible, including the level of tactical autonomy of the units that make up a force in conflict. In other words, tactics refers to the possible variables to be used and developed to achieve momentary (tactical) and permanent (strategic) objectives.

As the (permanent) strategic objective is established through ideological influence and political perspective, it (the objective) subordinates the method. It therefore makes no sense to say that "the end justifies the means", since it is precisely the means that are responsible for the greater possibility of achieving the ends. Therefore, if a force with a certain world view adopts methods that are not in line with this view, in one way or another its operators will become the fruit of the view (through the methods) that they do not share, at least in theory. We therefore realise that the empirical universe is conditioned by ideological and political influence, but it only exists on the basis of concrete possibility, not desires or the world of ideas and imagination.

Politics and ideology are, roughly speaking, among other things, a way of being in the world, and a perspective of this projection. By placing this perspective within a real framework (society, the system above it, the regime on a tactical level), a set of material interests is added to human aspirations and desires in order to establish a permanent objective. It is in this sense that we find what is inflexible (permanent and strategic) in the interests and aspirations of the people and the class. We don't think it's possible to establish a strategic objective that doesn't contain a political vision of the world, a set of non-material aspirations and a series of material interests to achieve (at least in part) these same desires. Therefore, in every conflict, in whatever form it manifests itself, in the current stage of capitalist domination (especially for Latin Americans), there is no strategy (conflict) without class interest.

Once we've said that the objective is decisive, we realise that the interests and aspirations of the class and the people are manifested at all levels, including intelligence. As has already been said, the objective is subordinate to the method, so it establishes its practices according to the type of objective it wants to achieve.

This is clearly visible in politics and economics. Today we can say that "*Taylorism* and *Fordism*" do not give the working class control over their productive routines (Zibechi, 2002). Therefore, these productive routines make it impossible for the working class to control the means of production, and therefore not to control their own labour power. We say this regardless of regime or system, since the production reform of the Russian NEP (copying the production line of Italy's FIAT, shortly after the Bolshevik Party's victory in the civil war of 1917-1921) did not allow for increased democratic participation (Lenin, 1987: p.180) of the working class organised in councils (*soviets*). Increased production and fairer distribution doesn't mean that the class gets closer to controlling the means (Maldonado Beltrán: 2005), no matter what kind of system the state has. "In other words, organised domination needs on the one hand, an administrative general staff and, on the other hand, it needs the material means of management." (Weber, p.59)



Another delimitation of the strategic objective is the set of specific possibilities within each field of knowledge and activity. In terms of intelligence apparatuses, if they are geared towards the internal defence and security of the state (or the transnational corporations that are allied to the national oligarchies that control it), their possible variables are well defined.

#### **7.4. Intelligence, planning and conflict internal**

The Chinese strategist Sun Tzu is a unanimous favourite, and was even the subject of a book written by the Agency's creator, Gen. Alberto Mendes Cardoso (the book *The Thirteen Moments*, an analysis of Sun Tzu's work, appears in the epigraph on the ABIN website). For these reasons, we intend to expose his statements as valid premises for all intelligence activity in the service of the state and ruling class interests. It's worth remembering that these premises, in our opinion, are also valid for a political organisation that disrupts order, or even a mafia, which operates on the level of intelligence and violence as an instrument to carry out its political will and set of material interests.

It is necessary to realise that the calculation of forces and all the variables considered in a possible conflict is a fundamental factor in any chance of victory. If we apply this principle to espionage, state security and internal defence, control over the variables where the enemy moves (in the case of ABIN, its hypothesis for internal conflict - as we saw in Chapter 2 - is the political organisations within the most militant social movement) is fundamental. Calculating and knowing implies studying, penetrating, infiltrating the potential threat, anticipating the adversary's movements. "The general (i.e. the general staff, the command) who wins a battle has made many calculations in his temple before the battle is fought." (TZU, 1996: p.20)

Reinforcing the concept of anticipation, we see how Colonel Walter Felix, former commander of the Army Intelligence Centre (CIE) in Brasilia during the three-year period 1996-1998 (we'll go into more detail about him, in Chapter 2), opens his private intelligence manual with a passage from the Old Testament: "Moses' order when instructing 12 agents he sent to the land of Canaan, in the year 1250 b. c.: Take this road and go up the mountain, and see what the land is and the people who live in it, whether they are strong or weak, whether they are few or many, and see where they live.c.: Take this road and go up the mountain, and see what the land is and the people who live in it, whether they are strong or weak, whether are few or many, and see the place where they live, whether it is good or bad, and what cities they live in, whether they are fortified or not, and what the land is like, whether it is hilly or flat, whether there are forests not..." (Felix, 2000, p.1).)

It is on the basis of the knowledge acquired, the questions asked and the answers obtained, with the permanent objective as a guide, that strategic planning is established. This is nothing more than prior planning, plus valid and possible variables, within a time frame and targets to be achieved in the respective periods.

In the case of a Latin American intelligence agency, it can't be surprised by oppressed social strata and the underlying enemies, the organised segments within these class sectors. Since the terrain, the scenario in which the conflict takes place, is the national territory itself, together with its geographical and human borders (e.g. the rivers of the legal Amazon, the more than 1000 kilometres of border of the Uruguayan-Riograndean pampa, the region of permanent wetlands of the Pantanal of Mato Grosso, the integrated economic network of the triple border of Foz do Iguaçu, among others), planning must take into account the increase in knowledge about the enemy and its possible manoeuvres. This, the bluntest terms, is infiltration pure and simple, collection through various methods, analysis of this data and its operationalisation. What counts in espionage is effectiveness, with legal terms (public justification discourse) taking a back seat.

These and other characteristics are permanent principles in this activity. Foresight and anticipation are thus recommended by the Chinese general: "What enables the intelligent sovereign and the good general to attack, to win and

to conquer things beyond the reach of ordinary men is foresight. This foresight cannot be drawn from courage, nor by induction from experience, nor by any realised calculation. The enemy's dispositions can only be ascertained by spies, and only by spies. Hence the use of spies." (Tzu: p.104-105)

This example applies in all situations, including internal defence. The less noticeable the presence of espionage, whether internal or external to the country, the better it is being used. To put it another way, overt policing is visible, perhaps intimidating, but it doesn't prevent conspiracy. Discreet presence, conspicuous, most of the time unnoticed, is the hallmark of efficiency in this type of activity. "Be subtle! And employ your spies in all kinds of activities." (Tzu, p.110) Thus, there is no point in demanding transparency from something that only works if it is invisible and with little or no external control over the activity itself. "In this way, only the enlightened ruler and the judicious general will use the army's most gifted intelligence for espionage, thereby obtaining great results." (Tzu, p.111)

We have thus reached its most general definitions through the principles applied to all versions of an intelligence apparatus. Most of the time, intelligence is promoted by an agent, the state, although there are private variables and those of opposition groups (momentary or permanent) in the structure of domination. Intelligence activity is based on the basic cycle of collecting, processing, analysing and operating information. The terrain and the enemy vary according to the situation in which this apparatus is applied. As we are addressing the application for internal defence (its primary state function) and control over the state itself and its ruling elite (secondary function), we understand the state security apparatus, as a whole, as the operational arm and agent of the structure of domination.

Before delving into this concept, we need to establish a few premises. We don't believe in the absolute independence of the fields, but rather in their own dynamics, with some of these fields sometimes predominating over others. In the case of

capitalism, we understand the mode of production (private control of the means and exploitation of the ) and the global centrality of European civilisation (imperialism) as its two pillars.

In the internal conflict, in its social version (class struggle), we understand that the predominance of one class and people's project (the majority and oppressed sectors of a population in a given territory) against another dominant one, can mean the victory or defeat of a long-term political process (including the regime and the system, not just whether the country is under military dictatorship or legal-formal democracy). In order to characterise the predominance of the oppressor class, which controls the forms of life in society within capitalism, the structural concept of domination is used.

We return to this concept as we saw it in Chapter 1, based on the work of Errandonea (1986), who set out in his work the coordinates for the concept of domination. By using this concept as a tool, the analysis of class and people's oppression in Latin America comes to understand the role of exploitation, imperialism and the coordination between the fields of knowledge that allow and enable domination to be predominant in relation to resistance (by the dominated) and the sabotage of the mode of production (by those whose labour power is exploited).

Domination (Errandonea, p.76) begins to be defined from the idea of legitimacy, which the Uruguayan takes from Weber. He believes that there must be a will to obey, a norm that allows the dominated to obey and the dominant to exercise their authority based on something legitimate. It is understood that domination does not necessarily occur through persuasion, but can also be through coercion or a combination of the two. The "naturalisation" of the existence between the dominant and the dominated would grant legitimacy to this de facto situation.

According to the Uruguayan sociologist, domination is realised in the form of a relationship, always bilateral, where there is a minimum of will between the parties and the sectors. It's a normative relationship, constituting a probability made up of mutual expectations, these being

are possible contents that form part of the mandates of domination. It's like even the most cruel and sadistic form of domination of man over man has limits of effectiveness, within the expectations caused by the norm, imposed or subliminal, of this same domination.

Legitimacy is the indispensable requirement for generating the consensus necessary for continuity and for institutionalising the various forms of domination. Consensus, according to Chomsky (1989), consent on the basis of ideas permitted by the oppressors, is the necessary basis for the stability of the norms of domination. The breakdown of consensus mechanisms makes it possible for the dominated to resist and break away, whether these are mechanisms of ideas, pure brute force, or the most common, a complex combination of both forms domination. The dominant consensus is the basis of oppressive authority, the foundation that evident at different levels in all sectors of a society whose creative and productive force is dominated by a hegemonic minority.

The most general form of domination in the current stage of capitalism is the class structure (Errandonea, p. 97-98). This form manifests itself when the stable probability (consensus) of obtaining continuous obedience becomes institutionalised. This is how the relationship of domination comes about. This continuous institution of domination, through the exploitation and alienation of the labour force and the control of the means of production and decision-making in society, forms social classes over the dominated majority. The system in which these occur forms a class structure.

It is essential to understand that the concept of class is relative to the existence of other classes. The structure of social classes manifests itself in the distribution of what is unequal in this same society. This inequality is not only manifested in the distribution of goods, commodities and material resources. It's obvious that the inequality of material distribution is both quantitative (amount) and qualitative (added and symbolic value) of means, goods, commodities and currency in various ways.

But the class structure manifests itself more broadly, everything that is distributed unequally, differentiated access or exposure to the ; in the exercise of political power; in bargaining and the correlation of forces in the defence of interests; in aspirations for prestige and a role in society; in the historical representation of the oppressed classes in capitalism (e.g. the figure of black people in Brazilian history); in physical coercion; in the functioning and "exemption" of the judiciary and its rules of behaviour and conduct (e.g. the figure of black people in Brazilian history): the figure of the black man in the history of Brazil); in physical coercion; in the functioning and "exemption" of the judiciary and in the "correction" of deviations in society; in religious significance and its norms of behaviour and conduct (e.g. the dispute Liberation Theology and its option for the poor within the Latin American Catholic Church) and in all forms of dispute over power and relations in class society.

Although it is not the centrepiece of this paper, it is essential to at least point out that class domination is something that manifests itself globally. Simultaneously with the mode of production, a mode of capitalist domination over the world has developed, perhaps never before as developed as in the current stage of the system. It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss globalisation, although we recognise the importance of the subject, especially for understanding the single neoliberal mindset.

## **7.5. In Latin America, popular struggle takes shape against imperialism**

Two points need to be emphasised. The first is the imperialist centrality of European civilisation, the so-called Eurocentrism. World capitalism cannot be conceived of without the influence of the West on the other regions of the planet, influencing at every conceivable level: ideological media attacks, political interference, the unification of economic development measures, the diplomatic agenda, legal mechanisms, the presence and military threat to disobedients and all other levels of life shared by peoples and countries on the planet.

As far as Latin America is concerned, it is impossible to think of any issue of autonomy or even economic development, income distribution, anti-racist policies, agrarian reform, state transparency and popular participation without considering the issue of imperialism in the general sense of the term. The very "creation" of the subcontinent is

took place through invasion and genocide promoted by the European powers of the Age of Navigation (Coll, 1986; Galeano, 1989; Las Casas, 1985; Portilla, 1985).

Today, the US military presence through its Southern Command (based in Miami), as a foreign policy pressure mechanism to which Latin American countries are satellites, has to be taken into account for any possibility of change in these societies. From an economic measure that could see the government that implemented it overthrown, to pure and simple intervention, these are permanent possibilities to be taken into account by any agent interested in changing the framework (conjunctural or structural) of any Latin American country.

This de facto situation, the result of the historical process that the peoples of the subcontinent have gone through, leads to a fairly simple conclusion. This means that, in Latin America, the class struggle is taking on anti-imperialist contours, as a direct consequence of the advance of the conquests of the excluded majorities. It is impossible to assume that the popular struggle in Brazil or any other country here will advance without the possibility of direct or indirect intervention by the power called the USA.

This implies de facto situations of violence and oppression, which are experienced on a daily basis, but which in some historical situations simply become institutionalised. At this level of repression, whether the regime is formal-democratic or military-dictatorial does little to change the overall picture. It's enough to remember that Colombia has formally been under a democratic regime since the 1940s (Lima Rocha, c,d,e), and not for this reason has it promoted structural changes in its society, or lowered the level of repression against political forces organised from the excluded classes.

Even the formality of a democratically elected government does nothing to change the structural framework when these governments give in or promote basic reform measures. The case of Jacobo Árbenz in Guatemala (1952-1956) is perhaps the most striking of all. His social-democratic government had been overthrown by a coup, triggered by the CIA and promoted by the United Fruit Co., which owned the *plantations*, banana monoculture estates.

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also elected by direct vote, Chile's Salvador Allende, prevents any serious study of structural reforms through legal processes.

What we want to say is that, in Latin America, political stability is recommended by US power, but it is by no means a requirement. When we look at the ways in which violence is manifested by one class against another, we see that it exists in different ways. In the case of correlations of force, confrontation takes the form, according to Clausewitz, of war on all levels (military, political, economic, social, ideological, communication, cultural, and all existing forms of social organisation). It is this level of confrontation that determines the level of systematic violence to be implemented in an internal social conflict (i.e. the class struggle).

## **7.6 The class struggle in the long term**

In political terms, the strategic hypothesis of the class struggle (i.e. its permanent objective) is the maintenance of the very structure that intelligence organisations must help to maintain. Domination manifests itself concrete reality through various forms, one of which is physical violence. Returning to Clausewitz, if war (the military level of human disputes) is the extension of political relations, political relations are a form of conflict (violent or not, systematic or episodic).

When this political relationship channels the class struggle in its form, we have a favourable scenario for the accumulation of forces between organisations of the excluded sectors of the majorities. With this accumulation, if one or more organisations have their strategy set on breaking with the established order, then there is the possibility of starting a process of so-called civil war with revolutionary ends. Ultimately, this is the permanent hypothesis of internal conflict against which the intelligence apparatus of the Brazilian state is preparing and acting to combat.

What is rarely publicised is that all belligerent forces for the maintenance of constituted order (military, police, intelligence, para-military and the like) maintain levels



in times of peace or war. In the case of internal conflict, its conditions of existence are typical of how capitalism works, i.e. domination and exploitation. Thus, the levels of attention of intelligence, whose institutional mission is to anticipate the enemy (whether declared or not, whether configured or embryonic), are permanent.

This is the *de facto* situation that so occupies *the modus operandi* of intelligence organisations. Politics in a class structure necessarily involves domination. In the domination of one class over another, violence manifests itself in its various forms, from exclusion, through poverty, war between the poor to systematic repression (generalised or selective).

Hector Luis Saint-Pierre (1999) emphasises the theme of violence and politics. In his doctoral thesis, "Armed Politics, the Foundations of Revolutionary War" (p.86-87), the author characterises the use of force as proper to politics, although not exclusive. He sees violence as a substitution for speech in the intention of imposing one's will, which is itself the limit of the definition of politics. It is always important to remember that politics does not necessarily mean physical violence, but rather a relationship of force.

The imposition of will, whether through bargaining, negotiation or conflict, implies the permanence of tension, the dispute of direct and indirect interests (reconcilable or not, material and/or ideological). Persuasion is made up of convincing as well as threatening (veiled or explicit); persuasion cannot be understood in isolation from violence, but rather one as an extension of the other. Conditions of structural equality (of means, possibilities and decision-making power) would allow for a hegemony where persuasion and consensus were established by methods other than violence and threats. As Saint-Pierre observes, the opposite is true of capitalism in a peripheral country like Brazil.

In a profoundly precise and accurate observation, the Argentinian points out other forms of violence, constant and present in contemporary Brazil, which we believe are important to highlight here:

*Violence manifests itself in many ways, with physical coercion being its most visible and ostentatious form, but not the only one or necessarily the cruelest. Starvation wages, forced poverty, unfair taxes, commercial retaliation and the monopoly of knowledge can be much more sophisticated forms of violence, but no less inhumane. In the airy speech of a president who from his "toga heights" attacks the "foolishness" of the starving masses, who don't "understand" the rationality of an economic plan that condemns them inexorably to misery, the violence of the masses' desperate action against this plan begins to gestate. (Saint-Pierre, p.86)*

The observation to add is that no excluded mass moves alone, chaotically, just out of the desperation of their needs. No matter how bad their living conditions are. But on this terrain (excluded social fabric), one or more real threats to the stability of the order of domination in a country can be generated. And it is precisely on these possible threats, in the associative form of an organised popular movement, cadre party or political organisation with exchange intentions, that the anticipation of the *status quo* must focus its attention.

### **7.7. The interdependence of the three applied spheres. The FAU's *modus operandi***

We have chosen as an example of a conflict between the intelligence apparatus of a Latin American state and a political-military opposition organisation a real situation that has already occurred, but which provides the work with important concepts and foundations for analysis (contained in texts and documents from this period).

A case of internal class struggle taken to its ultimate consequences occurred in Uruguay, a neighbouring country to Brazil, between 1967 and 1976 (El Copey, FAU, 1972). These

years mark, respectively, the first decree of internal security measures (December 1967, called the "constitutional dictatorship"), and the second in the coup d'état in Argentina (May 1976), three years after the coup by the Uruguayan military (the military coup in Uruguay took place on 22 June 1973). As a neighbouring and bordering country, in addition to the fact that Montevideo and Buenos Aires are only 40 minutes away by flight or three hours by speedboat (crossing the Rio de la Plata estuary), the Argentine capital and its metropolis served as a strategic retreat for the Uruguayan left and its armed arms operating from there. (Mechoso, 2002) When the Argentinian military coup took place, these organisations lost their bases and gradually transferred their remaining infrastructure to some western European countries (France, Spain, Italy and Sweden), thus ceasing to operate in their country of origin.

There were different organisations and parties of the left or extreme left operating in the country. Some were involved in elections and the mass struggle (such as the Communist Party of Uruguay, PCU), others only in the armed struggle (such as the Tupamaros National Liberation Movement, MLN). The specific anarchist political organisation, the Uruguayan Anarchist Federation (FAU), denied the electoral plan, but coordinated mass struggle (workers organised in unions, students and residents of poor neighbourhoods and outskirts), political-ideological struggle with armed struggle. The latter was based on the techniques of economic sabotage, armed support for popular struggles and politically orientated urban guerrilla actions (Mechoso, 2002).

We chose the example of the FAU to explain its concepts in this work for two basic reasons. One is because Clausewitz's conception of war as an extension and continuity of political relations is a valid premise in both the action and the theoretical formulation of this organisation. The second is because they produced a document criticising foquismo (El Copey, FAU, 1972), with a very interesting characteristic, which is that it was written while its militants were clandestine and also in armed struggle.

This is because at its peak, the FAU structure included a specific political apparatus, the Federation itself, founded in 1956, which went underground in December 1967 and remained so until the Uruguayan opening in 1985. At the level of popular struggle, it had a mass organisation (the Workers' and Students' Resistance, ROE) of a broader nature, bringing together workers affiliated to trade unions, student unions and residents' committees from outlying neighbourhoods and slums. As the armed arm of the Federation and tactical support for the ROE, the structure called the Popular Revolutionary Organisation 33 Orientals (OPR-33).

Understanding that the political level of the internal war is the determining factor, the FAU, in clandestinity, drew up a document called Copey (in 1972), which is now publicly accessible on the organisation's official website<sup>129</sup>. We thought it would be interesting to expose the concepts of violence, politics, society and war (among others) in our work, operating from the ground where the social fabric made up of the "oppressed masses" (highlighted earlier with Saint-Pierre) is organised. Since we have already explained the idea of domination and the class structure on which the former acts, we think it is appropriate to give examples of concepts (for analysing and intervening in reality) that start from assumption of another strategic objective.

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<sup>(129)</sup>[www.nodo50.org/fau](http://www.nodo50.org/fau)

Even an organisation that sets out to break with the established order and build another form of life in society makes use of the general strategy in the fullest sense. This is because, as we will see, the objective of the rupture subordinates the method, and through this, it acquires features that are common to all warring organisations within a class society. The observation of what is common and what is different between rupture and permanence is fundamental to understanding the concept of strategy, which is explained throughout this work.

For the FAU, the strategic objective of the internal war is to build another form of life in society. At the level of the conflict, the political and economic programme that this organisation is promoting is not to be found in the liberal and democratic frameworks, nor just in the proposition of a utopia - a place to be built - that is socialist and libertarian. Victory in the civil and class war means building a hegemonic power (People's Power) of the majorities.

This means that victory in arms, as an extension of political relations, is only fully realised if a new hegemony is conquered. The development of the revolutionary war implies the advance of socially-based power relations, in parallel with the destruction of the capitalist state. Ultimately, armed action would mean one of the expressions of an entire class (or at least of the organisations that operate within this terrain), in other words, the military level of confrontation, only preponderant at the moment of the conflict (which is politically oriented). In short, the victory of the class materialises in the monopoly of force and the premises for the conception of life in society, which are decisive at all levels and macro-environments of a country or territory.

*The Uruguayan revolution will be socialist and national, but it must not be liberal-democratic. It must set out to create a completely different power structure. This implies the work of conceiving forms of popular power (emphasis added), systematic criticism of the juridical-political levels of organisation of the dependent bourgeois state (obs. ours, the term refers to capitalism in a peripheral country), and criticism of the ideology*

*politics that sustains and informs this same dependent state-bourgeois structure* (El Copei, FAU, 1972).

We can see that the concept of Popular Power expressed in the document has no similarity to the capitalist state, and is proposed to be created within a society that is organised on the basis of social relations based on the principle of equality. These, in the FAU's view, can only exist in a territory that is not dependent on the international economy and is organised through a form of non-state political and social power. Victory in the revolutionary war, characterised as popular (of the excluded majorities in the same territory) and national (with these militants believing that, due to Uruguay's characteristics, the country would suffer intervention from neighbouring states such as Brazil and Argentina), is precisely the construction of this form of power in society. Destroying the enemy's belligerent forces is only part of the requirements for winning this victory.

Like any strategic objective, it can only be planned within a timescale of deadlines and targets. Strategy is therefore divided into two planes. The first is in the field of social action, i.e. strategy within the framework of the class struggle and the transformation society. On this level, the long-term concept implies adapting the times of war to social times, and advancing the capacity for armed struggle and the organisations necessary for this, simultaneously with advancing the political-ideological presence on the ground where the social fabric of the majority of the population overlaps.

The long term of the first (determinant) implies the action plan of the second, in other words, the war action. General strategy in the strict sense means the entire framework of manoeuvres, tactical variables of fundamental and inflexible features within a given time frame. For example, over the course of five years, the tactical autonomy of the armed apparatus would allow it to act with breadth, as long as it fulfils the framework necessary to strengthen the long-term (popular) struggle. These inflexible features could be the preponderance of the political level over the military and the impact of the political on the social and economic. Within the framework of the war, it means subordinating its

strategic action (at the tactical level the military apparatus has autonomy), to the ultimate goal, which is People's Power.

What is important is the definition that it is not the armed apparatus that promotes the people's war, but the structure that determines the struggle (at all levels). The FAU calls this structure a party (note that in this case it is the "specific political organism of the supporters of an ideology"; not to be confused with a Leninist party), which, because of its organisational form, is made up of cadres from the excluded majorities, but not of open membership (called a mass party). This is because the agent of planning and strategy (which in Golbery's conception must be the state, as an expression of capitalist society and the nation-state) at the political-ideological level of the revolutionary war is the party of cadres (Mechoso 2002).

At the level of the mass struggle, the party would not be the agent, but the mass organisations, organised by interest and programme of conquests. The military level of this internal conflict would have the armed organisations of these parties as its agent, acting primarily as support for the leading role (in the social process) of the struggles of the majorities. Because I believe that war does not exist on its own (i.e. because I disagree with the independence of the camps) and that the struggles for direct interests and conquests (such as wage increases, housing, living and working conditions, land reform, among others) have a strategic limitation (i.e. they tend to be enough on their own), there is a need for a coordinating agent of the struggle at all levels, who drives it towards the full strategic objective, i.e. People's Power. This can only be achieved through the ideological advance of the excluded majorities (at what Golbery called the psychosocial level).

*The ideological conquest of the masses presupposes the activity of a party and the acceptance of a long-term struggle. The creation of a party, that is, the activity of a public political practice linked to the armed apparatus, supposes ideological definitions, supposes that sooner or later theoretical positions are adopted. It also means publicly confronting ideological currents that are hostile to the revolutionary proposal. This is the concept*

*ideological-political, which makes it possible to directly associate armed practice with confrontation against the prevailing ideology* (El Copey, FAU, 1972).

In order to correctly apply planning to achieve the strategic objective, it is necessary to adopt a method that is consistent with . At the military level, the appropriate war methodology is the so-called protracted popular conflict. This type of internal conflict requires bodies that are armed (the armed arm of the cadre party), political-ideological (political organisations with revolutionary intentions), political-social (broader tendencies, such as currents of grassroots militants) and social-popular (class and interest movements, grassroots entities that express as many excluded sectors as possible).

The prolonged struggle, with the development of levels of confrontation according the capacity for social insertion and popular presence and the guarantee of the leading role of the movements organised for this purpose, is a type of internal war conflict; as is the civil war between oligarchic parties; the war of national liberation (polyclassist or classist); war for the independence of a region whose ethnic majority does not correspond to the sovereign state over that territory (called separatist); military coup to seize state power; white coup by an elected party (with arbitrary changes to the constitution and subordinating the other powers, the judiciary and the legislature); self-coup carried out by an elected president at the head; internal conflict with alleged ethnic or religious motivations, among others.

Internal conflicts, also known as civil wars, are one of the most well-known forms of contemporary warfare. In addition, there are the so-called "low-intensity" conflicts; unofficial or permanent interventions by a power (regional or global, as in a separatist conflict) in a neighbouring country; official intervention by the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Organisation of American States (OAS), as well as other international bodies under multilateral agreements between states. All these modalities are in addition to



already known as conventional warfare, whether between two states or two alliances between states.

From the 19th century onwards, wars took on the appearance of being totalising for a given people, territory, state or nation. In other words, conflicts necessarily involve confrontation at all levels (military, economic, political, social, ideological, diplomatic and, more recently, media) and agents who express and channel the war effort. In the case of conventional war, this agent of (class) society is the state. With regard to class conflict and popular struggle, the agent that catalyses and drives it at a strategic level is the group of organisations/parties with a finalist intention. The latter, with an impact on grassroots movements and organisations, raise the level of demands, expanding democratic rights to the point of questioning the legitimacy of domination. This would generate another stage in the struggle, starting from Democratic Radicalisation and accumulating forces through Popular Power.

For the FAU, political work necessarily goes hand in hand with the deployment of its armed apparatus, which in turn strengthens the participation of sectors of the excluded classes in its organisations and popular movements. In the case of conventional warfare, this means popular support for the war effort, labour fronts, the sale of war bonds, volunteering to help "our boys come home" and the country's consensus on permanent national objectives (Golbery 1981).

The extent of political relations and their development as a preponderant factor in a war, as seen in Clausewitz, is emphasised in the highlight below:

*Every prolonged war, whatever its form or methodology, requires the intense politicisation of military cadres and effective political work at mass level, so that the changes and alterations that war necessarily entails are properly understood and assimilated. It is only from a short-term point of view that we can underestimate the importance of the war.*

*the importance of political work at all levels. Only a short-term conception can definitively underestimate the importance of the party as a favourable and balanced instrument for carrying out this political work. (El Copey, FAU, 1972)*

Earlier in this chapter we looked at the role of violence as an extension of politics, subordinate to it, as one of the methods in relations of (persuasive) force. In other words, violence, systematised and implemented by a trained body (war), is an extension of political relations. In protracted war, violence contributes all levels, but it only contributes to the possibility of victory in this type of conflict.

The same is true of all the other levels in this type of conflict. Nor can the struggle on the economic (social, demands) level be preponderant. The determining factor in the conflict is the strategic orientation, i.e. what is inflexible, and not the moment (tactical). The method is subordinate to the objective, both at the military level of the class war and at all other levels.

*For our part, and we've been saying this for years - just repeating it here in case - we maintain that the aim of violence at the level of the economic struggle is not only, and not even primarily, to obtain economic demands. The purpose of the violence applied in the economic struggle is to contribute - and I mean contribute - to raising these struggles to the political level. To contribute (along with other means: propaganda, ideological struggle, legal or non-legal public struggle) to raising the economic struggle as far as possible to the level of a political struggle. Contribute to raising the consciousness of the labour movement (our obs., associative, class) of the economic interest (our obs., material, of direct conquest) that animates the economic struggle (our obs., struggle at the popular level). Contribute, we say, to raising the political consciousness, of political interest, which is the consciousness necessary to destroy bourgeois political power - the bourgeois state - the ultimate (our, final) objective of all revolutionary political practice. (El Copey, FAU, 1972)*

We understand in this highlight precisely the idea of process, of the long term in terms of internal warfare, but permanent when it comes to conflict at all levels. On the part of the Agency (or similar bodies), its strategic objective is to maintain and defend both the interests of the government and the preservation of a regime (on the tactical level, i.e. for the moment), as well as the way of life in society (on the strategic, permanent level). Any intra-elite disputes or hypothetical and now unlikely conflicts against states are defined on the tactical level, with the intervention (in order to mitigate) of the political, economic and diplomatic levels.

If strategy refers to the inflexible aspects of a conflict, considering war as an extension of political relations, the latter as an expression of the mode of domination and exploitation over the class structure; we can consider it strategic for internal defence to anticipate and combat the potential enemies (with antagonistic and non-negotiable objectives) of the hegemonic sectors of a society. In other words, if the agent opposing the *de facto* powers isn't operating or doesn't even exist, this is because the hegemonic structures are achieving a tactical victory. It is because this agent does not exist that the dismantling of guarantees and acquired rights becomes possible and feasible. In a relational sense, the reinforcement of a procedural democracy, where fundamental decisions are not taken by the qualified opinion of the majority, is strategic for the implementation of neoliberal policies.

The aim of this chapter is to provide an understanding of general strategy in the full sense, applied to internal defence, the operational level of Brazilian intelligence agencies, as the science of a permanent conflict at different levels. In other words, war or formal internal peace, the existence or not of overt dictatorships (which are quite common in Latin America), are changes at the tactical level of this conflict. Strategic plans refer to the permanence or otherwise of class hegemony (its bases of support, of which hegemony itself is an expression) and its respective organisms (state and organisational).

We emphasise the idea of process and not episode. The social process is permanent and systemic, and it is from there that the different antagonistic forces in a society operate. The visible or discrete landmarks of the conflict are manifested within the process in which it is inserted.

## 7.8. Violence as Language and the Real Game of Politics

Before we get into the proposal for a strategic planning method for a political cadre organisation, we need to get into the concept of the Real Game of Politics. That is, at least as far as this limited model of analysis is concerned. To do this, we need to define violence as language, or going beyond the rules of the game and the limits of contestation. A comparative observation is in order between the concepts set out in the subtitle. According to Saint-Pierre, systemic violence (precisely the violence that generates and reinforces the capitalist order) is the violence that is camouflaged in everyday life. But the illegal violence cited by Pinheiro (2000) is seen as an "anomaly of the democratic regime". This is because the system and its institutions are supposed to function ideally, or at least fulfil their functions as a constitutional state, to maintain the regime itself. Thus, the five fields pointed out by Pinheiro (*apud* Linz & Stepan, p. 11) as strengthened, interacting with each other and co-sustaining each other:

- *civil society*;
- *political society*;
- *the rule of law*;
- *economic society*;
- *and the state apparatus (in the search for a "usable" state); in the democratic regime, they should overcome problems of adjustment by overcoming "authoritarian cysts".*

Nothing seems more problematic to us, not least because none of the fields mentioned above has a reference in the operational category we use (from Errandonea onwards), i.e. domination. If we maintain the basis that everyday violence is a reinforcement in the generation of capitalist order, then by exclusion the state can be an attenuator of contradictions and/or a factor of injustice (as an exercise of illegal violence), but not the organ that provides distribution and equality.

Decidedly, if we see domination in a relational way, then myths of "social harmony" or class relations agreed according to a social contract that all parties will respect fall to the ground. This creates a theoretical challenge for any social and/or political scientist to propose any model of an ideal type of class society with the absence of physical coercion and the presence of substantive and strategic demands being met for the majority of the population. In the rare historical examples where this has occurred in Latin America, such as the first Juan Domingo Perón (Perón) government in Argentina from the February 1946 elections to September 1955 coup, the consequences for the political order were very conflictive (Dellasoppa 1998 and Sigal 2002). With Peronism in power, there was no full democratic order while GDP reached the distributive mark of 50% capital and 50% labour. I therefore believe that challenge for workers in the countryside, who position themselves from the perspective of radical and substantive democracy, is to build models of Latin American processes that lead to a distributist society, with full political rights and popular sovereignty being practised through methods of full participation.

We have thus ruled out moral veto factors or limitations on the use of violence to maintain the capitalist (and therefore class) order, based on the evidence from our own Latin America. Claiming that there is an anomaly because the democratic state is supposed to function in an equitable and fair manner seems as absurd to us as supposing that there is some limit to the use of all political resources and violence when there are one or more real strategic threats. And even in specific situations such as the non-intervention in Espírito Santo, Pinheiro's own real political activity proved the opposite. The costs of making the state equidistant and based on legal norms had less force than the political agents who operated in the real game, using the political level and not making it a limiting factor.

What we are saying is that there are multiple resources of violence and control, and not just voice and exit. The political pact for the formal functioning of a democratic system of law is just one of several factors in the generation of capitalist order. This generation of order takes place in the form of domination, the modalities of which are as follows

alternating in greater or lesser violence. A classic example of the use of illegal violence by the state to contain the substantive demands of the population is given in Foucault's book "Surveillance and Punishment" (2000, p. 232). After the French Revolution, the practice of using criminals to implement political repression of the dominated classes by the state changed its modality, becoming more complex and sophisticated. From the recruitment of delinquents to the implementation of surveillance policies based on illegal violence and subordinated almost directly to the police apparatus, it reinforces something akin to a "parallel urban and internal army" (Foucault, 2000, p.233). Having reached its peak after the 1848 Revolution, this type of elite delinquency (first recruiting, then acting outside its own legality) was competition with class delinquency (of another class), centred on the model of prison control and administration of this sector of exclusion of the dominated class (*id*).

For this complex form of control, the use of the judiciary acts on the economy of illegalities (as an element of exchange), and not necessarily as a parameter of what is legal or not. Thus, the justice system of the rule of law is an additional resource in the use of social control and not its limiting factor (Foucault, 2000 p.234). Moving on from Foucault's example, we propose the following general typifications of the use of violent resources as the political language of class society:

- Violence among the poor
- Violence against the poor (against the dominated class)
- Constant surveillance through social control (via the state and its parallels)

The full use of these resources of violence is one of the multiple forms of the complex political action that we are calling the Real Game, where the legal and moral bases constrain, but do not necessarily prevent, the action of the collective political agents of the ruling class. A basic definition of the Real Game is the use of all available resources, whether legal or illegal, of coercion or persuasion, without any kind of restriction on action, and operating at all levels where this collective agent has an impact (be they political, legal, economic, military-violent, ideological, etc.). In , in the economy of exchange of illegalities, just as there is an accumulation of

capital ( $K^{130}$ ), there is accumulation of the degree of punishment (or not, hence impunity). A classic case of this impunity is corruption itself as a factor of personal/collective accumulation, through the private appropriation of public resources used by the state. We can therefore see the following systematic practices in an expanded typification of the violence that exists in Brazil today as modalities of class domination:

- Violence as a monopoly of the State combined with tolerance of its parallel uses
- Systemic Violence (as a generator of capitalist order, Saint-Pierre, 2001)
- Violence perpetrated directly by the non-justice state (Pinheiro, 2000)
- Illegal and tolerated appropriation through personal loyalties (Bezerra, 1995, pp.184-186)
- Violent use of delinquency as a political resource for domination (Foucault, 2001)
- a counter-part of opposing force, Violence of political dissent by substantive demands of the dominated class, generating a choice of exit (Hirschman, 1973 ).

Since the beginning of this thesis, we have been saying that we see politics as a form of competition, with some constraining factors, but not necessarily impediments. When these forms of constraint diminish or are inhibited, we arrive at the Real Game, where the dispute of interests (clash) between collective agents often results in modes of warfare, such as the various forms of civil war, with or without class demands. Total competition is therefore the Real Game, with or without a legal basis of support or limitation<sup>131</sup>. In this respect, the work of Dreifuss (1993) develops and comments on the Real Game based on Weber's concepts of Politics, Power, State and Force as essential. In this book, Dreifuss brings Weber's idea that the "essence of politics" is *Kampf*, which can be translated as struggle, conflict, battle, combat,

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<sup>130</sup> Note: and we recognise here that there is no determining level of capital to be accumulated, it can be at least social, political or economic.

<sup>131</sup> Colombia today is a good example of what we are saying. The country is formally governed by the rule of law, but at the same time it is living in a civil war of a popular nature, with political agents of rupture controlling part of the territory, and this for exactly 40 years uninterrupted. For a good set of information on the Colombian situation and the history of the war, it is interesting to consult the official websites of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People's Army (FARC-EP, [www.farcep.org](http://www.farcep.org)) and the National Liberation Army - Camilista Union (ELN-UC, [www.eln-voces.com](http://www.eln-voces.com)). A good example of illegal and parallel violence tolerated by the state, in the same Colombian case, can be seen on the official website of the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC, [www.colombialibre.org](http://www.colombialibre.org)).

involvement, action, confrontation, competition, friction or war (Weber *apud* Dreifuss, 1993, p.62).

But we shouldn't see the idea of struggle and violence only as a physical clash, whether of domination, resistance or competition. According to Dreifuss (1993, p.64), Weber sees disputes and struggles as social relations, insofar as the action that takes place there is intentionally orientated, in order to impose the agent's own will against one or more forms of resistance from one or more of the agents involved (just as before). Deliberate requires planning, which in turn requires structures to carry it out. Violence and force are political resources and instruments (*id*, emphasis added), of institutions and agents with the capacity to use them; preferably in a systemic and non-spontaneous way. But violence and force are part of a range of similar resources, including persuasion, convincing, indoctrination and repression, all of which also belong or are related to the political level. The ability to impose force, or to generate latent and visible force, is an extended resource, with physical violence (impetuosity) being one way of manifesting force.

Observing the use of violent resources as one of the political languages, and adding to this the evidence of the impunity of the dominant elites, we see the theoretical impossibility of seeing the rule of law in Brazil today as a provider of justice. This is in addition to the fact that illegality is tolerated by the state itself towards its dominant elites and/or leaders; in addition to the fact that dominant collective political agents carry out various forms of illegality for economic appropriation (where the illegal use of public resources through misappropriation - corruption - is just one of several modalities).



## **Part II: The strategy analysis proposal applied to the Real Game through a political organisation with exchange intentions**

In this section, we will carry out an exercise in theoretical formulation, proposing a method of strategic analysis applicable to the model of political organisation whose main activity is the strategic objective described so far. This stage of the work represents an accumulation of formulation, exercise, practice, incidence and teaching in the area that has now completed seven uninterrupted years. From this point until the end of the chapter, the concepts are my own.

### **7.9. Fundamental categories for analysis and advocacy based on the proposed political organisation**

An analysis can be of the economic situation (at the moment), the medium and long term or any other type of analysis. But without stipulating which categories we use and consider important, we can't analyse anything. In a didactic and simplified way, we will list here the fundamental categories used in this work:

#### Historical Process:

Set of structural transformations, changes or alterations and the direction in which they are directed.

#### Stage:

A historical period with a short time span, characterised by some changes in certain social structures. What is defined are the tactical and/or strategic variables (of restricted time) in the historical process that different agents may be redirecting.

#### Considerations:

Depending on the stage of the system, according to its characteristics, a collective defines its action. The stage of the dominant agent is therefore important in defining the left with the intention of shifting. This is called strategic interaction.

The change of stage occurs when the social agents operating in society advance or retreat, on the offensive or defensive, but without changing the structure of domination. If the structure of society changes, then not only the stage has changed, but the historical process.

#### Structure:

They are the most consistent and stable parts of a social system. They are the forms that organise collective coexistence. That's why we can say that society is structured.

#### Conjuncture:

Manifestation of the structure, institutions and agents on it, in a given reality during a stipulated period of time (generally, conjunctural analyses are made at the exact moment in time). You can't analyse a cyclical scenario without necessarily calculating how long this analysis will be valid for (e.g. how long this scenario will remain unchanged).

#### Conjunctural Scenarios:

It's the moment we're living, but it's necessary to make a cut of reality in order to be able to interfere with it. there are at least 3 simultaneous cuts. One is the time frame, i.e. the period to which we are referring. We can say that the stipulated period of time can come from the planning itself (Very Short Term = 2 years; Short Term = 4/5 years; Medium Term = 8 to 10 years and Long Term = 12 to 16 years or more), or that we are analysing the conjuncture of the month, the bimester, the quarter and so . We can also say that we are analysing the planning of some other agent (it could be another political party, it could be an institution of domination), and then we use the time frame that this other agent has stipulated.

Another necessary cut-off point is geographical space. In other words, which terrain we are analysing. We can analyse the situation in a region of the metropolis (e.g. Restinga), or we can try to analyse Rio Grande do Sul, or even an analysis of the War against Iraq. You simply can't do politics outside of time and space, so these two sections are fundamental.

Conflict: Clash between social forces ( agents affecting social subjects = organised class sector or sectors) for control of one or more objects of dispute (targets, interests, spaces, something to be conquered). The objects can be very varied: money, natural resources, public opinion, food, energy, among others.

Power: This is the relationship behind structures. It is what builds structures and gives them stability and consistency. Power almost always originates from a relationship of conflict, so power is the act of imposing one agent's will and intentions on another. This imposition can generate resistance. The basic forms of power relations discussed in the document are:

#### exploitation vs. domination

The concept of *exploitation* refers to a reading that predominantly deals with the relationship between boss and worker / employer and employee. In other words, domination is read only in terms of the economic aspect. Today, we know, there are a number of social subjects - the unemployed, precarious and informal workers - who show that an economic reading of reality has been overcome.

Using the concept of *domination* goes beyond the economic level, as it considers it to be just one of several levels of domination. In other words, the category of exploitation is part of a broader category of domination.

#### power vs. oppression

Are power and oppression inseparable? In Hierarchical Power, yes. It expands as it generates dependence, alienation and economic exploitation. In Popular Power, no. Because it expands through free association, self-management and class independence.

Power almost always results from a situation of conflict and/or hegemony. Social forces with antagonistic interests vie for space. The one that most expands its social force to the detriment of the antagonistic social force is the one with Power. We can call them Dominant and Dominated, respectively. The Dominant currently remains in this

position by structuring the relationship of domination. To this end, institutions are created that aim to crystallise Power and, therefore, the position of social forces.

#### power and resistance

We believe that there is Power without Resistance, if we understand Resistance as not an individual, spontaneous, sporadic action, but rather the collective effort of one or more social agents that really constitutes a response to Power, a social force in dispute with the dominant social force. Therefore, we conclude that Power is an "imposition that can generate resistance", but that this doesn't necessarily happen.

Agents: These are the associations of people who have an impact on the political level (political agents) and the social-political level (social agents) in order to achieve their objectives and political wills in addition to their material interests. A broader idea can classify agents at various levels: social, political, military, economic, legal, religious, cultural, among others. These spheres or levels of analysis are not completely separate and the cut-off is only for intervention.

Social Subjects: These are the sectors and segments of the class as a whole. Within these, affecting the social subjects, are the agents who try to organise or control them.

Actor(s): They can act at various levels (e.g. political, social-political, military, etc.). They are the individuals who have the most impact from their individual/personal perspective. A classic example is a crystallised leadership, like a political boss.

### **7.10. Returning to the strategic concept applied to permanent social conflict (deadlines)**

With the map of the basic categories, an analysis tool is created (structural, therefore strategic), which includes the tactical plan (of the moment), allowing the conjuncture analyses to be made. Its raison d'être is none other than to understand and interfere with reality, whatever form it takes. If there are tools for analysis and operational capacity (however modest), there will be the possibility of interference. In the absence of the former, the capacity for action will have nothing to act on.

cannot accumulate power. If it doesn't have the latter, the analysis is reduced to an advisory role, with no autonomy to implement its own policy(ies).

The structural analysis and the intervention tool generate the strategic concept, which is the matrix of the levels of analysis. These are used to draw up the doctrine and its consequent use in reality in the short, medium and long term. These can be, for example

Short-term= 1 to 2 years      Medium-term= 5 years      Long term= 10 years

Or in the strategic planning of a electoral party, for example:

Short term = 4 years, the length of a term in office for the executive branch (municipal, state or federal); the same length of time applies to a legislature. The physiological interests and the appropriation of the Brazilian state take place for these purposes and through these instruments (the bourgeois-democratic mandates).

Medium term = 4 + 4 years, i.e. one re-election (e.g. two governments in a row by the same political and business group).

Long Term = 8 + 4 years, the most difficult and nerve-wracking, the power project where the successor is elected and the political and business group continues.

## 7.11 The incidence levels adopted in this Part II

Instead of adopting the same levels of analysis and interference applied by Golbery in his work - the military considered the political, economic, military and psychosocial levels (the last of which, according to the general, includes the media) - this paper will consider another set of levels of analysis. It cannot be emphasised enough that the concept of levels is something stipulated to help us operate on reality. There is no intention to be curious, to merely observe society (or to make conjectures that make no practical sense).

From this perspective, therefore, we consider these levels of incidence from the three spheres:

Political: related to the general levels of decision-making in a society; it is the level that analyses parties, governments, macro-organisations of the state and organised social forces (groups, organisations, within the institutional, political parties - left or right, with different variations, legal or not); the space of negotiations and confrontations the dominant and oppressed classes and arrangements.

Economic: related to the world of work, production and circulation of goods, products, wealth and services; it deals with the material conditions of development and existence of society itself and how the social product is shared or concentrated.

Military: related to the use of force, whether systematic or not, having to do with all levels of repression, violence in society and the possible confrontation of physical oppression, structures of domination and liberation/emancipation through the use of force.

Social: Related to all social institutions, the way of life in society, family existence, ties and bonds and perspectives; it also analyses forms of resistance or social collectivities (such as social movements and grassroots entities) and the social perspectives of a people's collective expressions. Some aspects of what is called culture, its associative form for example, apply to the social level. The same applies to religious manifestations (e.g. the subjective, the transcendent, the mystical would be the ideological and the social organisation of the religious phenomenon would belong to the social).

Ideological: relates to everything that circulates in the field of ideas, subjectivities, connotations that are not material, at the level of the symbolic and representations. It is part of what would be the collective unconscious and also what transcends the material. The feelings of religiosity, the world of utopias and the aspirations of the human being can be found at this level. The content of messages, the aesthetics and values contained in communication and culture are also at this level.

Law and Legal: related to the legal field and directly to the Judiciary; also forums, norms, regulatory bodies that sanction (e.g. litigation) and can define punishment within a society. Law should not necessarily be confused with the law, the defence with the lawyer and the normative agreement (e.g. a statutory basis) with the definition of laws.

## 7.12 The geographical cut-outs - the spaces and territories of incidence

The geographical sections we propose in this work are based on Latin America and the Caribbean as the maximum scenario for action. Let's take an example from a Brazilian city:

**Location** - neighbourhood or district of the municipality.

**Municipal** - the whole municipality.

**Microregional** - the set of municipalities in a given micro-region of a Brazilian state.

**State** - all the micro-regions of a state in the Brazilian republic.

**Regional** - the group of states that make up a region of the country (e.g. the Southern region is made up of Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina and Paraná).

**National** - the set of regions that comprise the member states of the Republic of Brazil.

**Regional-continental** - the set of countries that make up Latin America and the Caribbean (e.g. the so-called Southern Cone; Southern Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Argentina and Chile, the Andean Zone, Central America, the Legal Amazon and other Latin American and Caribbean regions).

**Continental** - the set of territories in which there are states in the geopolitical configuration known as Latin America and the Caribbean.

A possible continuum of cut-outs could be on sectors of the Latin American (and in our case, Brazilian) oppressed classes, categories of workers, metropolitan spaces (e.g. the levels applied in analysing Rio's favelas) and always with a temporal application, i.e. on time frames.

### 7.13 The basic concepts of time and motion. A conceptual map

Below is a short diagram to help you understand the concepts of time and movement:

Strategy - the science of conflict, of clashes of interests in a dispute/shock that can develop at all levels.<sup>132</sup>

Strategic interaction - it is assumed that there is no political will, or the will of the unilateral agent pure and simple. This occurs when two or more agents have some degree of equivalence and equalisation of forces.

Scale of importance and equivalence of analysis -

The Goal, being Finalist, is therefore inflexible.

The objective subordinates the method / Permanent, inflexible strategy is equivalent to the end activity, conditioned by the Finalist Objective.

The method restricts the usable variables / Time Strategy Restricted, inflexible for a certain period of time = end activity for a stipulated period of time.

Usable variables are contingent on interaction factors / Tactical variables, flexible for an even shorter period of time

Interacting factors imply other variables / Manoeuvres (tactics), flexible and applied in the very short term.

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<sup>132</sup> I recognise that I could go further, but this conceptual map is necessarily concise. I assume strategy from a Clausewitzian and Golbery do Couto e Silva point of view, and I also assume that strategy, if and when applied at the level of society, is the study of social conflicts (SILVA, 1981, p. 437).



In operational terms, the objective defines what is strategic. The strategy, in turn, defines the possible tactical variables. In classic military concepts, the objective provides the doctrinal frameworks that generate employment options. In a generic sense, the objective subordinates the method (and its concepts/tools considered valid), which in turn subordinates all forms of discourse (public or veiled) and the execution of its policies (intentions transformed into concrete actions).

Military example:

Objectives -- Doctrine -- Employment

General example (and applied to politics of revolutionary intent):

Objectives -- Method -- Application Variables

Ex of basic political theory:

Ideology (principles and aspirations) -- Doctrine (basic guidelines) --

--Theory (theoretical practice; only exists when hypotheses are applied in the real world)

In the affirmation of a permanent objective, ideological influence is always present (ideological level). It is on the basis of this influence that the premises (i.e. the prior bases) characteristic of these plans of action have manifested themselves on the social, political, economic and legal levels. Contrary to what may often appear, at state military level there is no such thing as "professionalism without patriotic ideology", without convincing the belligerent force of a way of life to fight for. If this doesn't manifest itself in the rank-and-file troops, the High Command is certainly convinced of it.

## **7.14 The idea of process and the accumulation of forces necessary for democratic radicalisation**

This emphasises the idea of process and not episode. The social process is permanent and systemic, and it is from there that the different antagonistic forces in a society operate. The visible or discrete landmarks of the conflict are manifest within the process in which it is inserted.

Starting from this idea of a long-term process, we have the same questions and hypotheses as the hegemonic institutions. We take as a premise that the process of social change that we want and understand as the only valid one has the popular movement (the people organised by interest, programme and defence) as the protagonist. The following questions therefore apply:

- Which categories of workers need to be organised? Which ones are already organised?

- Which have recent historical experience of struggle and which don't?
- Of those to be organised, which are under the hegemony of which trade union centre or sector of the movement (such as the MST) and which are not?

Obviously, these and the other questions are not exhaustive in themselves. They are a guide to the questions that need to be answered, and as soon as possible. The same type of question needs to be asked of the so-called social sectors, which are not necessarily organised as categories of workers. Starting from a few practical observations, we can see the valid answers. Let's take just two observations as examples:

This and other information is essential in order to compose a long-term process hypothesis. The question above is just an outline of the type of question to be answered. Once we have the information and real experience (on the social terrain that we want to organise), we can move on to the second stage, which is to start drawing up a long-term hypothesis. We start with what we see as already established needs, which can also be considered premises. With regard to organising for struggle, these are the premises revisited:

What is needed is a group of organising agents whose interests are irreconcilable with class society and exclusion. This is called a finalist political organisation. Therefore, without a political organisation with the intention of building a process of change (one or more), there is no possibility.

There can only be a process of Democratic Radicalisation, allowing for a profound social change through the long-term accumulation of forces (Popular Power) with the organised people. The protagonism of the people in struggle is fundamental. Political organisations must drive the people's struggles forward, going beyond their immediate needs. Therefore, without a popular movement that is combative at all six levels of influence, there is no possibility of a process and accumulation.

In order to win the support of the majorities, it is essential that all the political organisations and popular movements (the people organised within the limits of

In this way, the hegemony of the intention of People's Power implies social insertion into the social and productive fabric, increasing stocks of social capital in horizontal relations. Therefore, the hegemony of the intention of Popular Power implies social insertion into the social and productive fabric, increasing the stock of social capital in horizontal relations.

From the forms of popular organisation, still from the angle of struggle and confrontation, we move on to some certainties learned from the history of the continent. Considering that protest is part of the popular struggle, but has the function of supporting the struggle (see Copei, FAU document), we take as a premise that:

- 1) If there is a deviation and a determination of excessive conflict (militarist or movementist), the accumulation process is stillborn.
- 2) Only the accumulation of forces on the part of organised social agents can define the degree of majority support.
- 3) There is no predictability in the level of repression to be undertaken by the operators of the ruling class. If we take into account the level of repression in a representative democracy, the scenarios are predictable, although not predetermined.
- 4) What is needed is a group of popular movements making demands on the state and building complementary and parallel alternatives to it. The responsiveness or otherwise of the state is what marks the stage in the process of democratic radicalisation. In the expansion of rights, we must move towards exercising a form of democracy without professional representation. For this to happen, it is essential to have the influence and insertion of finalist political organisations within the constituted movements. Otherwise, there is no strategic planning that can survive the short-term demands of the sector. This is the way to generate a long-term struggle and process.

## 8. CONCLUSIONS OF THE THESIS

### 8.1. The exposition of the intrinsic part through the chapters

I begin this conclusion by returning to the two theorems I set out when I explained the intrinsic part of the Theory of Structural Interdependence applied to analysing the role of Political Organisation in the Process of Democratic Radicalisation.

Theorem 1 states that: "**The application of strategy makes social conflict possible through popular struggle.** Without a finalist political organisation, there is no possibility of a permanent strategy, so there is no strategic planning and no strategic concept. The reverse is also true.

Throughout the thesis, the arguments that lead to this conclusion are explained. Particularly in chapters 4 and 7, the application of the political organisational instrument, the accumulation of forces and the conception of process and protagonism from and in which this organisation operates and the strategic concept employed were respectively substantiated.

Theorem 2 states that: "**Popular struggle builds Democratic Radicalisation and accumulates Popular Power.** Democracy becomes substantive to the extent that it serves as an organisational value in the accumulation and coordination of forces by majorities (Popular Power) and progress in the conquests of rights, redistributions, sovereignty, guarantees and freedoms are achieved through organised social conflict."

Chapters 5 and 6 are dedicated to and emphasise the concept of applied democracy, starting from what can be considered the commonplace in political science, and the constraints suffered by the same concept applied by different democratic currents and interpretations.

The propositions of the intrinsic part of the theory are concentrated in chapters 2 and 3, where I explain the cross-cutting nature of ideology, position-taking and the sense of identity. I explain why the category of ideology is not seen as a falsification of reality, but just the opposite. The category of ideology is present as a raw material in every analyst's product and affects any product of strategic or symbolic analysis.

## **8.2. Answering the two central questions**

The answer to both questions can be found in the explicit part of the thesis, when the work presented the theoretical tools needed to analyse and influence the demands for popular participation in their respective areas of activity. The most important relationship is the incidence of an active minority organisation, from and from the so-called popular movement, generating organised collective action in the form of mobilisation and self-organising capacity. A different kind of relationship between organisation and movement occurs when the political party's form of intermediary representation is broken. This party of cadres operates outside or beyond the institutional framework and its accumulation and capillarity are not measured by the number of votes or electoral rolls, but by the degree of impact it has on society as a whole.

The expansion of democracy as a universal form of rights, achievements and guarantees is shown here in a format that goes beyond procedural barriers. It is understood that the representative democracy practised in Latin America gains stability, but loses its substantive element as it finds itself under a completely adverse format of (neoliberal) capitalism. The given situation generates minimal room for manoeuvre within the institutional parameters. Thus, by acting within the structural constraints of the world economy, its funding and regulatory bodies, politics is directed towards the consequent procedural limitation of Latin American democracies.

Acting beyond the institutional framework under an active minority conception implies that democracy among the organisational forms of the oppressed classes is an invaluable asset. This conception leads to the need to build a non-state space and the necessary infrastructure to guarantee the development of this organisation.

another growing institutionality within the present one. For this popular space - conceptualised as the oppressed classes organising their subjects through the actions of social agents under the direct influence of the organised minority - to be effective as a way of institutionalising horizontal social relations, it depends on increasing the stock of social capital in the territories and class sectors organised within the space itself. The material and non-material bases of this stock of social capital must go hand in hand with a participatory institutional design, enabling an increase in participation and the capacity to solve problems and concrete solutions for a section of society. The levels of popular participation are directly related to the degree of protagonism of the organised sectors themselves and start with tangible instances, which begin on a micro scale and, once condensed and reproduced, become universal.

The counterpoint to increased participation are the forms of social control within the democratic regime. Participatory pressure forcing the state to become responsive can lead to the state's limits under a system of capitalist domination. To study control, we work with the category of domination. We understand this to be a category that encompasses the categories of exploitation, physical oppression, social exclusion and technical-bureaucratic domination. Based on these fundamental categories, a process of accumulation of popular forces has been formulated, where efforts from different levels come together: - political; social-political and social. These concentric circles, strategically coordinated, can lead to a Radicalisation of Democracy, to the point of achieving a process of dual power (People's Power) that can lead to a situation of institutional rupture.

### **8.3. The application and expansion of the strategic concept centred on the activation of politics**

Throughout the work, we point to a rapprochement between the structuralist episteme, the anarchist ontological dimension and the analytical dimension of strategic studies. This theoretical and epistemological arsenal is applied as a conceptual tool based on a given objective: the construction of an organisational model and a political process in which the struggle for demands takes on the contours of democratic radicalisation, forcing the state to be responsive and at the same time accumulating organised social force. This is one aspect of

study of the same relationship seen as an object. The complex relationship is political organisation - popular movement - organised civil society - democratic radicalisation - organised people's power.

At no point have we exhausted the possibilities and needs for other types of work and study, such as a specifically institutionalist approach to predictively point out a political design that takes into account this multiplicity of representations within a distributist society. What we did point to was a proposal for the hard core of a theory centred on the object of politics and political science: the power relations between institutions, environments and individuals. In this work, although it is a recognised sub-field of political science, strategic analysis loses its centrality and enters as a support for political action.

This is because these are the needs seen in order to build a theory of the accumulation of forces, through the expansion of democracy in a substantive way, with the possibility of rupture based on libertarian ideology and doctrine applied to the Latin American social terrain. It also necessary to know and interpret with precision and rigour how the society of control works, the daily resistances and aspirations of the collective unconscious.

As a daily operational mode, it's necessary to point this out: grassroots  
resistance  
accumulation of forces by the organised people  
People's Power project through Democratic Radicalisation

Once this is understood on a basis, this process needs to follow the following accumulation logic if it is to be :

Flexible enough to withstand changes in circumstances (applying tactical variables).  
Inflexible enough to maintain strategic interests and objectives.



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## **Composite Annex of Demonstrative Graphs**

### Sequential listing of graphics

- 1) Situation analysis model - sections and relationships
- 2) Situation analysis model - basic sections
- 3) Strategic analysis model - basic concepts
- 4) Basic strategy orientation applied to politics
- 5) Basic orientation of the democratic radicalisation process towards the accumulation of forces for popular empowerment
- 6) Types alliance and strategic orientation within the framework of a political project
- 7) Strategic analysis - model for evaluating the effects of the political fact
- 8) Political analysis model - social subjects
- 9) Political analysis model - agents and subjects in the complex scenario
- 10) Political analysis model - permanent themes
- 11) Concentric circles of political organisation
- 12) Political analysis model - collective agents
- 13) Preconditions for stable organic growth
- 14) Political organisation on social fronts
- 15) Political analysis: calculations, possibilities, times and movements
- 16) Political analysis: basic debate of everyday activities